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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
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By

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TO THE MEMORY OF
GRANVILLE STANLEY HALL
(1846-1924)

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PREFACE

This volume is intended for students who are beginning the study of social psychology. As the title indicates it is an introduction to social psychology. This work has grown out of the author's experience in teaching this particular phase of psychology to undergraduates. The volume attempts to supply what the author feels is a genuine need, namely, a survey of leading problems that in one form or another have engaged the attention of students in this field. Social psychology, in some respects the most important of all psychologies, is characterized by an indefiniteness of both subject-matter and method unknown in any other branch of science. These two leading problems comprehend all others. As long as the student is ignorant of their origin, he can be only a reader of books. As long as they remain indefinite, he may be expected to become a learner of this or that aspect of social psychology without becoming in any real sense a student.

The nature of social psychology is such that it cannot in its present stage of development be known without recourse to its history. For this reason considerable space has been given to historical considerations. The close relation of social psychology to sociology, history and anthropology is sufficient reason for pursuing it from a historical point of view.

Social psychology on the other hand is a living subject. For this reason the student should be taught to discover it in the daily lives of communities and individuals. The major illustrations in the text are generally presented at length for the purpose of illustrating methods of study. It is the author's conviction that in the study of social psychology, class room discussions may be conveniently supplemented by the study of concrete cases. Students should be required to make detailed reports of specific social situations. In this respect the teacher of social psychology is especially favored—his laboratory is all about him. He cannot escape it even if he would; his very

class room with its members is a living workable laboratory. In fact the work for a whole semester of laboratory instruction need not extend beyond the college campus.

Numerous cross references have been made throughout. While these may appear unnecessary repetitions (and they certainly are for those familiar with the subject) they are made deliberately in order to emphasize certain fundamental aspects, or to illustrate their application in different connections, or still again to show their limitations. These aspects could not conveniently be shown at once, so it seemed best to treat them with as much sympathy as possible in one connection, and to show their relative worth in comparison with other aspects in another connection. In some places this method of treatment has amounted almost to contradictions of principles themselves. Reference is made especially to the separate treatments of the two fundamental questions of subject-matter and method, which are frequently discussed. The author feels that they are still unsettled questions and that they should finally be grasped as such by the student who has been kept in mind throughout. To use a structural analogy, the problems of subject-matter and method are the foundation materials or corner stones of the edifice of social psychology; these materials are quarried from many separate deposits: biology, anthropology, sociology, economics, history, theology, etc.

The reader will in all probability feel that whereas several questions are raised, none are answered. The object of this study is to state problems, not to answer them; to point out the way to solutions, not to make them. In the field of social psychology, particularly, dogmatism implied or asserted has dominated too completely. The author's attitude in regard to the problems, while disconcerting to students, especially beginners in social psychology to whom the work is primarily addressed, cannot be avoided. The reason is obvious: at the present time there is no answer for most of the questions. There has been as yet very little reliable experimental work done in social psychology. This work must await definitely stated problems; social situations must first be defined; human reactions must be observed under controlled conditions. Until this is done on a larger scale, social psychologies must remain as they are today,—bundles of theories discussed pro and con, descriptions of social events, arrays of vital, economic or political statistics, discussions about social institu-

tions, metaphysical disputes about mind and matter, etc., etc. The big problem is to draw some line, if possible, around phenomena that may be called social and to separate these, for purposes of study, from phenomena that are only partly social.

It may be that the subject-matter represented in these chapters will one day be known as two divisions of science: (1) group psychology which studies aggregates in reference to culture, and (2) social psychology which studies individuals and aggregates in reference to definite periods during which social interaction is going on. The former will in turn be studied under many heads: (1) the psychology of religion, (2) the psychology of war, (3) the psychology of art, (4) the psychology of industry, etc.

The pedagogy of social psychology is yet to be discovered. There is no text that adequately portrays the methods that should be used in conducting courses in this subject. If this volume assists in clearing the field, it will have accomplished the author's aim: to provide a general view of the problems which social scientists have regarded as important. The student should have on hand for frequent reference: Allport's *Social Psychology*, McDougall's *Group Mind*, Tozzer's *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, Lindeman's *Social Discovery*, Dunlap's *Social Psychology*, Ellwood's *Human Society*, Bernard's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Thomas' *Environmental Basis of Society*, Williams' *Principles of Social Psychology*, and Ginsberg's *Psychology of Society*. Znaniecki's *Laws of Social Psychology*, a difficult work indeed to read, contains a wealth of suggestions. In order to provide the students with the materials for an orientation to this vast and increasing body of literature, it has seemed best to select such references as may be collected for a reserve shelf. The present volume therefore is a mere guide to the study.

In the preparation of this work, the author has been stimulated principally by his students whose bewilderment during class room discussions has indicated the difficulties that confront the beginning student of social science. From the professional point of view, he is indebted to Dr. Mollie Ray Carroll and Dr. Ivan E. McDougall of the department of social science in Goucher College, and Dr. E. T. Devine formerly of the Columbia University faculty of Political Science, now Dean of the graduate school of American University. Acknowledg-

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J. W. S.

Annapolis, January 1, 1927.

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

GENERAL STATEMENT

A survey of the development of the sciences of psychology and sociology and their separate contributions is basic for an understanding of social psychology. A very brief account is here attempted. While it may be said that social psychology is something of a compound, the statement should not be taken too literally. The term mixture rather than compound is a more descriptive expression; social psychology may be likened to a mixture to which have been added from time to time ingredients from every field of science. The mixing has been going on for centuries. It is only in recent years that a history of social psychology has been developed to assist in the classification and appraisal of social theories.¹ In fact the history of the development of social psychology as such, shows that it has been passing through the same phases as have its parent stems, though admittedly less telescopically, and as a consequence more rapidly and less connectedly. Social psychology, therefore, like all other sciences has had its theoretical and scientific developmental stages. The latter stage is just beginning to make headway.² There was a lengthy pre-history of gropings toward a science of social psychology before its claim to a separate department of classified knowledge was recognized as such. Even at the present time one should not hastily conclude that there is a distinct science of social psychology. Social psychology in general keeps in close contact with knowledge of human institutional and cultural development on the one hand, and with that pertaining to individual psychology on the other.

¹ For an excellent review of this subject see Barnes, H. E., *The New History and the Social Studies*.

² See especially Dewey, John, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 266-277; Kroeber, A. L., *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23, pp. 633-650; Hall, G. Stanley, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 18, pp. 613-621.

Each basic accretion or discovery in these fields of knowledge promotes a change in the conception of human destinies, human nature, or human needs, and these in turn modify existing institutions or gradually replace them with new ones. Modification rather than replacement is more accurately descriptive. In the light of metaphysics, jurisprudence, biology, economics, or psychology, social psychology came in turn to center around the potency of ideas, contracts, organisms, distribution of wealth, or some basic instinct.

THE FOUNDERS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Attempting a more specific orientation to social psychology in the making, we may conveniently turn to the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Working along somewhat different lines of study, they concurred in the assumption of a spiritual principle directing human destinies; for the former it was a "folk-soul" conceived as an emanation from or embodiment of a World-Spirit. This background is reflected in the work of Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) and Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899), who are usually spoken of as the founders of the science of social psychology.³ But it is just as difficult to designate the founders of social psychology as it is to trace the history of the various sciences that contribute to it. Much depends upon the particular bias of a given interpreter of the history of this new science. Finding his basic theory anticipated in the writings of Adam Smith (1723-1790), F. H. Giddings⁴ assigns the beginnings of social psychology to him. H. E. Barnes⁵ with a strong political bias, tells us that Walter Bagehot (1826-1877) was the founder of social psychology, for his *Physics and Politics* (1873) was the first great modern psychological interpretation of social processes and institutions. Knight Dunlap⁶ says William McDougall was the first psychologist to write a text on social psychology. This would place the formal beginning of the new science as late as 1908, when McDougall's *Social Psychology* appeared. Finally, E. S. Bogardus⁷ mentions David Hume

³ Ginsberg, M., *The Psychology of Society*, p. ix.

⁴ *Principles of Sociology*.

⁵ *The New History and The Social Studies*, p. 154.

⁶ *Old and New Viewpoints in Psychology*, p. 83.

⁷ *Essentials of Social Psychology*, pp. 20 and 22.

(1711-1776) as the reputed founder of social psychology because of his theory of imitation. At the same time he mentions E. A. Ross as the first American writer. In a way Ross goes back to Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) who like Hume emphasized the psychology of imitation.⁸

Lazarus and Steinthal established in 1860 a periodical⁹ devoted to the study of folk psychology and philology. Their purpose was "to discover the laws which come into operation wherever the many live and act as one." Their avowed method was "direct observation." Their purpose and method as stated are justification for the assumption that they are the originators of this new science. "In the course of the nineteenth century great interest was developed in man, in his condition and activities. Naturally it was observed that laws, customs, myths, religions, and language, in short, all of what we have since learned to call institutional phenomena, though connected with individual psychological activities are still independent of them. Language, custom, myth, etc., while indubitably human phenomena are nevertheless independent of and prior to human individuals, and develop from age to age. From the pressure arising from such problems arose the conception of the folk-soul or mind (*Volkseele*) and the science of social psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*)."¹⁰ Regardless of where and when social psychology as such began, the Lazarus and Steinthal program of direct observation is in keeping with the spirit of modern philosophical thought and scientific procedure as well. Moreover, their folk soul theory,¹¹ notwithstanding certain objections that may be offered to it, has been a rather persistent one in the history of social science. The latest books on social psychology¹² show traces of the program that they instituted.

Mention should be made of the work of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), another German representative of the early stages of the new science. For Wundt, sociology deals with language, custom and myth. In this he shows his sympathetic connections with Lazarus and Steinthal, although he departed widely from them in theory

⁸ See page 17.

⁹ *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*.

¹⁰ Kantor, J. R., *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 285-286.

¹¹ See Chapter V.

¹² See especially McDougall, Wm., *The Group Mind*.

and method. It was with Wundt that the question of method first began to take critical form as a part of the now growing subject of social psychology.

Recent significant advances in the domain of anthropology and the reconstruction of theories therefrom, bridge the work of Wundt with modern social sciences, forecasting a newer synthesis for which the term "andrology"¹³ is proposed. If this appraisal is correct, we are by no means ready to say that social psychology is firmly established as a separate science. It means that the development of the science from the standpoint of its subject matter is not as yet complete.

EMERGENCE OF GROUP MIND THEORIES¹⁴

The earlier writers of social psychology generally found use for the conception of a group mind. This assumption was no doubt reinforced by natural inferences from observation, when once the study of society was seriously undertaken; observations were centered upon the institutional and differential aspects of peoples in different regions. Psychology, moreover, had not as yet entirely abandoned the idea of "faculties" and these suggested a counterpart for collective psychology. Still again, the phenomena of mere temporary aggregates, such as crowds, mobs and revolutions, became the earlier objects of study; they were readily accessible.

It may be worth while to call attention to one of the historical peculiarities of some aspects of psychology; it is the tendency to extend the inquiries from observation of the abnormal. Within the last quarter of a century this has been particularly true. Mental measurement, which is now regarded as a perfectly legitimate branch of normal psychology, began with attempts to study the retarded; psychoanalysis began with the study of hysteria; social psychology began with the unusual social situations, or again with racial peculiarities. But what has just been called the unusual in reference to the origin of studies in these and other fields of knowledge should be interpreted as the seeking after knowledge for the purpose of human adjustments rather than as an interest in what is merely spectacular.

¹³ Evans, R. T., *The Aspects of the Study of Society*, p. 11.

¹⁴ These theories will be discussed as a unit in Chapter V.

J. L. Tayler¹⁵ thinks that the originator of crowd psychology was a relatively unknown Scottish observer, John Dunlop, who published two studies between 1830 and 1840. Dunlop laid down what he called the laws of association which would explain what seemed to him "the universal tendency in mankind." Sir Francis Galton in his epoch-making *Inquiries into the Human Faculty* which appeared in 1883, found use for the term "herd" as applied to human associations. Whatever value may be attached to these earlier conceptions of a group mind, it may be said that Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Gustave Le Bon (1841-) between 25 and 30 years ago firmly established the theory. Other writers who at various times have contributed to the establishment of the theory should be mentioned: Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Alfred Espinas (1844-1922) and perhaps to a less extent Tarde, McDougall and Giddings.

The various theories of the group mind would make a volume. It will suffice here to say that this question in some form or other has constituted one of the chief concerns of many writers. Of late, there has been, as in the case of F. H. Allport¹⁶ a complete denial of anything approaching a group mind, for "if we take care of the individuals, psychologically speaking, the groups will be found to take care of themselves." Morris Ginsberg¹⁷ likewise rejects such theories but at the same time finds among the people who constitute a group, certain common mental elements due to hereditary structure, racial traits and the like. Common traditions both intellectual and moral give rise to sentiments so that the people of a given group may come to have a sense of loyalty for one another. An individual can be loyal to a group as well as to an individual. Social groups may therefore be as real as individuals. He concludes that there is some plausibility for such theories, although they have frequently been conceived in an altogether too metaphysical sense.

DIFFERENTIAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Much of the literature bearing upon the science of social psychology directly and indirectly belongs to differential social psychology—a comparative study of the psychology of races and peoples. Differ-

¹⁵ *Social Life and the Crowd*, p. 130.

¹⁶ *Social Psychology*, p. 9.

¹⁷ *The Psychology of Society*, p. 68.

ential psychology is not, as might at first appear, a question of subject matter merely. It came into being partly by virtue of classification of human social phenomena; in this sense methods of study have played an important part in segregating certain phenomena; that these phenomena should in turn be regarded as discrete elements of human nature, belonging to certain races or developmental stages alone, is to a certain degree to be laid at the door of hasty generalization. Psychology of every kind may be studied segmentally. By this we mean the breaking up of an entire series of connected phenomena for the purpose of throwing light upon its elements one at a time. Thus it comes that while we may have a psychology of perception, of attention, and of imagery, they should finally be studied synthetically with sensation from which these specific processes are ultimately derived. Just so in race psychology; the facts, let us say, of Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic race traits should be studied also as whole-human traits. At this point it will be well to keep in mind a fundamental principle: subject-matter and methods of studying it cannot be divorced.

One of the advocates of race psychology, Le Bon, holds that races may be classified psychologically as well as anatomically; that differentiation in psychical traits bespeaks racial superiority or inferiority in terms of intellectual and moral traits that are in turn responsible for all that goes to make up what he calls the "racial soul." The soul of a people is referred to a racial past which he believes is far more important than the social conditions at any given time in appraising national stability.¹⁸ The search for causes of racial differences early led to speculation about climate, giving rise to the so-called environmentalist or anthropogeographical school.

Thomas Buckle (1821-1862) in England and Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) in Germany were among the first to grapple with the problems of race and climate. Passing over the minor differences among the supporters of the environmentalist philosophy, their position may be stated as follows: national and race traits are due to the influence of climate and general geographical conditions. The operation of these forces over long periods of time results in the

¹⁸ Alfred Korzybski in *The Manhood of Humanity* has given a very extreme exposition of cultural inheritance from his interest in the philosophy of man as a "time-binding" animal.

establishment of differential traits which when crystallized tend to remain constant through inheritance. From such studies a number of correlations between geographical location of races and race traits were produced. The first distinction was between "central" (i.e., continental) and "marginal" races.¹⁹ The latter are regarded as the older races of the earth; at the same time they are primitive. Physical anthropology recognizes certain physical traits as race criteria: cephalic index, nasal index, nathism, structure of hair, color of eyes, color of skin, etc. In recent years these various physical criteria are receiving less consideration as factors in race differentiation, although the cephalic index is still supposed to be valid.²⁰ Lately cultural factors are coming to be the chief consideration for race differences. Griffith Taylor has attempted some general correlations between head shapes and cultural products, which Ellsworth Huntington approves as a step in the formulation of laws.²¹

Differential psychology assumes that our national, international and world problems must be solved in the light of this comparative knowledge of the psychological abilities of nations and their certain destinies, racially considered.²² Such theories seem at times the product of pure speculation on the part of alarmists; in the first place it can be shown that such studies characteristically make their appearance just when great wars are at their height, or when national feeling has arisen by virtue of economic rivalry. The famous *Les Allemands* of Pater Didon (1884) following the German successes of 1870, is an example. Numerous books have appeared in different countries at just such times; a nation's real or fancied difficulties with other nations provoke the recurring question of honor or special ability.²³

It is hard to say just what the effect of this class of literature is or may become. When one reflects upon the tendency of the masses to read indiscriminately, to believe anything and everything that happens to be in print, and moreover when one takes into consideration

¹⁹ Marginal races are isolated races; they live in out of the way places as mountainous regions, inaccessible islands.

²⁰ Taylor, Griffith, *The Geographical Review*, Vol. 8, pp. 289-328.

²¹ *The Character of Races*, p. 79.

²² See Grant, Madison, *The Passing of the Great Race*.

²³ For a good American study, see Perla, Leo, *What is National Honor?*

the powerful emotional appeal such nonsense has, and the use that designing politicians, big and little, make of it in securing and maintaining office, the future looks rather dark. It may require a generation or longer to eradicate the mistaken notions about race which many otherwise sober people now hold.

The idea of inherent racial dispositions has received some confirmation from biological quarters. It is hard for any scientist, no matter how objective his working data may be, to refrain from philosophical indulgences which lead to highly speculative and even fantastic conclusions. Perhaps the most radical of these biologists is A. E. Wiggam²⁴ from whom we quote without comment.

Nations can not progress to any high standards of social life, gentility and polish, nor to any ordered working of political institutions, without a homogeneous national mind, a common racial outlook, similar cultural traditions, common language and literature. In short, there must be a national like-mindedness, which is the outcome of biological like-mindedness, inner similarity or physiopsychological organization. The fact, as witnessed by the writer, that during the great Dayton, Ohio, flood, many of the foreigners of lower cultures, and doubtless of inferior racial make-up, had to be forced to clean the mud from their beds and houses at the point of the bayonet, is a poignant national reminder. This has a world political significance. Those who recklessly think the mining of a few more tons of coal, or the manufacture of a few more pounds of steel, is worth this price have reckoned in dollars instead of national character. This lowering of the bars of our American development which was rapidly trending toward unique, picturesque national individuality in art, politics, social life, education, folkways, speech and literature has probably robbed us forever of our manifest destiny. We had clearly before us to become a greater Greece, a grander Rome, a more puissant England with a still nobler influence. We are the children of these cultures and should enrich them. With wise statesmanship, we may do it yet, but you have thus infinitely delayed such a consummation.

A second somewhat less speculative theory, opposite to Wiggam's, is brought forth by G. F. Nicolai²⁵ who maintains that nations are in certain fundamental biological particulars like plants and animals. There is a limit to the amount of structural differentiation that a given species may attain. After this limit is reached, decadence sets in and the species may become extinct; it has utilized its inherent growth impulse; its basic physical mechanism will refuse to function.

²⁴ *The New Decalogue of Science*, pp. 227-228.

²⁵ *The Biology of War*.

There is according to this view a certain human cycle of development which nationally considered, bespeaks a period of ultimate decadence and even extinction. The final interpretation that must be drawn from Nicolai's argument amounts to a warning to those who place stress upon the inherent qualities of race.

The supposed superiority of the Nordic race has resulted in propaganda tending to influence the regulation of immigration. Leading anthropologists are inclined to treat the question as a myth. They do not discover a racial variation of any fundamental psychological importance.²⁶

While it is true that immediately following periods of inter-group struggle, there is always a fresh crop of literature having to do with the supposed superiority of different races, it is also true that such literature succeeds in directing the attention of scientists to its claims. At no previous time have the scientists been so well equipped to study these supposed differential traits as at the present time, and while these methods are by no means accurate even now, they are sufficient to show how such problems may be solved. The methods referred to are the so-called "intelligence tests" which became popular in selecting men for various duties in the army. It was during the late war that the group tests were first perfected; since then they have been widely used in comparative studies of the intelligence of various groups. In this wise a new science sometimes called "mental anthropology" is being rapidly perfected; it is beginning to throw light upon the opposed suppositions that racial traits are "static," and that racial traits are "mobile." So far the results of the several kinds of tests indicate that mobility in race traits is beyond doubt; from this general conclusion it is easy to assume that the science of eugenics may in the near future play an important rôle in promoting conscious evolution.²⁷

At the same time the environmentalist philosophy has gradually become the basis for further elaboration, especially along the line of economics. This narrower aspect of environment was singled out by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who applied the environmentalist philosophy literally and specifically. In so doing they committed the

²⁶ Dixon, R. B., *The Racial History of Man*.

²⁷ Garth, T. R., *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 23, pp. 240-245.

usual error of the enthusiast—that of attempting to reduce complexity to simplicity.

THE CULTURAL PRODUCT THEORY

Other theories of social psychology center around a revival of interest in anthropology. They are what may be called cultural product theories. Customs, mores, traditions, convention and even the extremely transient affairs as styles and fads have their psychological meaning. In some respects it is a good theory to account for the behavior of groups and their several interests. Chapter VII will consider this theory in some detail.

EARLY SOCIAL THEORIES BASED ON ORGANIZATION

The various theories of social psychology cannot be adequately considered apart from social theories. A careful survey of present day literature reveals the fact that they have grown out of sociology. It is therefore worthwhile to call attention to this influence, although it will be impossible to give more than a very brief account.

The social contract theories

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in his famous *Leviathan* attempted to bolster up the waning power of the Stuart kings by determining the origin of sovereignty. To this end he arrived at the conclusion that there was an original social compact between the king and the people and that this compact freed the people from the insecurity of a state of nature wherein war was the chief occupation. The sovereign maintains his place by force, rather than by consent. Nevertheless the people lose nothing, for a government of this sort is superior to anarchy which is the theoretical outcome of popular government.

John Locke (1632–1704), on the contrary, recognized a peaceful “state of nature,” which however was unsatisfactory because there was no recognized authority. He proposed that the people contract with the king, submitting to certain social restraints in exchange for certain civil liberties. The sovereign maintains his position by virtue of the consent of the people and may be removed from office in accordance with the will of the people.

A third form of the contract theory was that of Rousseau who

maintained that everything deteriorated at the hands of man. The "golden age" was a state of nature. Natural liberty might be transformed into civil liberty, by the formation of an association to protect the rights and property of each. In this way he supposed that the individual might remain as free as in the original state of nature and at the same time enjoy a protection not afforded in nature. The king, according to this theory was merely an agent of the people who were the real rulers.

According to Hegel who advanced another metaphysical theory of social organization, social evolution was a matter of progressive stages in individual freedom. At first, the king only was free; later the circle widened giving rise to an aristocracy; finally the freedom was extended to all. The Hegelian theory came in time to form the basis for struggles for "natural rights," which are of course metaphysical presuppositions.²⁸

The social contract theory, chiefly of interest as an historical example of social theories entering social science, illustrates the metaphysical ideas once regnant in social philosophy. Nevertheless these metaphysical notions are closer to us than it is sometimes supposed. The Mayflower Covenant is an example, as is the Constitution of the United States which begins with a preamble: "We the people." Our whole social philosophy even today appears to recognize some large body within the state. It is not surprising therefore that psychologists see in society a social consciousness or group mind. The chief criticism of the contract theory and of all social mind theories, as well, lies in the assumption that society may be controlled by reason emanating from the minds of the people as a whole. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Pure democracy is dangerous in the hands of ignorance. Students of social science are rapidly losing faith in that popular notion usually expressed by politicians that the people are good judges of what they need, what they want, etc. Again, many modern students of social science are coming to see that the larger society is really far away from the interests of the people; that society is after all a congerie of groups which represent interests lying close to their daily lives; that the struggles in society today result in compromises creating a status of changing and temporary balance of

²⁸ For a critique of metaphysical theories see Hobhouse, L. T., *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*.

forces generated by group interests. The mission of social psychology is therefore that of determining the behavior of groups through an analysis of the mental processes involved in group interests. We shall see, as we proceed, however, that this statement must be modified in certain particulars.

The organic theory

Metaphysical theories of the social order must necessarily fail in their application because they are fundamentally non-sociological. Rousseau's theory was perhaps in part at least responsible for the French Revolution. At any rate, shortly after this great social calamity there came a reaction in social philosophy in the form of the organic theory; this theory was stimulated by the development of the biological sciences and came to the climax of its popularity with Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). It is by no means an outworn theory however. We may state its tenets and modernness at once by quoting from Dunlap²⁹ as follows:

Just as the organization of individual cells makes up the complex animal, so does the same sort of organization of insects and animals (bees, wolves, or men) make up a still higher individual, the swarm, the pack, or social group. The relation between a man and the constituent cells in his organism is precisely like that between the highly trained army division and its constituent men, except that in the animal body, there are no commanding cells, but the whole is organized as an intricate republic.

The organic theory has served a splendid purpose in bringing into sharp relief the objections to the contract theory, but it will never answer for social organization. At best it is a description rather than an explanation. It does state the fact that in social life, one individual is related to all the others. But is an individual related to the others in the complete sense in which cells are related in a plant or animal? Even cursory observation shows that an individual may be related to the individuals in different groups at the same time; or again two individuals may be related in one social group and totally unrelated in another. The organic theory can be thought of only in the most general way. It cannot be applied with anything approaching the rigorousness that Dunlap suggests. It is open to the same objection

²⁹ *Elements of Scientific Psychology*, p. 171.

that was offered to the contract theory, viz., it attempts to state a unity in society that does not actually exist. Moreover the organic theory in the hands of extremists tends to set up a social order that takes too little account of the psychology of individuals. As Ellwood says,³⁰ this "theory has played too much into the hands of social conservatives and absolutists."

The popular objection to the organic theory of society is concerned with the sensorium that constitutes the basis of mind. It is contended that the social mind has no sensorium. It is possible to say however that the social sensorium consists of social interactions, social institutions and other manifestations of social differentiations and functions. Upon this basis there is no objection to the use of the organic theory.³¹ But even admitting this distinction, there is a danger in extending the process of analogous reasoning too far. Outright analogies possess no virtue save figurative expression. The organic theory beginning with Aristotle and copied or enlarged upon by St. Paul, Nicolas of Cues, Hobbes, Spencer and Schäffle, in turn, is one of the most subtle of formal delusions in social science.³²

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

We have noted that philosophical conceptions have accompanied the development of social psychology. Philosophy is not only a trail-blazing discipline, but a guide to the evaluation of scientific findings. It is hard to over-estimate the influence of such men as Comte, Hegel, Darwin, Spencer, Tarde, Wundt, James, Bergson and Dewey. The men to whom we turn as most directly connected with the present study are Comte, Darwin, Tarde, Bergson and Dewey. Even this brief survey of the philosophical background of social psychology cannot ignore some mention of their respective contributions.

A word should perhaps be said in defense of the philosophical references made in this connection and in general for all such references appearing in this study. The writer would gladly dispense with all philosophy if it were possible to do so and at the same time give a reasonable account of the subject treated. If space permitted several

³⁰ *The Psychology of Human Society*, p. 461.

³¹ See Child, C. M., *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*, pp. 268-71.

³² Maciver, R. M., *Community*, pp. 72-76.

reasons for the present-day disdain for conceptual reasoning as contrasted with strictly concrete reasoning, might be given. All these reasons may be met in the general statement that philosophy is just as much a science as is psychology, geology, anatomy, or agriculture. This does not mean that philosophy is necessarily as specific as other sciences, but merely that far from being something other than science, philosophy is a part of the very culture out of which the specific and concrete sciences and their methods have arisen.³³

COMTE AND POSITIVISM

Auguste Comte was the father of positivism, a philosophical ideal which marked the rising tide of science in its pure sense. This meant in the first place classification and in the second place the overthrow of eclecticism, the immediate forerunner of positivism. Eclecticism, however, was a creed rather than a system of philosophy, made up of elements of German idealism and Scottish metaphysics. Through the method of introspection of the old variety which has rightly been called "arm chair psychology," an elaborate metaphysics of the mind was invented. This metaphysical system of psychology was the Moloch before which the scholars worshipped until the days of Weber, Fechner, Wundt and Taine, all of whom were at the height of their productive careers some fifty to seventy-five years ago. These were the men who made psychology a natural science, placing it on an equal footing with the other natural sciences toward which eclecticism maintained an indifferent attitude. The development and differentiation of natural science at once put eclecticism to rout and called positivism into being. Positivism demanded experimental investigation of cerebral mechanisms and the bodily sensorium generally, as well as an analysis of the facts discovered thereby. Moreover it attacked as never before the problems of society. As a result sociology was declared the crown of all the sciences.

In the course of time positivism came to be a tradition—as such its influence is felt especially in the social sciences of our day. It inspired Espinas' *Des Sociétés Animales* (1878) in which he postulated an instinct of sociability, found in all animals, differing only in degree

³³ For a treatment of the relation of philosophy to psychology see Kantor, J. R., *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1, pp. 31–35.

and operating according to strict biological laws. The same positivism led Tarde in his *Les Lois de l'Imitation* (1904) to bring forth his law of imitation, which taken in connection with anterior invention constitutes the one and only formula of social progress. But the influence of the positivist tradition did not stop there. Durkheim found a law of determinism in and through which social progress takes place mechanically; yet he is not able to maintain his mechanical theory strictly for "although it is the effect of necessary causes, civilization can become an end, an object of desire."³⁴

It should be noted however that the influence of positivism somehow miscarried. In the case of Espinas, Durkheim and Tarde especially we find a group of sociologists laying the foundation for theories of collective consciousness which in turn became quite as metaphysical as the eclecticism which seemed to them reactionary. If as Ruggiero says, positivism turned out to be concealed materialism,³⁵ it is equally true that it basked for awhile in the light of pure science only to abandon it when the methods of science were slow in furnishing the facts in quantity. It is little wonder that as time went on, the spirit of one system of philosophy after another came to the front.

While positivism as a method reaches back a century, its spirit still influences modern psychology. For example the so-called Freudian theories (psychoanalysis) maintain that a strict causal relation for every single mental act or state is or should be the ambition of psychology to explain. Accordingly, psychoanalysis is represented as a new and better method than anything of its kind heretofore, because it insists upon strict determination. But this seeking for determinants is nothing new in the field of science; every science insists upon a determination of the causal relations of facts. In fact, the search for these relations has only too often succeeded in postulating them before they were actually discovered; in this respect the psychoanalysts have not fallen behind other students of mental life. The psychoanalysts have taken the whole field of mental life, significant and insignificant (supposedly), as their subject-matter. The outcome has been a flood of literature containing presuppositions

³⁴ *De la Division du Travail Social*, p. 379.

³⁵ *Modern Philosophy*, p. 402.

and metaphysical assumptions far more fantastic than anything that has ever obtained before. At the same time the psychoanalytical school has produced some very important contributions.

The least speculative of all the treatments of social psychology that go back ultimately to Comte (from the standpoint of the method of positivism) comes from E. A. Ross. It is his work alone that has raised the positivistic method to a place of importance among the several approaches to social psychology.³⁶

DARWIN AND EVOLUTION

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) paved the way for a revolution in natural science, setting the pace for Spencer and a long line of evolutionists who have carried the evolution theories into every department of natural science including sociology. The scope of Darwin's theories may be inferred from the following:

I look upon the geological record as a history of the world imperfectly kept and written in a changing dialect. Of this history we possess the last volume alone relating to only one or two countries. Of this volume, only here and there a short chapter has been preserved, and on each page only here and there a few lines. Each word of the slowly changing language, more or less different in its successive chapters, may represent the forms of life which are entombed in our consecutive formations and which falsely appear to us to have been abruptly introduced.³⁷

Applying the general theory to animal evolution, its implications are stated by E. G. Conklin as follows:

For many centuries it has been known that in bodily structure man is an animal; that he is born, nourished and developed, that he matures, reproduces and dies just as does the humblest animal or plant. . . . But as long as it was supposed that every species was distinct in origin from every other one, and that each arose by a special divine fiat, it was possible to maintain that man was absolutely distinct from the rest of the animal world and that he had no kinship to the beasts, though undoubtedly he was made in their bodily image. But with the establishment of the doctrine of evolution this resemblance between man and the lower animals has come to have a new significance. The most universal acceptance of this doctrine by scientific men, the most undoubted resemblances between man and the lower animals, the discovery of the remains of lower types of man, real "missing links," have inevitably led to the conclusion that man also is a product of evolution,

³⁶ *Social Psychology*.

³⁷ *The Origin of Species*, 6th ed., Vol. II., p. 88.

that he is a part of the great world of living things and not a being who stands apart in solitary grandeur in some isolated sphere.³⁸

Darwin's method known as the genetic method, lends itself directly to the so-called natural science method which implies strict causal relations among facts. The search for origins and continuities in nature is the distinctive feature of the genetic method, which has come to be a special department of biological science. In general psychology the method is known as psychogenesis. The influence of the genetic method in the social sciences may be seen in the following:³⁹

1. Spencer's theory of a gradual development from pain to pleasure economies in the course of social adjustment; this may be regarded as a successor to the older hedonistic theories.

2. Giddings' theory that as society evolves, rationalism develops to the position of control over impulses.

3. Ward's conception of the increasing rôle of psychic factors in social life.

4. Barth's theory that as civilization advances, individualism becomes more pronounced.

5. Swietochowski's theory that social evolution is characterized by a leveling of individuals to the same plane.

6. Bagehot's theory that imitation is less noticeable among peoples as civilization advances.

7. Child's conception of an increase in a democratic participation in government.

8. Maciver's law of communal development which states that "the differentiation of community is relative to the growth of personality in social individuals."

GABRIEL TARDE⁴⁰

Tarde was primarily a sociologist. As such he may be called the systematizer of that body of social philosophy which found a place in the writings of several of his predecessors and contemporaries. The theme of this philosophy revolves about the instinct (or rather principle) of imitation, used in different connections by Hume,

³⁸ *Heredity and Environment*, p. 3.

³⁹ See Znaniecki, F., *The Laws of Social Psychology*, pp. 22ff.

⁴⁰ See Davis, M. M., *Gabriel Tarde*, especially Chaps. 3 and 4.

Montesquieu, Bagehot, Huxley, Bordier, Espinas, Baldwin, James and Ross. Through Ross, Tarde's sociology gained its most direct influence on American scholars. It might be possible to ignore Tarde, except as a historical focus, were it not for the fact that his philosophical doctrine anticipated roughly that of our very latest writers. Here reference is made especially to the philosophy of Weiss.⁴¹ No student of social psychology can afford to ignore Weiss' stimulating theory of the antecedents of all human behavior. While Tarde probably had little influence on Weiss, it is interesting to note that both go back to physical sciences for ultimate metaphysics, and to the language of mathematics for theories of methods. Tarde's "universal repetition" expressed as imitation in society is essentially the mathematics of summation.

Although Tarde's was a system of sociology, it is to be understood as one approached through psychology. He carefully lays his foundation upon the philosophical principle of recurrence of phenomena in nature; number depends upon quantity; quantity is known as similars amassed, aggregates of some single original. Strict repetitives are known only in the universe of ethereal waves of which there are several types. In the domain of biology repetition is known as reproduction; this is the organic form of his universal law of recurrence. When he turns from the individual as a biological representative of his universal law to associated individuals, imitation is the term used to express this all-embracing law. It is a psychological process that should be strictly differentiated from the products of human effort known as inventions. Inventions are merely accepted through the process of imitation.

HENRI BERGSON

Bergson (1859-) assumes a mysterious creative force or mind energy or *élan vital*, which is something of a fusion of "instinct and intelligence at first wrapped up confusedly within one another, having in their development taken divergent directions." The instinct culminates in the hymenoptera (highest ranking insects) while intelligence culminates in man. Both lead to social life as if such a state of existence were a sort of pre-ordained goal original and essential but

⁴¹ *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior.*

never understood by the members of society, animal or man. Evolution leads directly to social life. Society, however, in its evolution must make use of two opposing principles: on the one hand, the individual must be subordinated to the group; on the other the individual must be free. He reconciles these requirements by assuming that subordination must be complete in the case of insects such as the ant and the bee, but human society alone has been able to keep the ideal of individual freedom within a group which exacts its modicum of submission. The assertion of the individual can mean nothing but strife, which is a sign that the individual is struggling toward the goal of evolution. Disquieting as wars may seem, they mean only that human nature is wearing off the corners and rough edges preparatory to a higher synthesis.

Bergson's philosophy partakes of the nature of two discredited theories of social origins and sanctions, viz., the assumption of something approximating a group mind, and the idea of force as a kind of metaphysical principle. As to the first enough has been said elsewhere in the course of our discussion. Something remains to be said of the latter. To this creative force Bergson ascribes all meaning for life; intelligence is nascent, surging out of the dark and meaningless mechanism of instinct.⁴²

At one time the same metaphysical conception of force prevailed among the theories brought forth to explain phenomena in the material or physical world. Before the days of Galileo, the rise of liquids in tubes was explained by saying that "nature abhors a vacuum." Exactitude in measurements came in time to show the error of the theory. But why do similar theories persist in social sciences? The answer lies in a consideration of the situations which hold the latent causes within them. In the ancient conception of nature's abhorrence of a vacuum, the physical property of air, viz. weight, had not as yet been discovered. So in the situations which obtain in the biological and psychological world, we must assume that the particulars or conditioning circumstances are as yet unknown wherever recourse is taken in metaphysical postulates. Applying the principle to social psychology, it remains only to be said that the forces involved are certainly nothing other than the multitudinous

⁴² Compare Gordon, R. G., *Personality*, Chap. 3.

relations an individual sustains to his environment, past and present. Environment thus considered is the creator and recreator of society.

• JOHN DEWEY

At the present time, the most important philosopher for social psychology is John Dewey. As a futurist he stands far above his contemporaries. His social philosophy can be briefly described by saying that he cuts himself almost entirely from the philosophies of the past. They have meaning for him chiefly as examples of false philosophy. The present age demands a more realistic interpretation of the relation of the individual to society, in contrast to the idealism and rationalism which were responsible for so many dogmatic presuppositions among earlier philosophers.

Human society is not an organism in the sense held by the immediate successors of Darwin. The distinguishing feature between human and infra-human creatures is something other than physical. Man represents a different order of nature because he creates a culture which gives meaning to life. Memory is the descriptive psychological trait which functions as the bearer of culture. It is vicarious experience and so may be utilized in the reconstruction of present experiences. This reconstruction acts selectively, endowing with value those elements of the past which are "emotionally congenial." Such memories are not to be tested for their truth or falsity. They are correct if they supply the necessary warmth.

At the same time the human being lives and behaves in a world of facts. These do not harmonize with the memories, so the philosophy which all of us come to have is something of a compromise between the remote and present. Fantastic notions must be eliminated gradually. The history of philosophy, segmentally speaking, is a series of movements to this end. Among the early Greeks it was Sophism; for modern Germany it was Hegelianism; for us it is a movement to endow the individual with a sense of social democracy, and what is best of all to supply the instruments for achieving it. Self-interest must be recognized as something desirable and even vital if either the state or the individual is to survive. Hence the needs of men must be reckoned with as something more important than the needs of states as bulwarks for abstract conceptions of the good, or the rights and duties of men.

THE NEW HISTORY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

One of the disillusionments which from time to time arrive to torment the social psychologist, is that of realizing that his supposedly reliable facts of society and its behavior, are not real facts; that they do not adhere to that all-important quality—integrity. Here lies the ineffectualness of so much of the work that has already been done in the hundreds of social surveys that clutter up the offices and files of the bureaus of social research, whose avowed purpose is to get at this evasive thing called society. A few years ago many social enthusiasts supposed that the prohibition of alcoholic beverages would be the way to improve society immediately, for “the liquor traffic would be taken out of politics,” “the youth would know nothing about the taste of alcohol” and “crime would be abolished.” Yet these very problems have turned out to be bigger than before, and their solution is far from being envisaged. Speculation had not taken account of the native endowments of man, and the conditions which initiate their coming into action. Society is too complex to be controlled by a single external force. Men behave as they do because they have a history—a history which contains tremendously pliable elements.

The historical approach to social psychology is confronted by the question of the distinction between the most recent conceptions of history as championed by Robinson, Shotwell, Barnes and others, and those of social or group psychology. Can these two disciplines be distinguished? In answer it is possible to say that the new history which is rapidly finding for itself more meaningful conceptions of historical facts and processes, does approach the ideals and aims of social psychology.

The “new history” consists primarily in reconstructing from the past the products of man’s multiform activities as a member of changing and developing social groups and cultural complexes. Hence, it can competently pursue its objectives only when the historian is adequately grounded in the various social sciences which are necessary to clarify the nature of the diverse and complicated social and cultural situations in which man has been placed in the past. Likewise, the social scientists, other than the historians, cannot intelligently or profoundly cultivate their several subjects without that interest in the problems of genesis and development which is contributed by the historical outlook and methodology. Therefore, no competent historian of the new school, and no enlightened social scientist denies the essential nature of this collaboration between history and the social studies.⁴²

⁴² Barnes, H. E., *The New History and the Social Studies*, p. viii.

SUMMARY

Old theories give way to new as facts are discovered, evaluated and placed in the evolving scheme of explanation, called science. Among the recent bodies of knowledge to come into the scheme, psychology (as a relatively pure science) is now taking the lead. While traces of psychology are found to be connected historically from the very first, it must be recognized that much of this historical psychology bears a mere tangential position. The new psychology means vitalized biology—a biology that recognizes man's place in nature. As long as science was submerged by theories of ecclesiastical and philosophical speculation, there could be no very rapid progress. Biology finally dispelled these conceptions, entered upon a program of experimentation, and in due time furnished facts of such kind and in such amounts that no one today would think of man as anything other than an animal. Thus biology is the vehicle and the animality of man is the burden. Biology changed the whole perspective of anthropology, created what we now call the new history, directed philosophy into various new channels such as evolutionary naturalism and new realism, and gave birth to dynamic psychology and behaviorism. In short the whole aspect of social psychology is made over, because the sciences which contribute to it have been taken out of the domain of speculation and planted upon the firm basis of objective biology. But in stating the biological significance of the disciplines that serve in rendering a reasonable account of society from the standpoint of psychology, one must beware of the tendency to identify animal and human psychology, for it has not yet been demonstrated that even the simplest reaction mechanisms are identical in man and his nearest relatives among the primates.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

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- BARNES, H. E.: *The New History and Social Studies*, Chap. 3.
- BARNES, H. E.: *Sociological Review*, Vol. 17, pp. 120-130, 294-300.
- BERNARD, L. L.: *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. 3.
- BOGARDUS, E. S.: *Essentials of Social Psychology*, Chap. 1.
- CHILD, C. M.: *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*, Chap. 17.
- DENNES, W. R.: *The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology*, Chap. 2.

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THOMAS, F.: *The Environmental Basis of Society*, Chap. 1.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Chapter I indicates the origins of social theories. Though the survey is admittedly incomplete, it does teach that the social philosopher is interested in determining fundamental principles; in short, he attempts to raise "common sense reflection to the level of science." But so far, there is no well determined body of fundamental principles that satisfies this aim. Succeeding social psychologists encounter the same difficulties that characterized the efforts of their respective predecessors. The difficulties are those that grow out of attempts to generalize. An effort is made in the present chapter to point out the sources of these difficulties in some detail. We may orient ourselves to this task by raising a few of the fundamental questions that constitute the problems of social psychology. (1) What is the nature of social psychology from the standpoint of subject-matter? (2) Where shall the social psychologist begin in seeking the ultimate elements of social behavior in terms of mind? (3) What is the unit of social psychology? (4) What are the origins of social forces? (5) Are psychical phenomena to be studied subjectively or objectively? (6) What laws, if any, are found to operate among social units? These are some of the questions that confront the social psychologist, guiding the course of his investigations. It is the purpose of the succeeding chapters to throw light upon these problems.

THE FUNCTION OF HYPOTHESES

To the reader unacquainted with the so-called scientific method which constitutes the technique of investigation and the explanation of facts as understood in scientific circles, there may be some confusion concerning the function of hypotheses. An important part of the task before the social psychologists is that of proposing, evaluating and discarding hypotheses in the light of accumulating data. Few people aside from the scientists, really understand this important

item in the scientific program and as a consequence the layman is not always willing to trust scientists and their science. Observing conflicting theories and hypotheses, the layman is often inclined to call them all guesses. The late W. J. Bryan made a great deal of this confusion as does George McCready Price.¹ What is called specialization or the segregation of the whole realm of natural phenomena into portions for the sake of investigation, is partly responsible for this state of affairs; each science comes to have its traditional classes of data and what is perhaps more important, traditional treatment. Thus Professor Moore² of the University of Cincinnati, a well qualified scientist in his own field—physics—exemplifies the layman's difficulty, the moment he steps out of his special field. When Moore recognizes, for example, in the history of philosophy similarly worded theories of evolution that were proposed under very different circumstances and for very different reasons, he draws the hasty conclusion that what is relatively recent in the history of knowledge, is dogma of longstanding.

The situation just referred to should be considered with more than passing attention for a salient principle of knowledge structuralization is involved. Throughout this volume several references are made to this principle or some special phase of it. The principle in brief may be stated as follows: facts and the theories which these facts support constitute our knowledge at a given stage of scientific investigation and since these facts and theories are relative to the developmental stages of knowledge structuralization for different sciences, care must be taken in applying theories beyond the specific group of related facts from which they were derived. The value of this principle may be seen at once when it is recalled that scientific theories are being constantly revised and discarded. In a few historical cases this process has amounted to the substantial overthrow of a whole science. No one today in scientific circles has much respect for astrology or phrenology. At one time, however, there were those who adjusted their thinking and acting to correspond with the supposed scientific verities of these now antiquated systems of facts and theories.

¹ *The Phantom of Organic Evolution.*

² *The Dogma of Evolution.*

It will be worthwhile to define an hypothesis and show how it leads to prediction. A. L. Jones³ defines an hypothesis as a "provisional explanation." That is, it is a statement of what may be expected to occur for a certain combination of facts; this expectation is based upon the facts so far as they have been ascertained and classified.

To take an example: In 1705 Halley calculated from a series of observations the positions and orbits of twenty-four comets. Going back into the history of comets, he found that the comets of 1531, 1607 and 1682 had the same orbits. While all the facts were not at hand there were enough to warrant the guess (hypothesis) that these dates marked the successive appearances of the same comet. He went further into the history of comets and found records of them for 1305, 1380 and 1456. The intervals between these appearances were as in the first series, about 75 years. Upon these observations he predicted that this comet would be observable in 1758 or 1759. After laborious calculations he made the further prediction that it would reach perihelion April 13, 1759. At the same time he allowed a month for possible errors in his calculations. The comet reached perihelion March 13, 1759.

The example chosen may be used to illustrate the meaning of an hypothesis for science in two particulars: (a) the difference between an event (fact) and a law, and (b) the relation of an hypothesis to law. The separate observations of the comet previous to Halley's were citations of events. As mere events, it had occurred to no one that there might be some causal relation between them. But Halley's observation was somewhat more searching than that of his predecessors; he noticed the appearance of some order, and this suggested the possibility of law. His search for the order led him into the history of comets where he was rewarded with the data that would eventually result in a law for the comet under consideration. Obtaining all the data he could, he proposed the theory (hypothesis) that these observed events were repetitions of the same phenomenon, that there was a comet in the solar system that might be expected to appear on a given date and regularly thereafter. This hypothesis, then, was an expression of a relatively low degree of probability (a month was allowed for possible errors in calculations). Today the astronomer is able to

³ *Logic*, p. 246.

predict the appearance of this comet to the fraction of a minute, if not to the very second. The modern astronomer thinks of the comet in terms of law. The relation therefore between an hypothesis and a law is a matter of degree of probability. Both are generalizations: the former a generalization with a low degree of probability, the latter a generalization with a high degree of probability.⁴

HYPOTHESES IN PSYCHOLOGY

So far as hypothetical approaches to social psychology are concerned, it may be said that they are of two general kinds: hypotheses for general (individual) psychology, and others for group (social) psychology. Social psychology is usually referred to as a branch or division of individual psychology, so that the hypotheses of the former are looked upon as subdivisions or extensions of the hypotheses of the latter.

For centuries, the notion has prevailed among observers of human nature that all individuals possess a common psychical capacity called mind. Their task has been that of analyzing this exceedingly complex human possession into its elements and discovering the laws that obtain for the combination of these elements. Accordingly, the concept mind was at first thought of in terms of capacities called knowing, willing and feeling. These were in turn subdivided into more specific processes such as association, imagination, etc. As time went on the capacity for willing became less prominent—more of a philosophical question than psychological; this came about when psychology succeeded in cutting loose from its parent discipline—philosophy. This consummated, there were left but two general subdivisions of the concept mind, namely, the higher mental processes and the lower mental processes, sometimes referred to as intelligence and instinct, respectively. The growth of genetic psychology during the past sixty years emphasized the importance of the lower mental processes (instincts or instinctive tendencies), so that there was a growing disposition on the part of psychologists to speak of mind in terms of instincts. In other words the theory of instincts came in time (some twenty-five years ago) to assume an important position among the more general theories of psychical causation.

⁴ See Ritchie, A. D., *Scientific Method*, especially Chap. 6.

Another important hypothesis borrowed from individual psychology for the purpose of explaining social psychology, is the theory of habit formation and its several variants. At the present time habits are conceived in terms of conditioned responses (conditioned reflexes). If a dog is shown a piece of meat, and at the same time a bell is sounded, after several such simultaneous stimulations, the sound of the bell alone is sufficient to cause a flow of saliva quite as readily as the meat alone. Such experiments carried out by Pavlov and his students have paved the way for a revolution in our knowledge of the mechanisms of individual psychology. In the experiment cited the meat is called the adequate stimulus, and the flow of saliva the adequate response. The substitution of the bell for the meat is taken to mean that a conditioned reflex is now established in the dog's nervous system, and the flow of saliva may in turn be called the conditioned response. Conditioned reflexes are found to be very easily established, modified, or obliterated; this means that environmental situations play a heretofore unknown rôle in setting the stage for behavior.

The general hypothesis for social psychology was what is sometimes called the group mind—a term not unlike the concept soul or spirit, carried over bodily from philosophy. This hypothesis or general theory will be studied in some detail in Chapter V. For the present it should be said that wherever social psychology was portrayed as something separate and distinct from individual psychology the theory of a group mind or collective mind was very prominent.

Individual psychology was the first branch of psychology studied by laboratory methods. Whatever remnant of the philosophical notion of soul it carried, was gradually abandoned. This threw suspicion upon the soul idea in social psychology. The abandonment of the concept of a collective mind was relatively complete when the individual person was looked upon as the unit of social psychology.

APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

F. H. Allport in a recent systematic study⁵ insists that social psychology is in the last analysis a study of the individual. While

⁵ *Social Psychology*. See also by the same author, *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 17, pp. 85-94.

he does of course consider social situations as stimuli to the individual, he is inclined to confine these stimuli to those that come from persons. He ascribes to the individual an a priori position in the study of social facts, for "within his organism are provided all the mechanisms by which social behavior is explained." He emphasizes mechanisms which imply elaboration of the stimulus and response formula now popularized by the behaviorists. Another systematic writer defines social psychology as "the science of the motives of people living in social relations."⁶ The mechanism is referred generally to instinctive reaction patterns. This writer would give slightly more importance to groups as such in analyzing the expression of individual traits and tendencies displayed as social behavior. A step further in the direction of the group as an originator of social behavior, is taken by F. C. Bartlett who maintains that "it is very easy indeed to forget this possible determining influence of the group," and that "the individual who is considered in psychological theory, in fact, is never an individual pure and simple."⁷ He also maintains that the psychology of groups can be studied best in terms of their culture traits. Bartlett however in the work cited, deals with primitive people only. The question of the applicability of his observations to civilized groups is raised. Some recent studies indicate that such application is quite allowable and even necessary. Bartlett's point of view raises a fundamental problem. Does an individual in isolation constitute a different problem for knowledge than the same individual in a group?

The psychoanalytical school places great stress upon social situations as rubrics for individual development, showing that everyone's personality may be referred for explanation to his human contacts. The earlier in life the contacts are made, the more significant they are. A fifth variant is that which defines social psychology in terms of desires.⁸ Further variations in basic principles may be noticed in the following definitions. "Social psychology has to show how, given the native propensities and capacities of the individual human mind, all the complex mental life of societies is shaped by them and in turn reacts upon the course of their development and operation in the

⁶ Williams, J. M., *Principles of Social Psychology*, p. 3.

⁷ *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, p. 11.

⁸ Dunlap, K., *Elements of Scientific Psychology*, p. 329. Dunlap's "desires" are not very different from instincts.

individual."⁹ Social psychology is "the study of the psychic factors involved in the origin, development, structure and functioning of group life."¹⁰ "Social psychology is the study of social interaction. It is based upon the psychology of group life. It begins with an interpretation of group-made types of human reactions, of communication, and of instinctive and habitual actions."¹¹ Social psychology "studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association. It seeks to understand and account for those uniformities in feeling, belief, or volition—and hence action—which are due to the interaction of human beings, i.e., to social causes."¹² "Social psychology deals with the psychosocial processes which arise in individual and collective behavior as a result of human interrelationships on a neuro-psychic plane."¹³ "Social psychology in its widest sense applies to a study of interactions among animals. More specifically, and as the term is usually employed, it applies to the reactions of members of the human race one to another."¹⁴ "Social psychology has to do with conscious experiences which are made possible by the presence of an individual mind in a group of minds."¹⁵

The several statements of points of view and definitions of social psychology may be reduced to classification as follows:

1. Social behavior may be studied in terms of the individual as a social unit.
2. Social behavior may be studied in terms of the group as a social unit.
3. Social behavior may be studied in terms of the cultural products of historical groups.
4. Social behavior is instinctive.
5. Social behavior is a display of instinct plus habit and intelligence. Bearing these points in mind, we shall approach the problem from another angle.

⁹ McDougall, W., *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 18.

¹⁰ Ellwood, C. A., *The Psychology of Human Society*, p. 16.

¹¹ Bogardus, E. S., *Essentials of Social Psychology*, p. 13.

¹² Ross, E. A., *Social Psychology*, p. 1.

¹³ Bernard, L. L., *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 23.

¹⁴ Gault, R. H., *Social Psychology*, p. 3.

¹⁵ Breese, B. B., *Psychology*, p. 2.

THE INFLUENCE OF SCHOOLS

In order to understand the divergent points of view in regard to social psychology, it will be of assistance to turn to the so-called schools of psychology, sociology and social psychology as separate sciences. It may then be clear that the confusion that exists at the present time in social psychology could not well be avoided.

As has already been said, psychology was in its early days more or less dogmatically defined as the science of the soul. This was prior to the period of experimentation which began with Wundt. During his time psychology withdrew from its metaphysical foundations; the soul is no longer considered an entity, entelechy or any attribute of personality conceived as something distinct from the body. None save the religious philosopher is interested in this speculative aspect of the individual. In the early days knowledge of psychology was comparatively simple; today it is exceedingly complex. The findings of experimentation are responsible for this complexity; as purely scientific methods are utilized, still further complexity of the conceptions of this science may be expected. Not a few of these conceptions are temporarily hypothetical; as stated before, they are necessary steps in scientific study. The scope of psychology is as wide as life itself, for wherever is life, there are sensation, affectivity and awareness; these are the ultimates for psychology.

The entire scope of psychology may be subdivided into several fields along two distinct lines—subject-matter and method. The diversity may be seen from the following table:

1. Psychology from the standpoint of subject-matter
 - a. Normal human adult psychology
 - b. Child psychology
 - c. Comparative psychology (study of animals)
 - d. Abnormal psychology (study of the insane and feeble-minded)
 - e. Criminal psychology
 - f. Race psychology
 - g. Individual psychology (dealing chiefly with problems of personality)
 - h. Applied psychology, embracing
 1. Educational
 2. Therapeutic or medical
 3. Legal
 4. Commercial
 - i. Spiritism (not seriously considered by scientists)
 - j. Social psychology

2. Psychology from the standpoint of method employed
 - a. Experimental
 - b. Non-experimental
 - c. Physiological and neurological
 - d. Psycho-physics (quantitative psychology)
 - e. Genetic and comparative (based partly on method and partly on subject-matter)
 - f. Introspection (self-observation)
 - g. Behaviorism (objective observation)
 - h. Psychoanalysis (based on both methods and subject-matter)

This must not be looked upon as a complete, much less a mutually exclusive, table of divisions. It is apparent that no one definition of psychology can be set down as final and satisfactory. Different investigators, interested as they are in particular data, necessarily come to hold different theories.

In the case of sociology an even greater complexity of subject-matter and method obtains. It is not too much to say that a complete enumeration of the categories of sociology would require a volume; indeed a few students have actually made this task the theme of historical accounts. Like psychology, sociology is continually extending its inquiries so that it may also be called an expanding science. Again, sociology has changed from a once speculative and more or less normative science, to a relatively empirical science—a science based upon controlled observations. Social surveys of many types are continually being made.

As in the case of psychology, it is customary to refer to sociologists as belonging to certain schools. Confining consideration to the modern period, the following table of schools will give some idea of the scope of sociology as a science. The names of the schools will suffice to explain the basic points of view held by their respective adherents. A few of the representative men of each group are mentioned.

1. The organic school—Spencer, Lilienfeld, Schäffle
2. The economic determinists—Engels, Paton
3. The biological school—Spencer, DeVries, Galton, Pearson
4. The social constraint school—Durkheim, Sumner
5. The group survival school—Carver, Novicow, Gumpłowicz, Ferguson
6. The anthropo-geographical school—Buckle, Ratzel, Ripley, Sumner, Huntington, Miss Semple
7. The psychological school—Tarde, De Greef, Ward, Ratzenhofer, Small, Giddings, Ross, Ellwood

Another way of stating the approach to social psychology through sociology is as follows:

Principle of Social Interaction

Sociality
Contract
Conflict
Imitation
Coercion
Consciousness of kind
Association
Reciprocity
Sociation
Suggestion-imitation

Adherent

Roberty
de Greef
Gumplowicz
Tarde
Durkheim
Giddings
Small
Simmel
Stukenberg
Ross

The above list of principles of social interaction cannot be assumed, as they often have been, to be basic principles for a science of sociology or social psychology. Severally they are examples of the violation of some aspect of knowledge structuralization as stated on page 25.

Social psychology is also beginning to show the traditional marks of a forming science, i.e., schools. It is somewhat harder to draw distinctions than in the case of sociology and psychology. There is as yet little to be said for the schools in respect to subject-matter and method, for the social psychologist is quite as puzzled in his determination of materials, as with a valid procedure for investigation. Social psychology may be said to be amorphous, if not chaotic, in both. Five fairly definite schools are to be recognized:

1. The planes and currents school—Adam Smith, Bagehot, Tarde, Ross
2. The cultural product school—Wundt, Lazarus and Steinthal, Thomas
3. The group mind school—Espinass, Durkheim, Le Bon, McDougall
4. The instinct school—James, McDougall, Trotter
5. The habit school—Dewey, Allport

It should be noted that schools no. 2 and 3 stress the group as the social unit while 4 and 5 stress the individual as the social unit. Since these schools are mentioned in the order of their chronological appearance in the history of social psychology, it will be noticed that the science of social psychology has developed in the direction of the individual as a unit,

THE PLANES AND CURRENTS SCHOOL

The planes and currents school conceives of sections of society as possessing similar acquisitions and notions in respect to languages, religious creeds, legal systems, amusements, dress, diet, etc. The whole cultural environment may theoretically be regarded as a system of planes, which come into existence through the association of men. These planes may in turn be regarded as social forces that mold the attitudes of people as they come to live in places where the planes are established. This dynamic, moving, molding characteristic of the different planes is to be described as due to currents or waves of imitation, suggestion and similar psychological processes. Currents are therefore to be thought of as waves of excitement, contagion, mental epidemics, sympathy, etc.

The planes and currents school has been a popular one. Until very recently it has dominated in psycho-social literature and teaching, especially in America. The adherents of this school were generally able to incorporate logically many of the other theories of social causation, such as group mind theories, instinct theories, and even habit theories, as they were later proposed. Logically, if not historically, this school may be looked upon as the mother school of social psychology.

THE CULTURAL PRODUCT SCHOOL

The cultural product school is the modern direct successor of the anthropogeographical school of sociology. The distinction between them lies in the fact that the older school thought in terms of indigenous traits rather than customs; their aim also was to account for race continuities and discontinuities; the cultural product school in recent years is primarily concerned with the daily lives of people, and their reactions as purposive adjustments to customs. The distinction should really be carried far enough to mean something that the term cultural product hardly connotes. Its meaning in this volume is similar to Znaniecki's interpretation of social action. "Psychology cannot be a science of consciousness in general, nor a science of all phenomena commonly called psychological, but a science of certain elements and complexes to be found in the course of concrete conscious life. Its limits are not to be traced in advance, but must be

determined in the very course of investigation."¹⁶ This point of view lays stress upon the dynamic or moving aspect of human adjustment rather than the static conceptions of mental processes which are so easily and erroneously acquired.

THE GROUP MIND SCHOOL

The adherents of the group mind school differ greatly among themselves as to the nature of its fundamental principle. Some of the earlier theories, e.g., that of Hume, conceived of the group mind in strictly metaphysical terms. Le Bon supposes that the group mind is the common racial unconscious of all the members of a given group and that it makes its appearance (gives rise to behavior) only when the group is formed. Another variation in the theory is that of Durkheim who thinks that the historic social environment becomes the strict determiner of individual natures. McDougall rejects the group mind theory in some respects and apparently supports it in others. All group mind theories have been rigorously criticized by recent social psychologists, especially by Allport,¹⁷ who points out a number of valid objections:

1. The group does not possess a nervous system.
2. Emotions are the same in isolation and in a group.
3. The actions of all are the sum of individual actions.

THE INSTINCT SCHOOL

The instinct school is genetically related to the anthropogeographical and economic determinist schools listed among the classes of pure sociology. These two classes of sociologists, especially, have produced an almost inconceivable array of facts. Psychologists have attempted to reduce these facts to an orderly arrangement showing causal relations. They chose the theory of instincts because it gave promise of confirming the presupposition of psychic unity, or uniformity of human nature, that seemed at once consistent with the method of natural science and with the nature of the data with which they worked. The presupposition of a uniformity of human psychical

¹⁶ *The Laws of Social Psychology*, p. 7.

¹⁷ Allport, F. H., *Social Psychology*.

make-up is similar to the presupposition of a soul and open to the same objection, namely, that such a presupposition tends to minimize the real complexity of the make-up of human nature.

But in this selection of a general theory that would serve their purposes, the instinct psychologists have reckoned with what individuals display rather than with what situations mean to individuals. They have, as will be shown later, placed too much faith in the possibility that the human kind is an order of nature readily distinguishable (functionally) from the environment in which it rises, works, plays, lives and dies. If one or even many instincts were the determinants of the similarities of human beings, so that social behavior could be predicted therefrom, it would follow that the laws of social psychology could be stated in some generally usable formula. But it so happens that the farther studies go into the nature of man (and his infra-human relatives) in connection with a comparative study of cultures, climates, etc., the more apparent it becomes that individual differences are just as important as likenesses.

THE HABIT SCHOOL (BEHAVIORIST)

The habit school is the most recent and in many respects the most faithful to facts. It is represented by those psychologists who find themselves in sympathy with the laws of natural science in general, and who accordingly have gone to biology for their facts. One eminent investigator, Pavlov, refuses to be called a psychologist; nevertheless, his conditioned reflex has amounted to a revolutionary discovery, which has been verified by certain American psychologists.¹⁸ The term conditioned reflex has become a stock word in general psychology, serving to provide a convenient term which through elaboration constitutes the bulk of behavioristic psychology. The behaviorist school (which appears to have a number of adherents differing among themselves) has not as yet been able to account successfully for social psychology in all its aspects. Nevertheless there are those among the behaviorists who believe that their new views will prove to be an "interlocking segment through which the social sciences will become an extension of the natural sciences."¹⁹

¹⁸ Burgham, W. H., *The Normal Mind*. Watson, J. B., *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*.

¹⁹ Weiss, A. P., *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior*, p. 8.

In pursuing their search for consistent elements, that may in turn give promise of a rigorous bio-social science, the behaviorists have extended their studies to physical and chemical realms, where the conception of all life as but differential forms of energy is now quite acceptable.

ABNORMALITY AND PERSONALITY AS ASPECTS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY²⁰

Another important approach to social psychology is represented by those students whose work is concerned with variations from normality. In some respects they might be considered as a distinct school. Their close relation to students of psychology from the standpoint of personality types, lends a marked degree of indefiniteness to their field of investigation. An important contribution from these two groups of students is that which reinforces the fact that the abnormal individual is merely a variant from an hypothetical normal individual.

The psychology of abnormality and personality comes chiefly from psychiatry and medicine. Leaders in this two-fold movement are Morton Prince, the founder of the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology* (first published in 1906), the psychoanalytical school as represented by Carl Jung, and Louis Berman, the popularizer of psychology as a study of glandular secretions.²¹ Prince's work is an outstanding achievement, while Jung's work²² has perhaps, more than that of any other, succeeded in bringing psychoanalysis into favorable repute. Berman's contributions while emphasizing a much needed and significant type of psychological investigation, are characterized by loose generalities. All three have stimulated investigation now beginning to show extremely valuable results.

The chief concern of a number of students in this general domain, is to differentiate character, temperament and personality as aspects of

²⁰ For further study see the following: Rosanoff, A. J., *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 17, pp. 281-299; Prince, Morton, *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 32, pp. 266-292; Washburn, M. F., and Stepanova, V., *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 34, pp. 96-99; Ream, M. J., *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, Vol. 17, pp. 58-61; Freyd, M., *Psychological Review*, Vol. 21, pp. 74-87; Faris, E., *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. 9, pp. 404-409; Downey, June E., *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, Vol. 18, pp. 345-349.

²¹ *The Glands Regulating Personality.*

²² *Psychological Types.*

individuality, and to show the bearings of these variables upon social interaction, or again through them to account for careerists who have been identified with social movements. Allport especially recognizes that personality is both a cause and result of social behavior.

While it is impossible to treat these aspects of social psychology adequately, it is possible to state in a general way the meaning of personality as conceived by modern science. Gordon defines personality as "the emergent synthesis of the bodily and mental attributes of the individual in reaction to environment in the most comprehensive sense."²³ The many attempts to segregate the elements of this comprehensiveness have yielded a variety of types of personality. The most that can be said for the science of personality is that it has reached the stage of refined classification. The principles used as a basis for such classifications differ considerably. The principle of habit formation and change offers a fairly consistent point of view. The vast differences which individuals display in matters pertaining to variations from an hypothetical normal individual, preclude any theory that personality traits may be explained on the basis of native propensities.²⁴

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY DEFINED

The subject matter of psychology is action, explicit and implicit. The subject matter of sociology is the forms of social organization. Social psychology is a science of mental becoming, i.e., the arousal of experiences through sensation, memory, reason and the like, as they take their places in social forms. In brief the subject matter of social psychology refers to what may be called social situations. Within the totality of interrelated and opposed factors that create a social situation there are two that may be regarded as controlling. Explanation of social behavior, if it comes at all, must come through a study of these two factors, which are psychological processes and social surroundings (organizations, culture, etc.). Upon the basis of these two factors we are able to state a tentative or working definition of social psychology. Social psychology is the science of human be-

²³ *Personality*, p. 13.

²⁴ For an extenuation of this point of view, see Bernard, L. L., *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. 16.

havior in the actual or imagined presence of an individual or group of individuals.

THE CLOSED SYSTEM

Some such definition of social psychology, as stated above, assists the student in segregating phenomena for the purpose of determining the so-called closed systems which are essential to the derivation of scientific laws. There could be no scientific law for any science if the scientist were not able to determine in advance just what phenomena he proposed to study. Once these phenomena are agreed upon he begins his observation which in its ideal form is experimentation under laboratory conditions, i.e., conditions calculated to provide for the repetition of the phenomena indefinitely under the same conditions. Thus out of the infinite complexity of natural phenomena, certain complexes of things and processes, which behave independently of other things and processes, are regarded as a closed system. The closed systems for any science embrace its subject-matter. For example, the agriculturalist has a closed system of plants, climate, soil, pests, etc.; the biologist's closed systems include animals in connection with climate, food-supply, presence of enemies. These systems are capable of subdivisions in almost endless varieties—i.e. smaller closed systems within larger for observational purposes. Subject-matter is therefore defined by the closed systems which are naturally or artificially included in the main closed system.

The definition of social psychology which has been given is in fact somewhat broader (and accordingly less usable) than that which some modern writers will allow. A strict behaviorist would not admit such terms as mind, consciousness or imagination. His closed system would be confined to those phenomena that are observed when an individual or group merely behaves or acts; no account would be taken of subjective mental processes. Such a narrowing of the closed system does violence to the causal relations of phenomena. Individuals do possess what is called mind and consciousness; these terms denote factors which accompany and direct behavior or action, even though they are often not observable. Psychological processes subjectively considered betray a closed system within the larger closed system which includes the individual as the focal receptor of stimuli and generator of responses.

The complexities just implied, may be reduced to a general statement which will serve to direct thinking about society in terms of laws. They may be stated in the all-embracing formula: individual reaction patterns plus social stimulus patterns. The science of social psychology is nothing other than an elaboration of these patterns in functional relationship. It must be remembered, however, that these two types of patterns are by no means self-determinant; they evolve together, exist contemporaneously, work together. An individual can no more exist and function, as such, in a social sense, than he can lift himself by his own bootstraps. At the same time society is at every point determined by individuals. These considerations suggest solutions for some of the questions previously raised.

INDIVIDUAL REACTION PATTERNS

Individuality, which may be defined in terms of reaction patterns, is a product of two types of experience—hereditary and acquired. Nature in the first place endows the individual with a body which possesses definite developmental possibilities. Whether or not these possibilities are fully developed in the course of an individual's lifetime, depends in a large measure upon the sort of stimulation which his surroundings afford. On the other hand this individuality may be suppressed, deformed and even made asocial by virtue of constantly recurring vicious environmental forces. It is possible to tell what an individual is if we know completely where he has lived. Why are we all so puzzled by the problems of personality? Everyone is continually trying to solve them. If we want to hire a man to perform a certain work, we begin to seek some knowledge of his personality, character, or in short, his individuality. Almost always we demand a personal interview. Not willing to trust ourselves with our first-hand observation, we require testimonials from others whose judgment we respect. This sort of procedure is true for all of us in planning social activities of every degree of practical importance. In other words, we direct our own behavior toward others in deference to our knowledge of their reaction patterns.

SOCIAL STIMULUS PATTERNS

Looking at society from the environmental point of view, it is clear that we all tend to respond to a given social situation along the

line of our previous responses to similar situations. We normally go to church with certain fairly predictable frames of mind. We might call such frames of mind our occasional individualities. At the same time those who have the church services in charge, normally carry out a series of stimulations which will conform fairly well with the occasional frames of mind possessed by the individuals at the time. In other words, the church service of the hour is an appeal to mind groups. We have as many occasional frames of mind as we have social situations. In other words, we potentially belong to many groups. If by chance we are exposed to a social situation for which we have no readymade response patterns, we are at once thrown into confusion. We would not normally seek such a situation unless we were determined to form and cultivate the frame of mind or reaction pattern which it requires. But after a while we become accustomed to the requirements of this new social situation; we develop or grow a reaction pattern which serves the purposes of adjustment; we come to experience a certain pleasure in its exercise. At the same time it must be remembered that the forms of social organization which are found in the general environment, are the products of individual effort and collective sanction. They all have a history; they become social patterns, are preserved and adhered to because they provoke definite reaction patterns and thereby give satisfaction to those who indulge them.

Some reaction patterns which owe their origin to the individual's contact with group situations may properly be called *cultural patterns*. In regard to their coming into existence and operation, they resemble what are popularly known as instincts or even intuition. Compared with habits or reflexes, they are to be regarded as more comprehensive, although if it were possible to analyze them into their components, they might be described as complex habits. The real difference between cultural patterns and habits lies in the fact that they appear to be established in the individual's nervous system as complexes; the components do not develop part by part. Again they appear to come from external sources, while habits are ordinarily thought of as being formed in connection with individual experience more personal in nature.

These cultural patterns are acquired in a perfectly unconscious way, although one may acquire them through conscious effort. But

in the latter case, they do not conform strictly to cultural patterns as here defined, i.e. cultural patterns possess certain features or criteria which enable us to differentiate between them and ordinary habits. These criteria may be summarized as follows: (1) they are essentially non-personal, (2) they operate arbitrarily, and in consequence they are actually detrimental to the individual as well as to the group to which the individual belongs, (3) they are historical in the sense that they may be traced to some social institution, (4) they are artificial, (5) they are endowed with exceedingly great strength due to the ease with which they may be associated with the emotional nature of the individual.

THE SOCIAL SITUATION

The social situation for any given observation includes all that is concerned with those closed systems for which a stimulus is the genesis and a response is the terminus of social behavior. Some important considerations must be noted.

A situation giving rise to social behavior may or may not include the actual presence of another person or group of persons. The task of finding a body of laws which would comprehend a science of social psychology might be immensely facilitated if social psychology could be understood as human action in the immediate presence of human beings only. The difficulty lies in attempts to differentiate the whole of a given situation, so as to separate the human from the non-human, and the immediate from the remote factors. The historical nature of the human being is largely, almost exclusively social, in the sense that all he does or attempts to do has for him some direct or mediate social significance. This is merely another way of saying that the most ubiquitous forces giving rise to behavior come from society, i.e., other people, social ideals, etc.²⁵ Some persons are known to lead lives of great self-denial in matters of domestic comfort in order to acquire and display possessions which elicit the admiration of others. The foregoing of ordinary domestic comforts is in such cases social behavior. You may observe a chemist day after day toiling alone in his laboratory; he may be (and in all probability is) motivated by a sense of an unknown human environment. This environment is however a part of the closed system which is delineated by the stimulus

²⁵ Another interpretation of the social situation is taken up in Chapter XI.

and response aspects of his behavior. In all such cases the responding individual is stimulated by an ideal or imagined relation to others. Direct observation cannot give accurate knowledge of these subjective aspects of the situation, although a series of observations may yield approximate or general knowledge of them. Prediction of social behavior is always limited to such knowledge.

Although one cannot ascertain completely the subjective setting of a given social situation, he can for practical purposes determine what a normal individual under normal circumstances may do.²⁶ Such an observer is in most cases drawing deductions from his own experiences. In this sense social psychology is a highly empirical science. Everyone who tries to predict what his neighbor will do is a practical psychologist; he is studying human behavior tendencies. One of the first things anyone does when he meets a stranger is to attempt to categorize him—to compare him with others. A feeling of better acquaintance with the stranger develops as he is made to take a predictable position in the observer's scheme of knowing human beings.

An important part of this psychologizing in respect to others has to do with those aspects of environment for which no universally referable social significance applies. We need to know what the historical environment of the individual has been. The cultural milieu in which an individual has functioned is just as important for prediction of social behavior as are those stabilized instincts to which some psychologists attach so much significance. The social psychologist cannot escape the fact that inborn or instinctive tendencies are to be interpreted in terms of those experiences which have come to be important factors in determining the habits that are built thereon. A plainsman longs for the open places; a sailor, for the sea; a politician is generally afraid of "issues" until he is sure of the wishes of his constituents, whereupon he lines up with enthusiasm; a soldier beholds a landscape in terms of military maneuvers, while a painter sees in the same landscape the possibilities of a beautiful picture. These mental attitudes are social tendencies.

But if it were possible to know in advance the individual instincts, habits and attitudes completely, prediction of social behavior would

²⁶ It should be recalled that normality is an hypothesis.

still be somewhat fragmentary. Individual tendencies change in the very course of their activities. Situations are never static; tendencies are never static. The human mind is forever reaching out beyond its customary ways of dealing with situations. At the same time it is forever reducing new-found reactions to stabilized forms. There is nothing permanent but change in all that stimulates an individual. Social psychology must be content with general classification of situations and the human behavior which takes place therein. Social behavior goes on within the sphere of experiences of individuals while awareness accompanies the behavior modifying it more or less.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

From the foregoing it is clear that in studying social psychology we are studying those adjustments which individuals or groups make or attempt to make to situations. Social life is a search for adjustment. Some writers refer to this as conflict. Individuals or groups are continually seeking to enhance their comfort in the midst of general environmental situations which must be brought under control. Individuals or groups therefore come to have fairly clear ideals which they wish to attain. Sometimes the ideal is one of self-preservation for which they devise protective means of various kinds; at another time the ideal may be the preservation of their cultural life generally or certain elements of it; at still another time the individual or group may entertain an ideal which in terms of purpose leads them to thrust their culture aggressively upon another group. Perhaps these ideals may be reduced to terms which are descriptive of potential or active attempts to secure for the individuals one or another of the values which add to the economy of living. There is really no end to the specific forms which this struggle takes on. People live. They all try to live more completely. Some succeed better than others, but success of any degree implies effort.

METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

Social psychology as a science has been characterized as still in the process of finding itself. Subject-matter and method are mutually intertwined. If the first is still undefined, still incompletely known, the question naturally rises: will not some settled method for studying the facts of social psychology assist in determining the boundaries of

subject-matter. But turning to the method itself, the most important of all the aspects of social psychology, we find no settled procedure. Moreover, while the chaotic status of social psychology in respect to conflicting theories of units, organization, etc., is known to exist, there seems to be little realization of the fact that there might be more than one sort of method. To be sure, the methods employed in investigating the nature of the individual are well known; they have been refined and improved in many ways. But until comparatively recent years it had not occurred to some, at least, that the methods employed in science in general and in individual psychology in particular, have been inadequate for the complete investigation of the field of social psychology. On the contrary, the growing chaotic status of the general body of social psychology, has only served to turn the student back to individual psychology. Without discrediting the method of individual psychology in the least, as a contributing agent, it is the purpose of the following discussion to show that it must be supplemented by additional methodological considerations. The problem will be to determine the source of this supplementing method.

Curiously enough this supplementing method is not unconnected with that nebulous discipline—philosophy—the final source of practically all the social theories with which we work. There is no escape from philosophy; classified knowledge leads to philosophy; philosophy evaluates the results of classified knowledge. In this discussion several philosophical questions might be included, e.g., theories of values and possibilities of arriving at knowledge itself. The philosophical digression at this point is not intended to settle such questions; it is presented to indicate the sources of the points of view. The men who have best indicated what the method shall be are Dewey,²⁷ Dennes,²⁸ Lindeman,²⁹ Znaniecki³⁰ and Simmel.³¹ There are others of course reaching as far back as Wundt, who postulated the often misinterpreted principle of “heterogony of ends.” In a sense the new philosophy of method is a reaction to the positivism of Comte.

²⁷ *The Reconstruction in Philosophy.*

²⁸ *The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology.*

²⁹ *Social Discovery.*

³⁰ *The Laws of Social Psychology.*

³¹ Spykman, N. J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel.*

One big philosophical antithesis surging in upon all science, including social psychology, is the yet unsolved riddle of vitalism and mechanism. For some psychologists this question has no place in psychological discussions.³² But social psychology cannot escape the controversy since mechanistic methods dominate individual psychology, as they do all sciences which make a pretense of becoming scientific. As Dewey³³ aptly suggests, man's tool-making power was turned to his own definition. This philosophical controversy will in all probability never be completely set aside. Meanwhile it influences reflection, and indirectly finds its way into the choice of possible methods of attacking social psychology. Vitalism assumes that there is something "spiritual" in the world which, however attacked, will not yield to explanation. Mechanism says that "vitalism is not admissible even as an hypothesis."³⁴

If mechanism could be followed to the end, would it render a reliable account of behavior? Is knowledge by this method attainable? The mechanists assume that it is; moreover they have succeeded in demonstrating the utility of the method to a considerable degree, i.e., they have proved their right to make the assumption. The mechanistic conception of life, for which behaviorism is the psychological aspect, has certainly given something worthwhile.

But at the same time it must be recognized that it has not given, nor is it likely to give, a complete account of psychology. Consider the following: psychology can be known only in terms of the individual; the individual is known in terms of physiology; physiology is known in terms of biology; biology is known in terms of chemistry; chemistry is known in terms of physics; physics is known in terms of electrons; electrons are known in terms of time and space; time and space take us back to metaphysics; metaphysics takes us back to the individual; the individual takes us back to psychology. This is the outcome of the mechanistic method. The reason why the "vicious circle" fails is that something is lost to knowledge as we shift from one part to another. It is the unsolved problem that is left entirely out of the mechanistic hypothesis. The problem itself is life. If we in turn ask what life is, there seems to be but one rational answer:

³² Dunlap, K., *Old and New Viewpoints in Psychology*, 80ff.

³³ *The Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 71.

³⁴ Elliot, H., *Modern Science and Materialism*, p. 116.

life is the relation of functional elements, multitudinous in number and degrees of interrelations. These elements may in the last analysis be simple energies as the mechanistic hypothesis assumes. All things that are called living may be more alive at one time than at another.

The vitalist assumes life to begin with. His assumption begins with something the mechanist cannot find. If a vitalist assumes some *élan vital*, *horme*, *trope* or *libido* as the fundamental life principle, the case is no different practically from that in which a mechanist assumes a chemical or other force, or combination thereof. The vitalist takes life as he sees it and presupposes a metaphysical source; the mechanist takes behavior since he can to some extent reduce it to measurable forces, discovers actual substances that are found in functioning relations, postulates this substance as the cause and carries his reasoning in the interest of further ultimates into the realm of metaphysics. In the end the difference between these two schools of thought is merely a matter of methods of approaching an explanation (science) of what for all practical purposes remains the same.

Among present day students there are those who entertain a suspicion that the mechanistic interpretation falls short somewhere. It is contended that the natural sciences have despaired of giving a rational account of society. On the other hand there are those who take the position that the knowledge sought is not impossible, but rather that the methods that have thus far been employed should be supplemented by others. One claim is that the method of natural science must be supplemented by the historical method.³⁵ A subsequent chapter will deal with these methods. The historical method here referred to is different from the method of history as ordinarily known. In other words social psychology as a discipline would not through this historical method become history. History asks, what has happened? Psychology asks, how did it happen? This is a rough distinction. If we assume with the mechanist that the electron-proton system is ultimate, the trend of physics is leading to a favorable acceptance of the mechanistic method. If we assume another order of nature to contain the ultimates, then the trend is away from mechanism.³⁶

³⁵ Dennes, W. R., *The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology*, pp. 148-176.

³⁶ See Weiss, A. P., *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior*, for an excellent statement of the mechanistic viewpoint.

The followers of positivism at one time despaired of reducing psychological phenomena to law; likewise the mechanists (the present-day followers of positivism) deny consciousness or any other concept bordering on a spiritual explanation of social groups. Yet in spite of these two historical attempts to do away with such concepts, because they cannot be linked with the logic of the exact, objective sciences, everyday observation yields evidence of a continuous, active, dynamic vitality in groups that cannot be thought of in purely logically consistent terms. The dilemma for social psychology is dissolved in this fashion: the reciprocal relations of social being create the mind group. A portion, however small, of the conscious lives of individuals grouped in a social organization, is common. This common individuality is a basis for unity of reflection and feeling. Herein lies the spirit of the group. Let us call it mind group stuff. If this assumption is correct, we have in it a basis for the coherency of social organizations as well. The larger the common mind group stuff, the greater the coherency. The older the mind group stuff, the more durable the organization.

The mind of man works in shuttle-like fashion, back and forth, among the ever renewing stream of circumstances and events which situations include; the mental aspects of the individual in the presence of a changing situation are often referred to as a "stream of consciousness." Though psychology sets for itself the task of analyzing the elements of the mind, its mental processes, it can never give a complete account from the sole standpoint of either behaviorism or introspection. The psychology of the unconscious helps some, as do all the other kinds of psychology that make claim for completeness of the picture of the human mind. What goes on in the individual mind is never completely known. At all events, it is enough to say that social situations create and temporarily stabilize habits, instincts, wishes, hopes and fears, which otherwise would lie relatively unparticularized in the unassociated individual. At such times these mental elements may be observed. The whole individual is involved in a whole situation. But we ordinarily observe partial situations and therefore partial personalities responding thereto. If we can say that an individual has the capacity to sense, so we can say that associated individuals have the capacity to sense; if an individual has memory, so has he in a group, and perhaps in the group relation an exaggerated

and distorted memory; if an individual is afraid of some wasting element in his environment and hopes for its removal, so only more readily, more completely does he hope in association. The mental contents of the individual are enhanced by virtue of his social grouping; i.e., the fullness of his personality is exposed, drawn upon and facilitated in its tendency to act.

SUMMARY

1. Social psychology as we know it today represents attempts to construct a consistent explanation of the mental processes coming into operation as individuals assume adjustmental relations with their fellows.

2. The knowledge constructs created by students of social phenomena are all highly empirical in nature. In consequence, social psychology may best be regarded as a number of unsolved related problems. These problems are approached hypothetically; the hypotheses themselves appear to take form in accordance with still more general assumptions which we have designated as points of view or working principles.

3. The data of social psychology, in turn interpreted in accordance with the working principles, are categorized by different students in such a way as to create what are commonly called schools.

4. Definitions, useful in coördinating knowledge of social psychology, are general statements of the nature of social psychology.

5. Social phenomena may be studied systematically in terms of closed systems of related facts. These facts pertain to individual reaction patterns and stimulus patterns operating under conditions that constitute social situations.

6. The test of the purity of any science lies in its method. Philosophy contributes to this very important aspect of social psychology. If a science is carried to the point of structuralization where it can dispense with philosophical considerations, it may be said to be to the same extent, settled. Social psychology has not reached that stage.

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CHAPTER III

THE THEORY OF INSTINCTS

The history of the development of social psychology shows that sociology and psychology have always sustained complementary relations. It is only upon the basis of some important change in theory affecting one of them, that their mutual interdependence is clearly apparent. During the last decade there has come just such a change. The sudden and almost complete reversal of the theory of instincts, has produced the spectacle of sociologists and psychologists groping for an adjustment of their theories. The "crisis"¹ in psychology implies a crisis in sociology. One of the most important aspects of social psychology, for the present at least, is that which has to do with the conflicting theories of instincts. Furthermore, the conflict when resolved, is very likely to see both psychology and sociology placed on a more enduring scientific foundation. The dilemma, therefore, in which the students in these two fields find themselves should be regarded as an auspicious sign.

THE CHANGING CONCEPTION OF INSTINCT

An integration of knowledge afforded by advancing branches of related sciences must be worked out unless short-sighted theories are to be accepted. Bernard² rightly arrives at the conclusion that theories of instincts have been accepted uncritically, but he erroneously ascribes the situation to what he calls the "prestige of the biologists," their "subconscious confusion" and their inability to adjust themselves to the rapidly increasing data of biology. An examination of the literature in psychology since James may serve to throw light upon the confusion from a different source. It will then become apparent that the "subconscious confusion" and "prestige" as well, may be referred to the psychologists themselves; the various defini-

¹ See Driesch, H., *The Crisis in Psychology*; also Kantor, J. R., *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, Vol. 18, pp. 50-77.

² *Instinct*.

tions of instinct advanced for more than twenty-five years indicate that there never was a very clear conception of what instincts really are. Finding himself puzzled by the implications of his "a priori synthesis," James reduces all argument to the axiomatic conclusion which beholds instincts as "selbstverständlich" and in need of no proof save their own evidence. He finds man endowed with innumerable "blind" impulses, but somehow strangely enough they lose their "Selbstverständlichkeit" or blindness, following a single expression in the presence of memory. An insect that never sees her eggs hatched must always lay them blindly, "but a hen who has already hatched a brood can hardly be assumed to sit with perfect 'blindness' on her second nest."³ One after another of the criteria of instinct has been modified, so that we are able to state their importance for social theory with less assurance.

The decline of the concept of instincts has amounted to all but a complete denial of their existence.⁴ The difference between James⁵ who saw in instinct an "a priori synthesis of the most perfect sort, needing no proof but its own evidence," and Dunlap⁶ who concludes that "for psychology there are no 'instincts,' " amounts to a revolution in psychology. As a result the application of instinct to social theory is in need of modification. Dewey's reversal of opinion as to the significance of instincts as a basis for social theory is a case in point. Some years since (1917) Dewey said that he was in agreement with the findings of Thorndike and McDougall, and that "henceforth our social psychology is placed upon the sure ground of observation of instinctive behavior."⁷ In 1922 he modified his earlier position.⁸ He would turn the observation about: "The underlying psychology is wrong. . . . There are an indefinite number of original instinctive activities, which are organized into interests and dispositions according to the situations to which they respond. . . . A study of the educative effect, the influence upon habit, of each definite form of human intercourse, is prerequisite to effective reform."

³ *Psychology*, p. 395.

⁴ Eggen, J. B., *Modern Quarterly*, Vol. 2, pp. 294-308.

⁵ *Psychology*, p. 394.

⁶ *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. 14, pp. 307-311.

⁷ *Psychological Review*, Vol. 24, p. 267.

⁸ *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 148-149.

On turning to the earlier psychologists of the period under consideration, namely, the last two decades, there is found something approaching a dogmatic belief in a never to be assailed position in respect to the nature of instincts and their fundamental importance for applied psychology. The central features of this consensus pertain to instinct criteria: their number, their universality, their survival values and the effects of experience upon them.

As has been said, James tended to regard these inborn tendencies as "blind." The fatality for human behavior which he attached to them was conditioned merely by the presence of so many that they stood in each other's way. This position once assumed led to the further deduction that their "transitoriness" would account for the variation in instinctive functions as observed in the behavior of a maturing person, while habits growing out of them might be regarded as exercising an influence comparable to that which he ascribed to the fact of their plurality. But whatever significance he attached to instinct as the basis of human or animal behavior, he never yielded ground as to the momenta of their drives. It remained for McDougall⁹ and Thorndike¹⁰ to stabilize the theory. For McDougall instincts were the "prime movers of all human activities." "The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind." For Thorndike, it was the variation in the driving power or strength of instincts that accounted for individual differences. Thus it is apparent that among the earlier psychologists of the period under review the one big characteristic of instinct was its power to initiate and sustain a drive.

The chief methodological consideration of all science is classification. To this attention was duly directed and it became customary to list the native tendencies or instincts under categories according to their supposed survival values. Earlier classifications of instincts had been definitive of function in a specific sense. Again attention was directed to the theory of "psychogenesis" or its correlative the "law

⁹ *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 45.

¹⁰ *Educational Psychology*, p. 299.

of recapitulation." Upon this theory it was supposed that the individual in the ordinary and normal course of growth and development tended to live through the culture epochs of the race. The pedagogical applications of this theory were carried sometimes to amusing extremes. But here as elsewhere in the establishment of scientific doctrine, nothing clarifies so well as experimentation and classification. Classification brings the student close to his facts from a variety of angles. Thus it came that a few years of reflection began to show results. Thorndike¹¹ found four classifications. That he did not consider his work as final is shown by the fact that he expressed approval of Kirkpatrick's¹² sixfold classification under which there were listed some thirty specific native tendencies.

But their attempts to classify at the same time brought out the theory that one or a few leading instincts were the matrix of others known as derived instincts. This point of view led to the wildest sort of speculation which in time began to place all instinct theories upon a precarious basis. It will suffice to call attention to Trotter's¹³ insistence that the instinct of gregariousness is as definite a response as that of the gastric juice, and that other tendencies to behavior depend upon the prior activity of this particular instinct. So too the Freudian school maintains that native tendencies are derived ultimately from the libido as their matrix.

INSTINCT IN BEHAVIORISM

Along with the changing conception of instincts from the theoretical point of view, as influenced by the method of classification, a second important approach should be considered. The problem of instinct came under direct observation from two distinct sources: the physiological psychologist or neurologist, and those biologists who confined their observations to the controlled behavior of children and animals of all kinds. These two groups of students in time gave rise to the behaviorist school.

So far as neurological data are concerned, there is nothing to show

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

¹² *Fundamentals of Child Study*, pp. 51-63.

¹³ *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.

that we may trace the neural paths for a given instinct.¹⁴ One might suspect that in the case of instincts which are supposed to be inherited from our ancestors, their neural connections might be identified, especially when we take into consideration that they are racially established forms of reaction. Without denying the possibility that such neural processes may yet be determined, it remains only to be said that in the absence of such knowledge, the way is left open for the assumption that there is no neural distinction between habits and instincts. Consequently Allport¹⁵ insists upon the usage of the term "prepotent habit," which seems to him to be of importance in clarifying thought, if not in stating more exactly what actually exists in terms of neural structuralization. Dunlap,¹⁶ for the same reason, cannot distinguish between the antecedents of instincts and habits. Impressed by the studies of Pavlov and his followers who have demonstrated the methods of establishing, modifying and obliterating conditioned reflexes Smith and Guthrie are inclined to call instinctive tendencies and habits by the one name "coenotropes," and in support of their position as to the need for this new term, they venture the suggestion "that further experiment may discover the integration of these coenotropes to be more dependent upon the slow maturation of innate nervous structures than we now have any reason to suppose."¹⁷

TROPISMS AND REFLEXES

Approaching the examination of the theory of instincts in the light of advancing knowledge, we encounter another trail which has served to show the complexity of problems once taken to be fairly simple. This time we come upon a body of facts from the field of pure biology. The biologists in their study of the behavior of lower organisms, especially those with no definite nervous system in the sense of a system of specialized receptors, find that they react regularly in a predictable fashion. They move as a whole to and from heat, light and chemicals, according as these are present or absent in quantities or qualities

¹⁴ For a general discussion of this and related points, see Kantor, J. R., *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Chap. 5.

¹⁵ *Social Psychology*, p. 80; see also Tolman, E. C., *Psychological Review*, Vol. 27, pp. 217-233.

¹⁶ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 19, p. 94.

¹⁷ *General Psychology*, p. 137.

that vary markedly from that of their accustomed environments. Such behavior is explained by saying that the animal in question possesses a tendency to adjust itself in its environment by virtue of "tropisms," or whole-body movements. A distinction can be made between instinct and tropism only by reference to the complexity of the physiological structure of the organism in which the behavior as an instinct or tropism takes place. Going up the scale to the point where specialization of function of parts is found they begin to talk of the behavior of an animal in so far as a specialized organ is concerned, as due to a "reflex." By reasoning backward they have the "chain reflex" theory of instincts. This will account for the reflexes and instincts theoretically but there is a neural difficulty to take care of in order to place tropisms in the same category. Ellwood,¹⁸ as well as others, gets around the difficulty by classifying instinctive tendencies into two kinds: "hereditary organic predispositions" and "hereditary nervous predispositions." As to the former of these dispositions it will be recalled that instincts of all kinds were at one time accounted for organically. Instincts, therefore, as distinguished from tropisms, stand somewhere between the lowest and highest forms of mental processes, i.e., between tropisms and reason. Structurally they remain as before, unexplained.

If on the other hand, the attempt is made to distinguish between reflexes and instincts, the problem is not so complex; at any rate a clear distinction is readily observed in considering them as passive and active response patterns, respectively. Koffka has stated the distinction incisively as follows:

While reflexes are typically "passive" modes of behavior, which depend upon the fact that some stimulus has taken place, instinctive behavior is, by contrast, significantly "active" in its search for stimuli. The bird *seeks* the material for a nest, and the predatory animal *stalks* its game. Instinctive activity is constantly controlled by the sense-organs. The situation which presents itself to the sense organs, after a movement has taken place, determines the continuation of the movement; but success and error are differentiated, so that varied activities may lead to a single goal.¹⁹

Our discussion of instinct so far may appear to be a contradiction of fundamental assumptions; the implication earlier made that the

¹⁸ *The Psychology of Human Society*, p. 284.

¹⁹ *The Growth of the Mind*, p. 100.

human mind is but a continuation of the animal mind, does not at first seem compatible with the assumption that the animal mind is predominately characterized by instinctive reactions, while the human mind is characterized by the absence of instinctive reactions. It may be said that the human as a continuation of the animal mind must logically display the same fundamental mode of behavior. But to take this point of view is to miss the meaning of instinct. Instinct as a concept in a chain of deductions must not, as has often happened in the past, be taken to mean a static mode of behavior.

The attempts to get at the details of the various kinds of inherited predispositions and the corresponding perplexities connected with their explanation, have served only to contribute confusion to the conception of them. On the other hand, the behaviorists who take their data so far as possible from the biologists, are content to minimize the specificity of the so-called inherited predispositions as such, preferring to call them habits.

EMOTION

There remains another phase of the general theory of instincts which demands some attention. This is the affective or "feeling" aspect which is usually referred to as "emotion." For a long time there has been a disposition to regard instinct as an inborn tendency to move and an emotion as an inborn tendency to feel. Both are regarded as impulsive, meaning thereby that when activity is initiated in either of them, they tend to run their course. Instincts and emotions are supposed to be closely related; sometimes they appear to be a unit of behavior. In this case each instinct has its accompanying emotion. Wherever a distinction is drawn between them, instinct is considered as the functioning of sensory-motor neural mechanism, while emotion is the response of the autonomic nervous system. The latter is assumed to be phylogenetically (racially) older. Instinct and emotion are similar in that they are both inherited types of response, having psychophysiological associations with specific environmental situations.²⁰

²⁰ For a comprehensive treatment of emotions see the following: Watson, J. B., *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 32, pp. 347-371; Wechsler, D., *Psychological Review*, Vol. 32, pp. 235-240; Allport, F. H., *Psychological Review*, Vol. 29, pp. 132-139; Hall, G. S., *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 25, pp. 149-200.

INSTINCT AS NASCENT INTELLIGENCE

The relation of intellectual to instinctive behavior is not exactly determined. Without attempting to clarify the situation genetically, it will help us get our bearings on the question at hand by suggesting the possibility of considering instincts as the basis of intelligence, or even in the long run to that highest form of mental activity known as reason. This is possible through the functioning of the affective or emotional aspects of instincts. We might say that the purely reflex tendencies are relatively specific, while the emotions are highly general or unspecific. In fact the same emotions may function in surrogate fashion, i.e., find expression as concomitants of several different reaction patterns of the chain reflex type.

Upon this view we may with risk postulate a hierarchy of mental processes and assign to them names in the order of their generic stages as: tropism, reflex, instinct, habit, conditioned reflex, perception, memory and reason, all of which have their affective phases, emotional or conscious. A complete account would of course include a number of other psychological terms and a statement of the mental reinforcement of each of these stages upon every other. No sharp line of demarcation exists between anyone of these and the one that stands immediately above or below it. They are all more or less plastic. For all we know, instinct may be intelligence in the making, although when we observe instinct and intelligence separately and categorically we say that the former is independent of experience while the latter is created by experience (environment). The newer concept of instinct becomes more pregnant for the meaning of behavior; something is detracted from its older conception as a blind impulse, serving always some survival value.

Looking backward from intelligence, instinct may be "lapsed intelligence" or experience habituated. This older conception is now practically abandoned. The Peckhams²¹ and others have observed in the same species of the *ammophila*, whose behavior Kellogg²² describes as "Simon pure" instinct, a variation which denotes the presence of intelligence. Some individuals actually seize a small

²¹ *Wasps, Social and Solitary.*

²² *Mind and Heredity.*

stone between their mandibles and use it to tamp down the lid of their cells.

Looking forward from reflex selectively, intelligence seems to be sensation colored by experience. This comports with all we know of instinct variation when we come to compare its manifestations in lower and higher forms of animal life. Instinct is less stable in higher forms; more closely related to habit, which of course is subject to variation in the presence of different situations. Many of the so-called instincts are nothing more nor less than action patterns habitually laid down in the plastic period of childhood or initial periods of contact with objects. Thus we come to have Sunday School habits, eating habits, skating habits, golf habits, etc. This is very significant for social theory. In society, what is known as tradition, for example, becomes the "mind stuff" excitant through which the inherited tendencies find satisfaction. Observance of tradition is the mind group reaction pattern which corresponds with habit in the individual.

This connecting of the categories of psychological processes with situations is a fundamental consideration. It has sometimes been claimed that there can be no laws for the ordering of psychological phenomena because every mental datum is a new creation; chaos only can result. Such is the implication of Bergson's philosophy. Such assumptions are stumbling blocks to progress in psychology and indirectly thereby to ordered knowledge in any science. It is better to take the view that objective requirements, as repetitive phenomena, establish relatively settled (and predictable) forms of responses—reflex, habits, and all the others.

SOCIAL INSTINCTS

Customarily psychologists classify instincts as individual and social, meaning thereby that some of our native reaction tendencies are ego-regarding while some are group or other-regarding. The so-called social instincts are invoked to explain individual behavior which has for its purpose the attraction of attention, causing submission, administering succor, seeking assistance, provoking respect and adoration, etc., on the part of others. They are spoken of as the original social forces and give rise to mobs, political parties, fraternal organizations, labor unions, sectarian groups and even nations.

The number of social instincts is variously given. Bernard's²³ exhaustive study reveals 149 classes of social instincts, in more or less common usage among writers. In the light of what we have already said about the changing concept of instincts, it would appear that the term social instinct is more a matter of usage than comprehension. If we can think of these forms of action as originating from experiential relations rather than from impulsive, unlearned capacities, we get a truer picture of them. They are therefore, generally speaking, habits acquired through contact with environmental situations. The term social, here as elsewhere, means mutual coöperation or assistance in the pursuit of common interests which arise in the round of existence. Such behavior presupposes give and take relations on the part of the individuals composing the group in question, although the fact that they unite to form a group may or may not be the result of study and deliberation. It is fair to assume that before a person enters into a given social relationship with another, or with a group of other persons, for any ordinary purpose, he has had some practice in particulars similar to that involved in the act. Knowing the particularized experience of a given individual, one may in a general way, at least, predict his response to a given social situation before he is placed in contact with it. In this sense, the social instincts may be looked upon as complexes of personality.

As one centers his observation upon bees, ants, and other creatures of low order which display group activities of the most perfect sort, he gets the notion that they possess social instincts. Such creatures react in regular fashion to stimuli, internal or external. If some environmental difficulty is placed in their midst during the course of the behavior studied, they appear to be thrown off the track completely. They are likely to give up their activities and prepare to carry them on in a new location.²⁴ Such behavior is called mechanistic—it is the type of mind which is possessed by more than three-fourths of all the half-million known species of animals. Conforming to the spirit of evolution theories, some have concluded that the absence of proof of consciousness in insects puts an end to the metaphysical ideas that all matter, and hence the whole animal world possesses consciousness.

²³ *Instinct*, p. 199.

²⁴ Kellogg, V. L., *Mind and Heredity*.

Extreme views will never describe the psychology of the individual, and much less his social behavior. Psychological concepts and categories are merely the tools which the psychologist uses to describe his observations and to transmit the results of his observations to others. These concepts and categories are therefore symbols, and as such they sometimes fall short of their intended meaning, because of the inherent difficulties associated with attempts to express conceptual thinking in terms of perceptual symbols (words).

The psychoanalytical school gives some very illuminating aperçus to individual and social psychology. In general it has made valuable and lasting contributions; in particulars it has displayed a narrowness unsurpassed in the long history of psychological dogma; many of their mechanisms are entirely fictitious. So far as social psychology in the light of psychoanalysis is concerned we are led to believe that sociability is entirely wanting in the human animal.

Freud says:

We believe that civilization was forged by the driving force of vital necessity, at the cost of instinct-satisfaction, and that the process is to a large extent constantly repeated anew, since each individual who newly enters the human community repeats the sacrifices of his instinct-satisfaction, for the sake of the common good. Among the instinctive forces thus utilized, the sexual impulses play a significant rôle. They are thereby sublimated, i.e., they are diverted from sexual goals and directed to ends socially higher and no longer sexual. But the result is unstable. The sexual instincts are poorly tamed. Each individual who wishes to ally himself with civilization is exposed to the danger of having his sexual instincts rebel against this sublimation.²⁵

We have referred to the psychoanalytical school as champions of the theory of instinct. They use the term constantly, though different adherents vary in their conception of instinct. The unit instinct theory which some hold cannot be ascribed to them. The vagueness of psychoanalytical terms generally places them in position to assume any interpretation of psychological terms that conforms with temporary convenience. This may be the reason why Eggen²⁶ says: "Psychoanalysis does not warrant the use of any instinctive explanation of behavior, despite the fact that the word is often used in books upon the subject. Jung has ridiculed the idea of instincts in his *Theory of Psycho-Analysis*. This point must be insisted upon."

²⁵ *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 8.

²⁶ *Modern Quarterly*, Vol. 2, footnote, page 301.

THREE MENTAL LEVELS

The psychology of an individual is a unit consisting of innumerable elements. Many of these elements have no doubt yet to be discovered and described. We must proceed upon the theory that they all sustain functional interrelations with one another. As G. Stanley Hall was accustomed to saying: "The soul has many mansions." Attempts to simplify this many-mansioned soul have often over-emphasized some of its aspects. Still attempting to render a descriptive formula, we may safely picture the mind as made up of three fundamental levels: instinct, habit and reflection (thinking which displays intelligence). These are functional levels. The differences functionally between them are sometimes closely interrelated so that at a given time, or more properly speaking, in the presence of a given situation, they may give rise to behavior that displays them as coalesced. Another situation may display purely instinctive behavior; again we may have a situation which calls for behavior of the learned (habitual) type; finally we may have a situation which provokes reflective thinking or analytical power, operating on the intellectual level.

The instinctive and habitual levels are usually working in closer harmony than either of them with the intellectual level. So rarely do individuals engage in reflective thinking, in the strict sense of the term, that one is inclined to see rather clearly an argument for the position which the mechanists have assumed. But the intellectual level does function selectively, at least in the presence of some situations. To be stimulated by a situation in its entirety and to react to it with the entire self, call for selection; the individual is aware of this; he says he is conscious; he can in a measure describe this conscious state.

But as we have seen pure instinct can hardly be called a human level; like intelligence (except of the selective variety) pure instinct is rare, in fact, indistinguishable from reflex. This means that habit is the characteristic human level of mentality, habit reinforced or sustained by the instinctive or emotional level and guided to a certain degree by intelligence. This intellectual guidance must in every case be cautiously employed. Many studies of the learning process have been made. Learning is after all a matter of profiting by past

experiences, and acquiring command of novel situations. The most descriptive phrases in all accounts of the learning process are trial and error and trial and success. If learning were conditioned so completely by instinct as some would have us believe, these descriptions would generally read trial and success. The groping which accompanies the exercise of selective intelligence adds the other description—trial and error—while habit formation or training brings it back to instinct, or what amounts to the same thing—well set habits.

ENVIRONMENT

It has already been noted that the earlier theories of social psychology were focused upon the problems of differential race traits as instinctive tendencies. It would appear that these writers were only casually concerned with the problems growing out of immediate environment; such problems occupied a mere marginal position in their minds. Wherever the problems of environment or culture were brought into consideration, it was to lend support to an hereditary theory of social traits. We now know that it was environment that created the mind of man in the first place, laid down the fundamentals of his emotional nature, established his instincts and created his habits. Environment has its specific, temporal and changeable attributes modifying all the human traits. The modified human traits arrive by virtue of conditioned reflexes. It thus appears that the earlier observers began at the wrong end of behavior; their search for genetic ultimates not only led to speculation of such variation as came in time to reflect upon all their findings, but discredited the genetic method itself. Social behavior has both immediate and remote environmental causation.

Our insistence upon the necessity of taking into account the immediate environment as well as the remote, raises the question whether or not we are justified in attempting to explain social behavior by reference to presocial or extra-social experience. Restated, can we say with certainty that when an individual displays social behavior, he is giving expression to individual tendencies of purely personal values? The answer admits of two points of view, one of which we here contend is erroneous. It is as follows:

Among the earlier students of primitive society, notably Tylor²⁷ and Frazer²⁸ there is a persistent effort to explain rites and ceremonies in terms of individual experience unconnected with social situations. Primitive beliefs were supposed to be traceable ultimately to some individual's accidentally meeting an animal, discovering how plants grow from seeds and being conscious of the pangs of hunger. These experiences were taken to be the origins respectively of totemism, agriculture and initiation ceremonies as social activities.

Opposed to this is the theory that social habits are formed gradually. In the words of Hobhouse,²⁹ "mind is a product, not a precondition." There is no unsocial individual, unless it be an abnormal individual, and even in such a case we may regard the behavior as social in origin. Social situations are among the very first to play a part in the formation of early habits. We are surrounded by social stimuli throughout our lifetime. Upon this view we need not seek to explain fully present social life by reference to primitive social life. In other words, the doctrine of instinct as something continuous, persistent and predictable for behavior, emphasizes the stability of personal habits rather than the existence of racial backgrounds. A given social situation is relatively, at least, sufficient unto itself.

The unanalyzed implications of the general doctrine of evolution apparently uphold the first point of view. Man is rather dogmatically spoken of as being connected with the animal kind. As a general statement, this of course, is beyond doubt. There must be other considerations of equal naturalness and plausibility. There must be accretions all along the evolutionary scale. In fact evolution itself would be meaningless without this conception. But scientists or rather the interpreters of the scientists, have at times, in their enthusiasm for a theory which propounds an orderly account of nature, applied this orderliness too rigidly. In this sense the classification of scientific facts, i.e., seeking orderliness for phenomena in the interest of knowledge, is not strictly comparable with the application of this knowledge to situations dissimilar to the situations in which the phenomena were originally observed. There is therefore a certain amount of discrepancy between science and its application.

²⁷ *Primitive Culture*.

²⁸ *Totemism and Exogamy*, pp. 156ff; *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I., p. 106.

²⁹ *Mind in Evolution*.

Thus it comes that the general theory of the inheritable group of human traits is overemphasized. This overemphasis is especially to be found in the application of instinct to modern social theories. Though the theory of a group mind may be cast aside, something approaching its once respectable plausibility still persists. This persistence is manifested in the more general acceptance of the theories of recapitulation, and psychic unity. These theories are merely applicational species of the same family. Pedagogy especially uses the former, anthropology the latter. They are in need of careful analysis and when they are in turn subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny which has come to reject the theory of a group mind, it is not improbable that they will share a similar fate and pass into a like desuetude, though perhaps not so completely. There are some reasons for retaining these theories. Heredity is a fact. Its overemphasis is a common fallacy. The application of recapitulation to pedagogy will here be considered; the theory of psychic unity will be taken up in a later chapter.

RECAPITULATION IN PEDAGOGY

Instinct theories in the domain of education have been confusing. By this we mean to direct attention to the abandon with which educators have addressed themselves to the detailed application of the instinct doctrine. The psychology which formed the basis of this pedagogy is popularly known as genetic psychology. While we may name Rousseau and Basedow as forerunners of the geneticists, we may well agree with Barnes³⁰ who says that "no other writer has made a contribution in any way approaching the work of G. Stanley Hall in formulating his body of "genetic psychology." As a result of Hall's work, to which he devoted his life, the whole field of pedagogy has been revolutionized in the course of some thirty-five years. One popular educator³¹ has said that the factors which most condition the teaching process are those which have to do with the utilization of instincts. While he recognizes the existence of many instincts, he names the following as particularly important for pedagogy: play, constructiveness, imitation, emulation, pugnacity, curiosity, owner-

³⁰ *The New History and the Social Studies*, p. 91.

³¹ Strayer, G. D., *A Brief Course in the Teaching Process*.

ship, collecting, sympathy and wonder. He then enters upon a description of their educational values by way of suggesting how the teacher may apply them in the work of the school. He speaks of the "play instinct" as a preparation for adult life and subscribes to the theory "that the ideal life is the one in which work is play." In fine all the instincts which he recognizes sustain basic relations to an educational program, for "the fact remains that all our work is conditioned by the native equipment."

The application of the instinct theory to pedagogy is in a certain sense a revival or restatement of the older Herbartian "culture epoch" theory. The following table³² illustrates the flowering out of the culture epoch theory as applied to curricula building:

SCHOOL YEAR	MATERIALS OF INSTRUCTION		GENERAL CHARACTER OF EPOCHS
1	Folklore and fairy tales		} Mythical and heroic mind
2	Robinson Crusoe		
	<i>Sacred:</i>	<i>Profane:</i>	
3	Patriarchs and Moses	Thuringian Tales	} Medieval state building
4	Judges and Kings	Nibelungen Tales	
5	Life of Christ	Christianizing and Kaiser Period	
6	Life of Christ	Kaiser Period	Historic mind
7	Paul	Reformation	} Social and political development
8	Luther	Nationalization	
			scientific and philosophic mind

This brief exposition of the instinct theories applied to pedagogy may be found in various ways among contemporary pedagogists. We shall attempt a criticism of the instinct philosophy as follows:

In the first place the specific instincts which many educators describe have not been discovered experimentally. In the second place they are not usually differentiated from habit. Thirdly, the instinct philosophy tends to place a premium upon easy going methods and discipline; next, the philosophy of instinct as applied to pedagogy has given assistance to the theory that education should be as wide as life. As a result the curriculum has been overcrowded with subjects. Finally, it ignores the salient fact that education is a state of mind, that this state of mind is characterized by habits of reflective thought,

³² From the *Year Book of the Herbart Society*, Vol. I., p. 99.

and that these habits in turn are in no way very closely related to impulses; in fact they are the opposite of impulse however observed.

INSTINCTS IN INDUSTRY

Most accounts of instincts in industry are unreliable because they take a narrow view of the industrial situation in reference to human interests and needs. Thus Ordway Tead³³ who has on the whole given the best comprehensive short study of instincts in industry prefaces his book with the assertion that there seem to be "specific innate influences" revealed in industrial life. But if one proceeds to seek for these "specific innate influences" in his account, he is due for disappointment. A list of the instincts treated is: parental, sex, pugnacity, play and curiosity. A mere perusal of this list will suffice to show that what he calls instincts in industry could just as well be called instincts in the professions, instincts in religion, instincts in family life, in fact instincts in anything wherever human energy is expended in the interests of social adjustment.

From this it may be concluded that what are often referred to as instincts in industry, must be taken to mean something other than the term instinct connotes. It would be best to apply the term interests here. There are no specific industrial instincts. What some observers call instincts in this sense, are nothing other than specific names for the various forms of activity which an industrial career necessarily provokes. The behavior in all such cases is accidental in the sense that the worker happens to be employed in a given trade, and his behavior as an employee reveals his human nature. The term instinct in industry is meaningless. It is the whole individual that is involved in his entire industrial life.

THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW

Any analysis of industrial life must include both psychology and sociology. Industrial problems first grow out of social problems in the larger sense. While it is true that perhaps the most fundamental aspect of human nature is concerned with what man has done with his hands, and what he has at the same time felt and thought about his occupation, it must be recognized that these thoughts and feelings

³³ *Instincts in Industry*.

are centered around the larger social adjustments. This is in fact exactly what Tead discusses. These industrial interests may be seen by taking a brief survey of industrial social life as it has developed in England through the activities of the British Labor Movement. Blanshard⁸⁴ lists forty-six "Great Events of British Labor History," taking place between 1720 and 1923. Twenty-two of the events have come in the twentieth century and twelve of these in the last decade. Practically all of these events have come as a result of agitation on the part of labor through their various labor organizations. A study of them leaves no doubt in the reader's mind as to the final sources of social organization and control, as well as the human interests back of them.

The whole social setting gathers around three fundamental human concerns: the laborer's desire for relief from unemployment, sickness and destitute old age. These human demands have after years of struggle found some adjustment in the rise and operation of three corresponding institutions: unemployment insurance, health insurance, and old age pensions, all of which involve governmental supervision.

The insurance against industrial unemployment began as a governmental experiment in 1911 and continued as such till 1920, but during this period a few trades only were involved: metal trades, building and ship building. Since then the insurance has extended to all forms of employment except domestic servants, farm laborers, permanently employed government workers, and those receiving more than \$1200 annually for non-manual labor. The scheme involves a coöperative plan on the part both of the employee and the government; the various contingencies arising in the administration of the plan have been carefully provided for, and the list of these contingencies tells clearly what the personal interests of labor are, as well as the influence of group control on legislation. Insurance against sickness is similarly handled, while the old age pensions are paid to all members of the laboring class above the age of 70 who have an annual income of less than \$150.

WILL IN SOCIETY

In some respects it may truthfully be said that the World War remade psychology. But this assertion is like most new statements—

⁸⁴ *An Outline of the British Labor Movement.*

merely a revival of an old one. At any rate, since 1914, we have been favored with an abundance of literature which describes the functioning of instinct in social situations. One persistent tendency has been that of reviving and for the most part abusing Nietzsche's philosophy of "the will to power." Groups of people are said to possess will—a kind of purpose, basic in human nature, universal in the group to which it is ascribed, collective in its operation. Whether or not it is a social purpose worthy of praise depends upon the attitude of the writer toward the behavior of the group under consideration. A careful examination of this supposed will is more likely to make it conspicuous by revealing its non-existence, than by determining its specific qualities. It is our purpose now to show that this supposed social will is nothing more than a resurrection of the old theory of a group mind; that it carries with it the companion illusion that groups of people, such as nations, adherents to a given political party, communicants of a given church, members of trade unions, lodges, etc. are differential groups, and that the members of these groups are conscious of group purposes and are organized to carry out their purposes intelligently.

One might, on the very face of the situation, be placed on his guard against the acceptance of the theory. It is indeed a very rare event when any considerable number of people may be conscious of pursuing an intelligently arrived at plan of action. In every case we see sentiment as habit aroused by the leaders, to which the members of the group acquiesce. This is a very different thing from willing, which implies reasonable desire plus a sense of attainment. On the other hand if we should say that this will is instinctive, we would find upon examination that it does not so function. Where it is a question of will, there is no need for group marshalling, or for a wise interpreter of group duties. What is spoken of as a social will can best be described in the terms of behaviorism and called a conditioned response created during the period of adjustment to a situation, the needs for which unfold as the action proceeds.

SOCIAL PURPOSE

People influenced by social purpose are united in their behavior, i.e., they give their sanction to prearranged programs of action. But this consent has a history. The first element in the historical

account is individual interest; the second is action characterized by almost any degree of individual response from militant advocacy to blank indifference. Social behavior varies with social situations; the social situations contain within them the elements which draw out the individual reactions. One can no more ascribe a will to a group of people than he can say that a given situation has a will. The most that can be said is that a situation contains possible stimuli, that the individuals in the group may be counted on to act in a certain way toward the stimuli in the situation. If the individual response happens to be instinctive, habitual or intelligent, or all three, it is a case in which an entire situation provokes an entire individual to action. Nor do we arrive at the conception of a group will by multiplying the number of individuals in the group by the common denominator of their behavior. The behavior of a group is therefore a function of the environment with its many variables, in terms of the variables of individual capacities and ways of responding. The assumption of a common will or purpose is often a short-sighted policy. The assumption can be and often is made; moreover it can be inculcated, it can be attached to individual interests, enlarged upon in any number of ways, and laid down in habit-like formation so as to create class consciousness. In such cases the foundation is being laid for the creation of a special part of society which, by virtue of its monopoly of control of public interest, may throw the whole of society into distress. Whenever a part of society, a special group, comes thus into power, we have the spectacle of a part becoming greater than the whole. Street railway and coal strikes are familiar examples.

Again the theory of a common will tends to produce reactionary policies in government, by placing undue faith in the status quo. The demagogue relying upon the inertia of the individuals, when once their habits are set, may align his personal activities accordingly and appear as the guardian angel of society. He boldly asserts that he is protecting the fireside gods and thus retains his power and influence; meanwhile the group suffers because its leadership betrays its better interests.

So it comes that from about every angle that we look at the theory of instincts, there is little left of its supposed verities. Nor can its history justify its continued use. There is no theory of instincts at the present time which deserves the title as such. At its best it

means something that will define problems for future investigation; at its worst, something to be displayed by a succession of events not yet organized. The theory of instincts is exploded—at least in the sense that usually goes with the meaning of the term. The question will be taken up again in Chapter IX.

SUMMARY

The foregoing treatment of the theories pertaining to instinctive behavior may be summarized as follows:

1. Psychologists observing a certain amount of uniformity in human behavior embraced, in the interest of some dependable basis for the establishment of their science, the theory that such behavior might be accounted for in terms of native or unlearned mechanisms. The biological sciences emphasizing nature as against nurture, contributed to the acceptance of the general doctrine. Inasmuch as the biological sciences were studying the behavior of infra-human creatures, the reaction patterns of the mechanical or reflex type did actually appear to dominate behavior. Darwinian conceptions of evolution, while undergoing some change, came to be accepted as a general fact (rather than theory), lending all the force of a fact to both biology and psychology. Psychology therefore became a branch of natural science and as such accepted its facts and principles.

2. Instinct theories applied to the explanation of psychological phenomena are of several fairly distinct varieties. For the earlier psychologists instincts were characterized as *a priori* syntheses, blind in some species, modifiable in others as a result of experience. Other psychologists regarded them as "springs of action" or forces that embrace a teleological factor. Others disliking the metaphysical implications of the "springs of action" theory, postulated a neural explanation—instinctive tendencies to act were ontogenetic. Another group of psychologists thought of the neural basis of such behavior in terms of phylogenetic principles,—the individual in maturing recapitulated the history of the race. Hence instinctive patterns came to maturity with the maturity of the individual organism.

3. The various conceptions of instincts, under analysis, came in time to be complicated by their observed relations with other behavior traits and processes, such as emotions, reflexes, tropisms, conditioned

reflexes and habits. Confusion was the ultimate result. Experimental evidence has tended in recent years to show that the term habit is actually a more factual expression of behavior descriptions. The so-called school of behaviorists in psychology was in due time able to place the principle of stimulus and response foremost. This principle is now gaining a dominant place in psychological theory and promises to maintain its position, since it qualifies as a scientific presupposition and is experimentally valid for some types of investigation.

4. The changing conception of instincts ushers to the front of psychological theory, two important considerations: (a) the whole of psychology has become dynamic rather than static; (b) the environmental situations appearing to the individual as segments of reality, are regarded by psychologists as stimulus patterns. These stimulus patterns being frequently presented are responsible for the setting of habits.

5. The higher and lower mental processes are not strictly separable in function. Hence it appears that the whole-individual and whole-environment conceptions of behavior in the general run of experience, lend plausibility to the theory that environmental forces are more important in social psychology than are innate or unlearned mechanisms.

6. Attempts to account for social activities in the realm of pedagogy, industry and politics on the basis of instincts have not succeeded. Sociology in its several domains must adjust its theories to comport with those of modern psychology. Sociology and psychology are inseparable in their strict applications to the social sciences.

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CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL FORCES

The term "social forces" frequently occurs in the literature on social science. Of all the categories of social science, social forces are undoubtedly the most indefinite. Sometimes the term is employed as the equivalent of energy in the physical sciences. Spencer's position in this respect is familiar. Another source of confusion may be imputed to the failure to differentiate between forces that create society and forces that an already created society brings to bear upon its members. A few examples chosen at random are: (1) individuals are social forces;¹ (2) historical tendencies under the influence of institutions are social forces;² (3) economic and industrial conditions are social forces;³ (4) psychological factors, such as interests, wants, sentiments, wishes, attitudes, and values, concerning which the literature is voluminous, are social forces, etc. Taking all these into consideration, social force may be defined as "the ground of social change so far as it is internal or intrinsic to the social organization in which the change occurs."⁴ The task in the present chapter is to examine this concept for the purpose of ascertaining its place as a definitive factor in social behavior and progress.

PSYCHOLOGICAL USAGE OF THE CONCEPT SOCIAL FORCES

For many writers the term social force does not differ essentially from instinct; the two concepts are synonymous. McDougall⁵ especially emphasizes the driving power of instincts as the "essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action, whether individual or collective." These essential springs are constant for to assume that they "varied greatly from age to age and race to race" is according

¹ Willey, M. M., and Rice, S. A., *Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. I., pp. 338-344.

² Cheyney, E. P., *American Historical Review*, Vol. 19, pp. 231-248.

³ Ogburn, W. F., *Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. I., pp. 73-78.

⁴ *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

⁵ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 20-21.

to McDougall to engage in speculation "founded on quicksand." Likewise Professor Ross regards the instincts as the original social forces, for group (i.e., social) action is a result of concerted mentation which in turn takes place predominately upon the instinctive level.⁶ Sometimes this instinctive origin of social forces was conceived in still more metaphysical terms, especially among the earlier sociologists. Ward⁷ is a good example of those who were able to postulate feeling as a dynamic agent in society, and then in turn to call feeling a cosmic force.

With the coming of the psychology of the unconscious as set forth by Freud and his interpreters, the instinctive foundations of the concept of a social force underwent a slight modification. The specificity of the instinctive background yielded to the more generalized libido of the Freudian school, while at the same time writers began to use freely (and uncritically) those doubtful mechanisms that are supposed to account for the libidinal transformation. For Freud⁸ the libido is a reservoir of energy tending to be released in the interest of race preservation. To this source he ascribed all significant human activities. For Jung⁹ the libidinal transformations take direction in the interest of individual self-adjustments, while for Adler,¹⁰ another typical psychoanalyst, the libido transformations are directed along the general line of individual compensation for some actual or imagined inferiority. In recent years the psychoanalytical theories have found favor among a number of American writers, among whom Holt especially is important because of his philosophical interpretation of the Freudian wish.¹¹

Professor Gault in his recent study appears to be fully aware of the insecurity of the instinct theory as a basis of social psychology. He says that an "examination of motives, whether they have been called instincts or habits, suggests that they are not essentially different from the 'complex' of the psychoanalytical school. In the sphere of abnormal psychological phenomena, the psychoanalysts seek to

⁶ *Principles of Sociology*, Chaps. 4 and 5.

⁷ *Pure Sociology*, p. 99.

⁸ *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*.

⁹ *Analytical Psychology*.

¹⁰ *The Neurotic Constitution*.

¹¹ *The Freudian Wish*.

explain many forms of abnormal behavior on the grounds of a suppressed complex, that in normal life is effective, if at all, unobtrusively."¹² Taking this statement as his premise he reasons that habits are complexes; that all complexes imply drives; that each individual has political, civic, religious and other complexes.

Another recent writer who takes the modified instinct basis as the origin of social forces is Professor Weeks who likens the minds of men to a mine of undeveloped natural resources, and speaks of the human resources as energies yet to be exploited or guided aright. His exposition of the origin and nature of social forces indicates the influence of psychoanalysis upon his thinking, though he does not mention the school. Take the following excerpts: "Invention would know no end if the surplus imagination of sex could be released to science."¹³ "Any trait may be modified and the instinctive tendencies may be swerved and attached to almost any object."¹⁴ "The supreme strategy of civilization is to cut the channels through which energies may flow to acceptable ends."¹⁵ "The downtrodden classes of the Roman Empire accepted Christianity the more readily for its affording an avenue of escape into a world in which the bitter struggle of living was forever removed."¹⁶ "In the psychological sense evasion extends to the setting up of illusions and self-deception. Or evasion may take the form of a selection of interests that minimize the possibility of conflict."¹⁷ "The individual who does not bring his impulses under analysis, and in many instances flout his instinctive promptings, is incapable of the greatest usefulness to society."¹⁸

Pillsbury¹⁹ accepts the modern notion that instincts are subject to great change in accordance with experience. He finds the best evidence for this fact in the case of naturalization, for a study of which America affords the best possible laboratory, although even in America he finds insufficient statistical data with which to substantiate his

¹² *Social Psychology*, p. 53.

¹³ *The Control of the Social Mind*, p. 256.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹⁹ *Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism*.

contention that naturalization hinges upon individual mental states. In the absence of sufficient data upon which to construct an instinct theory, he approaches the problem of naturalization from the standpoint of the dual origin of social forces, viz., "the attitude of the individual towards society and the attitude of society towards him." In this respect he agrees with Balz²⁰ who finds that social forces are confined to two origins: original nature and social environment.

Pillsbury discusses the following specific forces which operate in naturalization: social instincts, race prejudice, assumed superiority of native groups and the consequent feeling of inferiority on the part of the immigrants, public education, acquirement of new language, desire to accept habits of dress, etc. in America, democratic ideals of government. On the whole Pillsbury favors habit formation instead of instincts as adequate forces for promoting naturalization. The acquirement of habits is to be regarded as forced upon the individual from society at large. Accordingly the mechanism of repressions as advanced by the psychoanalytic school fits well into Pillsbury's theory of interaction that gradually results in citizenship. He finds the transformations that the immigrant must make, represent a recapitulation of our whole national history on a small scale.

Some sociologists hold that the effective social forces are due to the operation of intelligence rather than instinct. Professor Giddings is the present outstanding advocate of this source of social forces; he interprets Comte and Ward as forerunners of "Teleological Sociology." Giddings surveys social progress over long periods of time and arrives at the principle of "social telesis" as the causal explanation of a great many phases of progress. "The trend of the telic process is normally from rude struggle towards societal engineering."²¹ Between the "rude struggle" and "societal engineering" is an important controversial stage that marks the first appearance of intelligence as a sort of projected genetic (impulsive) urge in the direction of telic advancement. Different spheres of social life are simultaneously in the impulsive, controversial and engineering stages. These stages are to be conceived in the sense of a theory of natural evolution although Giddings substantiates his telic theory with facts that were not so apparent in the days of Spencer and Bagehot who held similar views

[²⁰ *The Basis of Social Theory.*

²¹ *Scientific Study of Human Society*, p. 145.

of social progress and who may also be designated philosophical forerunners to Giddings.

We now turn to a consideration of Giddings' teleological theory from the standpoint of sources, and are told that only about 4.5 per cent of the general population is responsible for such progress. The entire population is of course the beneficiary, but the real forces, as distinguished from the "turbulences," emanate from the few. It is possible however to look to a somewhat larger leadership (about 9 per cent) after the telic social forces are set going. Lindeman²² criticizes Giddings on this point, since it would appear to him that the term social forces by definition must refer to the whole of society. But a criticism of the telic theory on this score is unwarranted; in fact the long slow history of progress must lend credence to Giddings' theory; one might if anything surmise that Giddings is too liberal in ascribing both the source and the leadership of telic forces to about 15 per cent of the general population. The only real criticism that may be offered to Giddings' theory of the origin and directing of telic forces is what appears to be his faith in the findings of those psychologists who have told us so much in recent years concerning the accuracy of the Army and other mental tests. Such tests are by no means standardized; they do not differentiate clearly between native abilities and literacy; nor do they segregate creative intelligence from mere mental alertness although they appear to be two different capacities. In the light of recent developments, it is becoming apparent that native creative intelligence is much more rare than is sometimes supposed. However this may be, another recent writer²³ with statistics quite reliable concerning the sources of intelligence, concludes "that there are not in all the world 100,000 persons whose creative effort is responsible for the advancement of science." That number would include about one-tenth of one per cent of the population of the United States, alone.

Our survey of prevailing opinion in regard to the nature and origin of social forces so far has had to do chiefly with those writers who look primarily to individual mental processes—social forces that are assumed to come primarily from the individual as a social unit. We shall now note briefly the position assumed by those who conceive

²² *Social Discovery*, p. 86.

²³ Little, A. D., *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 134, pp. 771-781.

social forces as originating from aggregates as social units. In general those who look to the group as the source of social forces, are adherents of the group mind school discussed in the next chapter. Their basic presupposition is that when a group of persons function socially, something new is created, or an unusual force is brought to bear upon the individual, so that his behavior is markedly different from what it would be in isolation.

For present purposes we will begin with Bagehot who has been named as one of the founders of social psychology. Like Giddings, Bagehot accepts the naturalistic interpretation of social progress—the laws of evolution as applied to natural science also obtain strictly for social science. Two leading principles that he uses are the survival of the fittest and the struggle for existence. Conflict is basic and the strong groups are responsible for progress. These are mechanisms external to the individual.

But why is one nation stronger than another? In the answer to that, I believe, lies the key to the principal progress of early civilisation, and to some of the progress of all civilisation. The answer is that there are very many advantages—some small and some great—every one of which tends to make the nation which has it superior to the nation which has it not; that many of these advantages can be imparted to subjugated races, or imitated by competing races; and that, though some of these advantages may be perishable or inimitable, yet, on the whole, the energy of civilisation grows by the coalescence of strengths and by the competition of strengths.²⁴

Another basic principle for Bagehot is what he so often refers to as the “cake of custom.” This is the principle of imitation.

This is the precise case with the whole family of arrested civilisations. A large part, a very large part, of the world seems to be ready to advance to something good—to have prepared all the means to advance to something good,—and then to have stopped, and not advance. . . .

The reason is, that only those nations can progress which persevere and use the fundamental peculiarity which was given by nature to man's organism as to all other organisms. By a law of which we know no reason, but which is among the first by which Providence guides and governs the world, there is a tendency in descendants to be like their progenitors, and yet a tendency also in descendants to differ from their progenitors. . . . The fixed custom which public opinion alone tolerates is imposed on all minds, whether it suits them or not. In that

²⁴ *Physics and Politics*, pp. 49–50.

case the community feels that this custom is the only shelter from bare tyranny, and the only security for what they value.²⁵

The foregoing principles—conflict, submission and imitation—have been treated in order to show the influence of the earlier philosophies upon contemporary social psychologists. Ross does not wander far from these external forces in his *Social Psychology*; likewise they are basic for Bogardus.²⁶

The following are a number of familiar socio-psychological terms and principles which find prominent places in current texts and which may be taken to represent the mechanisms of forces emanating from the group as a social unit.

<i>Principle or term</i>	<i>Advocate</i>
Priority groups	Bogardus
Custom-imitation	Ross
Mob mind (or crowd mind)	Le Bon and many others
Suggestion	Sidis, Ross and others
Discussion	Giddings, Ross and others
National ideals	McDougall
Coöperation	Wright
Group unity	Ellwood
Group rivalry	Williams
Repression	The psychoanalysts generally
Social subjectivation	Znaniecki

CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL FORCES

In the first place a social force is something other than stimulus. A stimulus is an agent that acts momentarily; a force is an agent that acts continuously or has had the way prepared for it by relatively long preparatory circumstances affecting the individual about to respond. Both stimuli and forces may be caused by internal and external conditions. In a special way it may be urged that a series of stimuli may be taken as the equivalent of a force evocator in the sense here proposed.

Moreover a social force is not to be placed in the same category of natural phenomena as forces in chemistry, physics or their applied

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

²⁶ *Essentials of Social Psychology*.

fields. This, some have consistently tried to do, as the following quotation from Weiss²⁷ shows:

The fact that force is the name for a relationship between stimuli and not a stimulus itself is also a source of error in the traditional conceptions of human behavior. The individual is supposed to not only possess physical and chemical properties but also a property known as psychical force. If the psychical forces were merely regarded as a relationship between, say such things as the rate of solving a problem and the adequacy of the solution as measured by certain biosocial standards, no confusion would result. However, the psychical force is regarded as some property of the organism which produces the adequate solution. If a physical force is the name for a particular relation between physical units, then a psychical force should be the name for a particular relation between psychical units. Concretely, if "volition" is regarded as psychical force, it should be a particular relationship between such psychical units or elements as sensation, image, feeling, Gestalten, or whatever may be regarded as the psychical elements of a given psychological system. However, there are no relationships between sensations, images, feelings, that are so uniform and constant that anyone has attempted to formulate them into an equation. If, for instance, we could say that a given visual sensation is invariably followed by a given visual image there would be a justification for a term such as psychical force or mental force; but such a relationship between sensation and image or any of the so-called mental elements has never been affirmed. If, as is the case, it is necessary to introduce a physical or physiological series upon which to base whatever uniformity may be found in the so-called psychical relationships, then we are actually dealing with physical forces and the term psychical force does not represent a non-physical force but only a special type of relationship between physiological processes.

The instinct psychologists tend to uphold a similar position, although they usually assume that the instinct, impulse or emotion is a sort of "a priori synthesis" beyond which further seeking for ultimates needs not go. Neither the conception of force (in a social sense at least) as urged by the behaviorist or instinct schools can stand the test in social psychology.

For a more satisfactory conception of a social force, we must turn to those sociologists who have made this subject their special field of investigation. An excerpt from Giddings will help to clarify the concept of social force as viewed by the sociologists.

There has been a good deal of unprecise talk among sociologists and social workers about "social forces." For quacks and amateurs the phrase is charged with mana. It creates an illusion of knowledge at command which suspends in-

²⁷ *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior*, pp. 32-34.

tellectual animation, and may end in mental coma. To scientific inquirers able to keep their heads it offers possibilities not yet exploited.

Social energies there are; obvious in manifestation or detected by accident, subtle in working or terrific in explosion, and so far known; but they are not yet brought within scientific description, certainly not within the quantitative formulation characteristic of our familiar descriptions of thermo-dynamic, chemical, and electro-magnetic energies. Therefore, they are not always correctly identified and classified. Not all of them in strict parlance are "forces," namely, coördinate motions. Most of them are turbulences, like chemical energies and heat.²⁸

The term "social forces," as I have intimated, is loosely used; in fact, so loosely that it has acquired at least three different meanings. (1) There are energies that do not originate in society but which often produce social and societal results. Conditions and circumstances, including hardships and dangers, that drive men into consorting and coöperation are in this sense social and societal energies. It would be better to call energies that produce social and societal results "socializing energies," whether they originate outside of society or within it. (2) Tremendous energies that originate in society produce results that may or may not be social in quality. Riots and lynchings, for example, are not. It would be well to call these energies "societal," regardless of the quality of what they do. (3) Then we should have, as the intelligible and accepted definition of societal-social energies all energies that both originate in society and produce social and societal results: the socializing energies that are societal, and the societal energies that are socializing.²⁹

Bogardus would define social forces from the cultural point of view:

By contradistinction, let us look at the ordinary group environment into which he is brought at birth. There is his parental group with its established language, its developed beliefs, and iron clad rules of conduct, its religious traditions and convictions. These all-powerful parental forces are made up out of neighborhood, national, racial, and cultural heritages millenniums old. They are often permeated by titanic superstitions, and by interpretations of life that have been passed from generation to generation and possess all the force of the ages. Compare the hoary age and the tremendous power of these group forces with the weak naïvete of the new born babe.³⁰

From another leading sociologist we have a more extensive statement of social forces:

We may conveniently divide the factors of human association into original and derived. The original factors are those furnished by physical nature and

²⁸ *Scientific Study of Human Society*, pp. 189-190.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

³⁰ *Essentials of Social Psychology*, pp. 188-189.

original human nature. The derived factors are compounded out of the simple, original factors and many of them are products of human culture. As original social forces or active factors in human association we must recognize the following:

1. The physical factors:
 - (a) Geographic environment, including climate, food, natural resources, topography, etc.
 - (b) Biological factors, as heredity, variation, selection, etc.
2. The psychical factors:
 - (a) Impulses, both hereditary (instinctive) and acquired (habitual)
 - (b) Feelings, both hereditary (emotions) and acquired (habitual)
 - (c) Intellectual elements, including sensation, perception, and ideation (conception, imagination, reasoning, etc.)

Derivative social forces or factors in association are those compounded out of these original elements. They are very numerous and have never been satisfactorily listed or classified. They include, for example, the desires and wishes of individuals, compounded mainly out of feelings and impulses; the sentiments, which are enduring attitudes built up mainly out of feelings and impulses; the interests and values, which are compounds built up out of feelings, impulses, and intellectual elements. All of these supply normally the motives for the reflective activities of civilized men. Hence they all modify and condition the expression of the original psychic factors of impulse, feeling, and intellect, just as the physical factors also modify and condition them.²¹

The foregoing definitions are not entirely satisfactory. The theories of social psychology are so diverse that the concepts which are comprehended in them defy strict definition. Moreover it seems that as social science is again and again approached by students who employ the strict logic of mathematics or other exact sciences, there come from these same students expressions of doubt as to the possibility of ever including social psychology among the exact sciences. The author of a recent book on social statistics says in his introduction:

Today we refer to that field of endeavor which has to do with the study of human relationships as the social sciences, and it is a question in the minds of many, whether in their present state of development, they justify being so designated. Some even contend that human relationships are of such variable and highly complicated order that it will never be possible to reduce their study to the status of an exact science.²²

From the foregoing it must be clear that the study of social forces must for some time to come be regarded as a challenge to the ingenuity

²¹ Ellwood, C. A., *The Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 113-114.

²² Dittmer, C. G., *Introduction to Social Statistics*, pp. 3-4.

of the student. Nothing can be gained by ignoring the difficulties involved, nor by claiming for them a method of classification which in itself contains ambiguities quite as tantalizing as the data which such methods propose to elucidate. It would appear therefore that social forces must be described rather than defined. Classification will assist in this respect. There are two fairly dichotomous and interlocking classes of descriptive terms which apply to social forces in the light of those conceptions which social scientists appear to hold. They may be stated as follows:

- a. Individual-regarding social forces
- b. Group-regarding social forces

This classification, however, is by no means completely descriptive. It represents what might be termed a primary classification. Nothing short of a factorial description of social situations will indicate the quality and quantity of social forces which function therein. Take the case of a powerful social leader, e.g., the President of the United States. As a social factor (a force generator), he is an individual. But since he stands as the spokesman of a group, he may actually yield a force which partakes of the nature of a group as well as that of an individual. His opinion (as an individual) in regard to economy may influence the country quite as decisively as would a large number of people organized and working for an economy program. So too the Prince of Wales dictates the styles for men's clothes; the late Mr. Bryan's pronouncement on the theory of evolution was unfortunately more powerful than that of a score of America's best known scientists. Such personalities Ross calls "radiant points of imitations." In all such cases the individual-regarding force may be positive or negative or both. In this the psychology of prestige, leadership, wealth, personality, birth and scores of other categories are important considerations. A vast complexity is confronted. Again the negative quality of the group-regarding force is to be taken to mean what usually happens in common social situations. Here is the psychology of suggestion, imitation, submission, repression—all familiar terms in social psychology. But forces emanating from the group may act positively on the individual, as Allport abundantly shows. The psychology of interaction as discussed in Chapter XI applies in this connection.

SOCIETY AS A SYSTEM OF FORCES

A thoroughly modern social principle is that which recognizes society as a system of reciprocal forces. From this viewpoint forces may be classified as: (a) integrating forces and (b) differentiating forces. Integrating forces are those that tend to form what Giddings calls "sodalities," "blocs," "classes," "sovereign states," etc. Differentiating forces are those that tend to preserve such social integrations once they are formed. Simmel's principle of "reciprocity" applies in this connection.

. . . . The group is more than a merely subjective synthesis. It is an objective unity, judged by the one valid objective criterion of unity, namely, reciprocal activity of parts. Unity in the empirical sense is nothing but reciprocity of elements. It is a functional, a dynamic, and a gradual concept. An organic body is a unity because its organs are in a more intimate interchange of energies with one another than with any outside agent. In the last analysis, even the unity of the individual mind is nothing but the dynamic functional reciprocity of its energies.

The group possesses a unity of the same nature. A social group consists, in the last analysis, in mental attitudes or psychological occurrences within the minds of the individuals; but the fact that these attitudes and occurrences are the product of mutual determinations and reciprocal influences creates a dynamic functional relationship between the individuals, and that dynamic functional relationship creates and is the unity of the group. The group is a unity because of this process or these processes of reciprocal influencing between the individuals. The state is a unity because between its citizens there is a more intimate exchange of reciprocal influences than between these citizens and those of other states.³³

INSTITUTIONS AS SOCIAL FORCES

The institutions which society has set up are agents generating the most powerful of social forces. The "strong arm of the law," "court opinions," "ecclesiastical sanction," "conceded by the press," are common expressions which denote the negative or suppressing power that originates in the several institutions. Institutions however must not be looked upon as social impediments merely because they exercise a controlling force upon the individual. Society is, institutionally speaking, a system of forces whose purpose is to assist all in the solution of existential problems. Whereas an individual may be a "radiant point" in the dispersion of free forces, an institution is a reference point for forces which require standardization.

³³ Spykman, N. J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, p. 27.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Students of social phenomena in their search for consistent explanations of social movements and social progress assume some mechanism or force as the efficient principle back of such movements and progress.

2. While their explanations vary greatly, most students use the term social force to account for the causal relations they observe among social phenomena.

3. The several meanings of the term social force as found in the literature may be summarized as follows:

a. Historical progress regarded as natural history is due to hidden forces evolving and operating as events unfold. No definition of force is given by historians.

b. Social force as an energy creating social movement is analogous to energy in the world of physical phenomena.

c. Social forces are due to psychological factors operating in the individuals composing society—instincts, wishes, ideas, etc.

d. Social forces are complexes of community life.

e. Individuals who are able to influence large numbers of people are social forces.

f. Social institutions operate as social forces.

g. The term social force having no strictly determinable mechanism must be regarded as a general statement of sequential rather than causal relations among social phenomena.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

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CHAPTER V

GROUP MIND THEORIES

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The present chapter will consider some of the group mind theories with as much brevity as a portrayal of their bare essentials will permit. It is not possible in the present study to do them justice. The selection is made for the purpose of pointing out some typical ways in which writers have attacked the problems of social psychology.

The assumption of a group mind in one or another form is central for social psychology, notwithstanding the fact that present day psychologists regard the group mind hypothesis as unwarranted. It is central because out of the discussions that have raged around it, has come that knowledge which constitutes a clearer conception of social facts and laws; central again because certain psychological terms are upon the basis of such assumptions being studied for the purpose of arriving at more exact definition. It appears that there are still good reasons for studying social psychology in the light of collectivities, although collectivities do not necessarily imply a group mind in the sense of some of the systems to be reviewed. Most social psychologists have addressed their studies to groups rather than to individuals for the following reasons: (1) The behavior of an individual in a group differs from his behavior in isolation. But most empirical observations were not clarified by the additional knowledge that the individuals so observed were the recipients of different stimuli under the two conditions. (2) Certain aspects of the general environment appear significant to the individual out of sheer historic values. These historic values seem always to operate as axiological determiners of individual mental activities. These values are perpetuated in organizations that survive generations. Upon the basis of these two observations, most of the group mind theories are proposed.

Genetically speaking, there are three sorts of group mind theories: (1) those that assume a more or less metaphysical group mind over and above individual minds; (2) those that stress instincts or other

processes such as imitation, etc.; (3) those that account for a group mind on the basis of cultural products. These in turn are variously subdivided, according as the several writers center their observations upon regional (physical), strictly social, economic, or other aspects of environment, or one or another of the many kinds of mental mechanisms operating as determiners of social behavior.

All are open to the same objection—they tend to minimize the individual. If, for example, an extreme view of the influence of physical environment is taken, the individual and his groupings are portrayed as dehumanized parcels of the physical region in which they reside. On the other hand social environment theories are also often extremely stated. It would be best to speak of this second class of theories in their extreme forms as exaggerated interpersonal theories. They in turn fall into two classes: concept theories and process theories. The earlier writers, on the whole, emphasized the concept theories, which picture the social or group mind as masses of ideas, images, or presentations floating about the community and influencing, even coercing the behavior of individuals. The process theories emphasize the instincts, ideational and reflective powers of individuals in various degrees. Generally it is the instincts that are advanced to account for the influence one person or group of persons brings to bear upon another person or group.

All these conceptions were of course entertained by their advocates in the interest of some unified and definable subject-matter. They were searching for a basis for systematization of a science of society; a system that when arranged, might be thereafter studied by a specific method which would in the end reveal social laws.

There is just enough truth in most of these conceptions, if moderately stated, to say that the true nature of social groupings and their behavior is a composition of them. A society is dependent in many ways upon its physical surroundings; mental contents, ideas and the like are shared by individuals in the sense that they come to hold them as meanings or values; human beings do in general possess the same mental processes—they perceive things through the senses, come to acquire similar habits, do a certain amount of what is called reasoning or reflecting, are moved to act in accordance with native tendencies, on what more recently are called "drives." These individual tendencies are the basis for a certain amount of social interaction. In the

present chapter we shall confine discussion chiefly to social environment or interaction theories, leaving the other environmental aspect to another chapter.

ESPINAS' COLLECTIVE THEORY

Espinas in *Des Sociétés Animales* sets out to explain the feelings of attachment among individuals in a group. This he says cannot be accounted for except on the theory that each individual conscience or mind includes that of all the others. Many minds fuse into one mind forming a collective consciousness or group mind. This fusion of individual minds is explained as follows. The individual consciousness, capable of division and diffusion, is at any time composed of two general factors—presentations (ideas) and impulses. Presentations pass readily from mind to mind by means of signs (language, gestures, etc.) while the impulses are diffused rapidly through the agency of recognized leaders. The impulsive factors increase in energy in proportion to the number of individuals concerned and the type of organization involved. Ideas and impulses, like the forces of nature, may at times be dispersed, at other times concentrated. In the latter condition they are highly active.

Each individual also possesses a non-communicable part. This part is unconscious; it is composed of ideas and trends which may be called purely individual, but it does not as such separate one individual from others. This non-communicable part undergoes gradual changes due to racial factors.

Another feature of Espinas' system is the assumption that society, on account of its multiple consciousness, is capable of knowing itself; it therefore exists in and for itself. This is a higher stage of reality than that of the individual mind.

One weakness of Espinas' general theory lies in the fact that he becomes hopelessly entangled in trying to work out a method for social psychology that will be in strict accord with the method of the natural sciences. Ideas and impulses as forces comparable with the force of gravity, at one time quiescent, at another active, influenced by arrangements of personalities as the carriers of these forces, call for unusual presuppositions in regard to the functional aspects of psychical elements. Secondly he becomes confused in regard to mental processes and mental contents. These two factors are differ-

ent in nature.¹ Yet he speaks indifferently of them as passing from mind to mind. Psychical processes are purely individual in nature. While different individuals may possess similar processes giving rise to similar ideas, etc., the processes (acts of experiencing) can never by any mechanism become common property. Nor can introspection fully determine if they function alike for different individuals, although known and recognized as functions by arbitrary names.

Mental processes being individual, and known to others only by analogical deductions, it follows that the contents (ideas or presentations) which the processes create, are also individual. Similar thought contents, similar ideas, similar affective states, etc., may and do become common property in the sense that they are recognized as individual mental contents responsible for similar acts or tendencies to act. In such cases it is correct to speak of universal or ideal contents. So too, if some common cultural product arouses identical mental processes in the minds of individuals, a prediction of common behavior can be made. But both the processes and the contents remain strictly individual.

Finally Espinas' criterion of the reality of a group mind which ascribes to it the quality of consciousness is nothing short of speculation.²

DURKHEIM'S SYSTEM

Durkheim's theory of the group mind for which he maintains a rigorous adherence to the natural science method as conceived by positivistic philosophy, is one of the very best examples of the failure of that method to account fully for social psychology.³ Because of

¹ "In every experience we may distinguish between the *act of experiencing* and the *object* or 'content' of that experience—in other words, between experience taken as *process* and experience taken as *content*. The word 'experience' itself is ambiguous, and covers both these meanings. As between the two it will be recognized that the *content* of experience may be, and perhaps always is, extremely complex, and analyzable into a number of simpler components—as, for example, my experience of a symphony, a painting, the World War, or life in general: the act or *process* of experience, however, the experiencing of the content, is at every moment a single act of consciousness, a simple and unanalyzable fact." Moore, J. S., *The Foundations of Psychology*, p. 22.

² The student may profitably compare Espinas' theory with C. H. Cooley's principle of social consciousness as set forth in *Human Nature and the Social Order*.

³ See Chapter XII for an explanation of method referred to.

the elaborations and adjustments which he was forced, in the interest of "objectiveness," to make from time to time, Durkheim's system may be considered a fair test of the natural science method so far as his presuppositions are concerned. In many respects Espinas' theory and Durkheim's theory are similar: both make the group mind metaphysical; both reduce the individual to practical non-entity—in Durkheim's theory this vanishing of the individual is almost wholly consummated; both minimize individual instincts; both say that the group possesses a consciousness of its own; both stress the organization and number of individuals in the group as criteria of group mind qualities; both confuse process and content.

Durkheim begins with individual sensations. When an individual receives a sensation, his cerebral cells begin immediately to react upon it; a fusion with sensations already in the brain takes place and in the course of time this sensation is transformed so that it soon loses its identity as such and becomes an image. Images compound or fuse to form concepts; concepts in turn fuse to form individual representations. Images, concepts and representations are regarded as purely psychic in contradistinction to the cerebral characteristics of the sensations out of which they evolve. The only connection they have with brain cells is that the latter are carriers of the former. This relation is however merely nominal.

Let us suppose that a number of individuals as carriers of individual representations come together; then it is that the individual representations fuse to create a new entity—collective representations. Collective representations are embodied in social facts (yet to be explained). Collective representations differ in character, quality and kind from individual representations, so that Durkheim is able to say that "The group thinks, feels, acts quite differently from what its members would if they were isolated." The social mind is according to Durkheim superior to the individual mind.

The superiority of the collective mind, since it escapes all influences from instincts, is characterized by higher and higher stages of intellectuality. This is effected by successive fusions of collective representations, which in due time create "purely collective representations." To these Durkheim ascribes the fullest meaning of society. In fact, it may be said that this body of representations is society, for the individuals lead a life wholly subservient to the coercive force

of the purely collective representations. Society (the body of collective representations) reaches out in space and time so that centuries of time and millions of individuals are concerned in its structure. A mere individual has no prestige in such a society. The individual, in fact, can realize his possibilities as a social being only as he submits to its power. There is no original genius or inventor, no criminal; no one willingly marries, seeks divorce, or commits suicide.⁴ Individual acts of every sort are coerced by the group mind.

The confusion of processes and contents of which Durkheim seems to be unaware, renders his whole system devoid of meaning so far as his definition of social facts is concerned. A social fact for Durkheim is a thing, a content. Such contents must be observed entirely apart from individuals, the original carriers of individual representations. For the same reason he has little to do with cultural products since they cannot be observed aside from the individuals who are influenced by them. Moreover he cannot assume an historical or actual group of individuals as a social unit, but must fall back upon a theoretical "horde" which he admits has no reality. Thus Durkheim's whole system turns out to be meaningless, as all systems must, which start with the presupposition of a group mind as something over and outside of individual minds.

LE BON AND DURKHEIM COMPARED

One way of determining the worth of all group mind theories as explanations of social psychology, is to compare them. This was done in the case of Espinas and Durkheim. But there it was a case of comparing two systems which were consistently similar. It will now be of service to compare two systems that are in several respects dissimilar beyond the general assumption that a group possesses or comes to possess a mind of its own, and the consequent correlative judgment that something essentially foreign to the nature of the individual takes possession of him when he becomes a member of a group. The comparison will serve at the same time to state the essentials of Le Bon's theories.

The first comparison has to do with the foundation of their respective group minds. Le Bon is at once less mystical and less consistent

⁴ For a more recent and identical interpretation of the place of the individual in society, see Korzybski, A., *The Manhood of Humanity*, pp. 115ff.

generally than Durkheim. Yet the group mind is the highest form of social reality for both. For Le Bon it is displayed in "national character." "A people is guided far more by its dead than by its living members. It is by its dead and its dead alone, that a race is founded. Century after century our departed ancestors have fashioned our ideas and sentiments, and in consequence the motives of our conduct."⁵ For Durkheim the group mind was not so much concerned with race characteristics; at any rate, the race traits as distinguished from their causes are not active; these are his purely collective representations, which are taken to mean compounds of representations (ideas) of all past generations rather than inherited traits as in Le Bon's theory. Therefore, as would be expected, Le Bon stressed instincts. Whereas Durkheim found that the group mind was a conscious mind, Le Bon sees it as an unconscious mind. He repeatedly refers to the racial soul and racial unconscious. It is this feature of Le Bon's system, so far as he may be said to have a coherent system, that led Freud⁶ to look with favor upon his basic principles.

It has been said that Durkheim found no place for instincts and impulses in the group mind processes. His was an extremely intellectualistic theory—society actually became a great God, all powerful, omniscient and infallible in judgment. From Le Bon we get the direct opposite: the group mind is the acme of stupidity.

Crowds are to some extent in the position of the sleeper whose reason, suspended for the time being, allows the arousing in his mind of images of extreme intensity which would quietly be dissipated could they be submitted to the action of reflection. Crowds being incapable both of reflection and of reasoning, are devoid of the notion of improbability; and it is to be noted that in a general way it is the most improbable things that are the most "striking."⁷

Le Bon, however, is inconsistent in what he conceives to be the contents of the group mind. Two quotations will illustrate the confusion.

⁵ *The Psychology of Peoples*, p. 230.

⁶ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*.

⁷ *The Crowd*, p. 75. The term crowd as used by Le Bon in this citation and generally throughout his popular treatise on social psychology expresses the equivalent of the expression "popular mind," its subtitle. Le Bon's idea of the group mind is accordingly less metaphysical than that of Durkheim.

There are certain ideas and feelings which do not come into being, or do not transform themselves into acts except in the case of individuals forming a crowd. . . . What really takes place is a combination followed by the creation of new characteristics, just as in chemistry certain elements, when brought into contact—bases and acids, for example—combine to form a new body possessing properties quite different from those of the bodies that have served to form it.⁸

Men the most unlike in the matter of their intelligence possess instincts, passions, and feelings that are very similar. In the case of everything that belongs to the realm of sentiment—religion, politics, morality, and the affections and antipathies, etc.—the most eminent men seldom surpass the standard of the most ordinary individuals. . . .

It is precisely these general qualities of character, governed by forces of which we are unconscious, and possessed by the majority of the normal individuals of a race in much the same degree—it is precisely these qualities, I say, that in crowds become common property.⁹

Within the scope of two consecutive pages Le Bon maintains that this content of the group mind is a new creation, and at the same time common property which is carried about unknown to the individual. The group mind therefore is made up of both unknown and known quantities.

The next problem will be that of determining the mechanism responsible for the group mind's coming into existence. In the case of the common (unconscious) factors of the group mind the mechanism is very simple: the conscious mind goes to sleep, individual characteristics become obliterated and in this state the racial unconscious emerges, so that what was heterogeneous before the group was formed becomes homogeneous after it is formed.

Le Bon accounts for the new factors in three ways. First, the individual feels a sentiment of power, his ego is enlarged. This feeling which increases with the number in the group, allows him to yield to his impulses, prevents him from restraining or checking their force. In the second place, the individual in a group is subjected to the phenomenon of contagion, an "aptitude very contrary to his nature, and of which man is scarcely capable except when he makes a part of a crowd."¹⁰ The third and most important according to Le Bon, is the process of suggestibility which is described as the creator of contagion.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31-32.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 34.

These considerations leave us still more confused. New characteristics are created, but upon examination they turn out to be processes which arise as products of other processes. If as Le Bon insists (though he admits it is hard to explain) the psychological state of mind known as suggestibility turns out to be a creator rather than an experiencing state, the way is left open for all sorts of confusions of mental processes with mental contents. This confusion was to be expected when Le Bon announced that something new in the domain of psychology is created when a group is assembled. It is possible however to give Le Bon the advantage of the doubt as to his clearness, and take the view that the process of contagion is something uncovered in the bringing of successively lower levels of the unconscious into play. In this case it would appear as something already possessed by all individuals and it takes its place with suggestibility as a process. This reasoning does away with his earlier statement that something new is created, something "contrary to his nature" which comes into play when an individual becomes associated.

LAZARUS AND STEINTHAL

Some writers have recognized a difference between the German and French students of social or collective psychology. The French on the whole, as the foregoing cases show, tend toward abstractness; the German students tend toward concreteness, chiefly because they have derived their theories from facts pertaining to the cultural products of groups. The spiritual characteristics of the group for the French go back ultimately to the interaction of individual minds; for the Germans such characteristics are derived from environment in general. These two points of departure include correspondingly different methods; the French use (though they sometimes abandon) the method of natural science; the Germans are less sure of their method, which turns out to be a mixture of the methods of natural science and the less definite descriptions and conceptions of history and philosophy. These distinctions, however, are by no means absolute. As relative distinctions they serve to direct attention to two general aspects of social psychology that continually confront us in this study, viz., the abstract and the historical conceptions of the individual.

Lazarus and Steinthal depart widely from such writers as Durkheim. The latter could find but little place for the consideration of cultural products; his social reality could not be understood in terms of an individual or group associated with a concrete environment. Opposed to this view, Lazarus and Steinthal proposed to be objective, to see culture in its historical setting. This statement of their procedure should be qualified to some extent for they divided the whole of their studies into two parts: one was an abstract part which was to deal with the laws of group consciousness without reference to particular peoples; the other, a concrete part which was to deal with the mental characteristics of particular historic groups. Their group psychology was to explain groups as a whole, just as general psychology explains individuals. Their group psychology was a continuation of individual psychology. Dennes says: "The transition from the *minds* of individuals to *mind* operating in the social group is crucial for Lazarus and Steinthal . . . if Lazarus and Steinthal had made the transition from minds considered in isolation to minds considered as operating in social groups they would have avoided the need of supposing the existence of a social or collective mind."¹¹ As to the psychology for their second division, it can best be described as a sort of social morphology. The successive contributions to the "*Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*" tended to ignore the first division and its methods.

The abandonment of the first part of the Lazarus and Steinthal program in favor of the historical or cultural part shows that in their work there is to be noticed an evolution of method more apparent than in the case of any other systematizers. This fact is an additional reason why, as was earlier mentioned, these students are to be rated among the founders of social psychology. Some confusion as to the exact position that Lazarus and Steinthal took as a basis for their group mind theory, is found among the writers who endeavor to interpret them. It is undoubtedly correct to classify them among those who belong to the cultural product school. This means that their conception of a group mind is that which displays the characteristics of peoples as influenced by environment rather than that conception which acknowledges a group mind as resulting from the interaction of individual minds.

¹¹ *The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology*, p. 61 (footnote).

MCDUGALL'S THEORIES

McDougall first based social psychology on individual psychology. In his *"Introduction to Social Psychology"* (1908) he designated the inherited tendencies of the individual as the all-important subject matter. Taking the instinctive foundation as laid down in this work in connection with his theory of organization in the *Group Mind* (1920) we have the two steps in a complete outline of a system of social psychology. These two important studies must be taken together.

In his earlier work McDougall defines an instinct as "an inherited or innate psychological disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a peculiar quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action."¹² He enumerates the chief instincts and their accompanying emotions as follows:

<i>Instinct</i>	<i>Accompanying emotion</i>
Flight	Fear
Repulsion	Disgust
Curiosity	Wonder
Pugnacity	Anger
Self-abasement	Subjection
Self-assertion	Elation
Parental	Tender
Reproductive	Tender (less definite)
Gregariousness	
Acquisitive	
Constructive	

The last four instincts have impulses that are of great importance for social life.

In the *Group Mind* he takes the position (provisionally at least) that there is no collective consciousness such as Espinas and Durkheim advocate, but that the "conception of a group mind is useful and therefore valid." This group mind becomes, in a highly organized society, a "system of forces which has a life of its own, tendencies of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals, and a power of perpetuating itself as a self identical system, subject only to slow and

¹² *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 30.

gradual change.”¹³ His emphasis on group mind forces tending to act, makes his whole system dynamic, thereby differentiating his conception of a group mind from those which conceived it as something spiritual.

An important item in McDougall's theory is social organization. He illustrates the degrees of organization of which society is capable. The so-called “simple crowd” (unorganized) is characterized as “emotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent,” etc.¹⁴ These “peculiarities tend to appear in all group life, but are modified in proportion as the group is removed from a simple crowd.”¹⁵ Collective mental life is raised in organization; five conditions are laid down for this process. The evolution from lower to higher stages of organization, however, seems to make it more self-conscious, so that the intelligence of the whole is not only raised above the average member, but even “above that of the highest members.”¹⁶

From the above it is clear that McDougall is forced to abandon his original assumptions. His whole system seems to end midway between an individualistic and collective explanation of social psychology.

Taking the native individual endowments and social organization as the two leading factors in the McDougall system, there is yet another point to consider which may justly be appraised a third fundamental. This is the principle of “sympathetic induction of the emotions.” Suppose a person understands by the facial expression, tone of voice, gestures, or general movements of another person that this person is acting under the emotion of fear. According to the theory the observer would on merely perceiving this state of mind be affected by the same emotion; i.e., the emotion would be “induced.” Each of the instincts and emotions stated above may be regarded as having a central core or “permanent nucleus.” This nucleus which has three parts—suggestion, imitation and sympathy, is never directed toward a specific end. These “pseudo-instincts” are characterized by their many-sidedness and are the mechanisms for connecting the mental states of the persons associated. According to McDou-

¹³ *Group Mind*, p. 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

gall each instinct has its cognitive, affective and conative aspects or faces. Suggestion, sympathy and imitation are declared to be their respective mechanisms of communication.

CRITICISMS OF GROUP MIND THEORIES

It has already been noted that some investigators stress the individual. For Allport the individual must be regarded as the ultimate social unit. His insistence upon this point comes as a result of his antipathy for what he calls "group fallacies."

When, however, we read in the words of the older social writers that the crowd "feels" and "wills," or is "emotional," "intolerant," "immoral," and the like, we come perilously near to regarding the crowd as possessing a mind of its own apart from the minds of its individual members. The very intangibility of these states, combined with the striking vehemence of their manifestation, aids language in establishing this illusion. . . . Against these inadequacies and fallacies we must again urge the importance of going below group phenomena to a deeper level, the individual in the group. It is only through social psychology as a science of the individual that we can avoid the superficialities of the crowd mind and collective mind theories.¹⁷

This statement sums up the point of view of practically all recent social psychologists. It carries us back ultimately to innate and acquired modes of reaction common to all individuals. The behavior of a given group is therefore the behavior of those individuals composing it. The group reacts to a given situation in a fashion that corresponds with the reaction of any one of its members should he in isolation be subjected to the same stimulus.

Allport centers his criticisms of group mind theories upon McDougall's sympathetic induction of the emotions.¹⁸ Much discussion has centered around the theory. It will be worth while to consider at some length the nature of this discussion merely for the purpose of disclosing critical points. Allport¹⁹ brings forth objections to the theory as follows:

1. He finds that all the phenomena which McDougall ascribes to sympathetic induction may be accounted for by substituting the mechanism "conditioned emotional response."

¹⁷ *Social Psychology*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸ *Group Mind*, p. 36.

¹⁹ *Social Psychology*, p. 234.

2. It does not comport with certain experimental results which Allport himself obtained.

3. It presupposes the maturation of complex innate "perceptual dispositions," which Allport rejects as untenable.

4. The facts of real life are not in agreement with McDougall's theory.

To insist upon the substitution of the term "conditioned emotional response" for "induction," is to engage in a battle of terms. Especially can this be said in view of the fact that McDougall defines an instinct in terms of innate disposition to perceive or pay attention to objects in one's environment. Yet Allport resorts to something approaching the theory he rejects in attempting to explain crowd phenomena: "In terms of behavior we may say that the individual reacts to stimuli which he actually receives as if they were coming from an enormously greater number of individuals."²⁰ Thus the mechanism of social facilitation seems to break down, for "We must therefore find some explanation, other than facilitation through social stimuli, to account for this dependence of crowd excitement upon numbers."²¹ What he offers is "mental imagery" as the conditioned stimulus which is to account for excitement in the members of a crowd.

It may not be out of place to call attention to the experimental basis for the second of his objections to McDougall's theory. He finds that "the general accuracy of individuals in identifying such expressions is less than 50 per cent."²² The method of experimentation is even more important than results; the weakness of Allport's method lies in the fact that he used photographs. Obviously, as he himself recognizes, photographs are unreliable for this purpose. He offers this experimental evidence for what it is worth.

As to Allport's third objection to the McDougall theory, viz., the maturation of innate perceptual dispositions, there is to be found any amount of literature treating of experimental results which throw light upon maturation. Many of these studies, however, indicate that there is such a thing as maturation of innate tendencies, although it must be admitted that there are none pertaining to the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 234.

maturation of innate perceptual dispositions which Allport rightly classifies as a presupposition.

Allport's fourth objection is argued from the standpoint of the tender emotions, where he rightly assumes the mechanism of the induction would be most likely to function. In this case he finds the "most telling argument" in favor of his conditioned response. If a man has suffered from the bereavement of a relative, he can more easily sympathize with another in a similar bereavement. It is the "knowledge of the conditions affecting him that makes it possible for him to understand (and indeed to sympathize) with the other's state of mind."

In this last statement especially Allport must be credited with having seen something in the act of perceiving which goes beyond the mere mechanism of perceiving. In another chapter an attempt will be made to show that strict mechanism has its limits. Allport seems to be in agreement with Znaniecki whom we accept favorably on the question of social experience. Znaniecki says:

In experiencing a human person or group of persons, we usually experience, of course, the body or bodies of these human beings. But these bodies are not experienced as mere material things possessing certain physical qualities. They are endowed in our eyes with a potentiality of acting, thinking, feeling, judging about other things and about ourselves, which gives them a meaning, a significance that no purely physical body possesses. We take them as instruments and symbols of conscious life; we project into them "souls" or rather we see them as soulful. In the case of a group not only do these potentialities of conscious behavior seem attached to each member, but we experience the possibility of concerted conscious behavior of all those bodily beings together, as of one whole; we ascribe, rightly or wrongly, a collective thought or a collective will to the group.²³

The discussion has been carried to this length for the purpose of showing the importance of the theory of sympathetic induction of emotions and its criticisms as brought forth by Allport. There is nothing to indicate that the question is really settled; it has elsewhere been pointed out that the theories of innate and acquired tendencies are basic for social theories. Some disposition of these opposites should be attempted. The writer is frank to admit his preference for Allport's theory of conditioned emotional response as a theory, but he cannot see the simplicity of its mechanism, especially in the absence of experimental data of more convincing nature.

²³ *The Laws of Social Psychology*, p. 55.

The fact remains that an individual in the presence of his fellows is more or less influenced to act in accordance with the acts of the group as a whole, or of an individual in the group, depending of course upon his feelings, habits or both, in reference to the members of the group in which he finds himself. We must, in all cases, look for practical consequences. The place that induction or facilitation as mechanisms holds in the consummation of social behavior is well understood by public leaders.

While it is true that some individuals are only moderately influenced by the behavior of their fellows, it must be recognized that the vast majority of people who constitute society are powerfully so motivated. This common observation has caused some to say that men think in packs. The mere assumption of innate tendencies of similar strength and quantity will not, fundamental as they are, account for the appalling irrationality that obtains in social thinking, if such it may be called. Practically any absurdity in belief or opinion may be held by a considerable number of people in deference to the opinion of a majority. No sharp distinction in this respect can be made between instinctive tendencies, perceptual acts or even rational sanction. The mechanism involved is much the same. It operates along the whole gamut of individual reaction patterns from the instinct of self-preservation to preference for metaphysical postulates. Mere rationalization is often mistaken for reason. As to the nature of rationalization as a type of "thinking," we may well quote J. H. Robinson:

The "real" reasons for our beliefs are concealed from ourselves as well as from others. As we grow up we simply adopt the ideas presented to us in regard to such matters as religion, family relations, property, business, our country, and the state. We unconsciously absorb them from our environment. They are persistently whispered in our ear by the group in which we happen to live.²⁴

The whole individual is involved. This point of view is much as Ginsberg says:

Reason, sense, will and impulses are modes of manifestation of the self, ways in which it asserts and maintains itself. The energy involved is the energy of the total self, which no doubt takes various forms and finds for itself different channels

²⁴ *The Mind in the Making*, p. 42.

according as the activity is impulsive or voluntary, but which remains essentially one.²⁵

It thus appears that in a consideration of social forces originating in the group we may begin with an instinct and by merely carrying out its modifications and additions land in the realm of custom and even fad. There is no more sparsely settled region in the domain of human levels of mentality than that which is commonly supposed to be the capacity to think and act independently. What is commonly called individual thought is ordinarily nothing more or less than submission or acquiescence or concession which in nearly every situation is a case of reaction to the forces of environment, reinforced and directed by individual dispositions. And this will hold for situations in which no actual physical human factors are present. It is hard to distinguish, psychologically, between the mental processes which refer to human associations and other environmental associations. One point to be kept in mind is that whereas we speak of social (human) contacts in group psychology, the real situation contains that same human contact intermingled with non-human contacts. The mind works with, and by virtue of a situation as a whole. A man may be in a situation having no actual present human contacts, and yet behave socially. The most important question of social psychology is therefore a question of behavior, as understood by the school called behaviorist. The individual behaves along the line of his habits (or instincts), but by virtue of and in accordance with what he perceives to be going on among his fellow men, or what he has every right to imagine might go on. Various names have been applied to this behavior. It has been called "consciousness of kind," "suggestion," "sympathetic induction," "racial instincts," "primitive comradeship," "crowd impulses," "patriotism," "the call of the blood," "public opinion," "herd instincts," "social facilitation," etc., depending upon specific application to situations. Whatever may be the name applied, this is the first class of social forces which come into operation by virtue of social connections.

It should at once be pointed out that every conceivable degree of strength of attraction of such a social force is found in actual situations. There is constant interplay, now checking, now promoting,

²⁵ *The Psychology of Society*, p. 36.

in consequence of the dynamic power of the purely personal tendencies, dispositions and habits. If we consider this mechanism in reference to the group we cannot escape the deduction that each individual not only acts in accordance with the behavior of the majority of his fellows, but at the same time contributes, in a slight degree at least, to the creation of a part of his own social environment. We must always remember that man himself becomes a part of the environment which he shares with the next man he meets in a social way, if it be nothing more than greeting him the time of day.

The complexity of social behavior takes us beyond the horizon of isolated mental processes, as such. Social behavior is therefore to be explained in part on conceptual levels which have to do with relations giving rise to values. Concepts of relations may themselves be regarded as habits and these change very rapidly. No strictly mechanistic scheme can predict behavior in this sense. We must, it would appear, be prepared to see in social behavior a certain amount of strictly social life which presupposes a corresponding amount of what may be called social mind if for no other reason than to mark off spheres of human behavior. Life and mind are co-partners in functional manifestations of existence.²⁶

Allport and McDougall, so far as we considered them at the time, are concerned with the mechanism wherewith individuals bring about their influence upon one another. Their respective positions are maintained in the interest of what they had in mind as regards the nature of individuals as subject matter for investigation. Let us suppose we were studying the psychology of fear in an individual. Grant any mechanism for its communication to the next individual you please; you are studying something in addition to mechanism when studying social psychology. This, however, does not deny

²⁶ "Now, is it likely that, just as the special differentiations of organic form and function are connected with special characters of elements in the environment, so the more inclusive are connected with the commoner features of the environment as a whole? And, inasmuch as every organ save the central nervous system deals specifically with some special material which encounters it from moment to moment, and inasmuch as the central nervous system specifically reacts to all kinds of materials, even those in remote spaces and remote times; is it not probable that the deepest utility as well as the deepest peculiarities of cognition can be understood only through an analysis of the deepest peculiarities of the whole space-and-time order of nature?" Pitkin, W. B., *The New Realism*, p. 444.

that a correct answer to the question of mechanism is desirable. But the mechanism tells only what is common to individuals—a medium connecting stimulus and response. Individuals differ widely as to the effect that any given stimulus will have upon them. The question of communication of fear is bound up with the fear of some specific object—something that has meaning to the person stimulated. It is stimulus-plus-meaning, differing for different individuals as well as for the object from which it originates in case the object is another person. Should the object be a flash of lightning the object-plus-meaning to each individual would depend upon their respective experiences in the presence of lightning.

This distinction is made in order to call attention to some of the attempts that have been made to reduce effects of the group upon the individual to mechanistic terms. The point to be considered concerns the possibility of ever thus being able to account for group psychology. If it can be shown that a complete mechanistic account is impossible, then some other method than that of natural science (which it is) must be used.

Sidis²⁷ made a bold attempt to show by the logic of mathematics that the number of individuals in a group sustains a mathematical relation to the amount of suggestibility that is induced in the individuals composing it; on the same basis he accounted for other phenomena of the same class. The aim was to take psychology out of metaphysics. Allport²⁸ subscribes with reservations to the same sort of reasoning.

The foregoing discussion may be illustrated as follows. An individual, as such, possesses a certain innate religious tendency. This is a strictly personal instinctive endowment which functions as wonder or unsated imagination in the presence of unusual environmental situations. There is nothing specific about the situation that evokes it. Sometimes it is more potent than at other times. It combines readily with other elemental emotions, e.g., fear and its opposite, hope. This religious feeling and the speculation it begets may be conceived as codified and rationalized into a creed and norm for behavior. It is then a system of theology. A few accept it and its

²⁷ *The Psychology of Suggestion.*

²⁸ *Social Psychology*, p. 3.

tenets are handed down from generation to generation. There is established in the course of time a great sect because the group is able to persuade others to unite with it in common observance of its system of creeds and practices. What is the part a new convert plays as an individual in becoming a member of the group? He was of course at first in possession of an undifferentiated religious disposition; by the accident of residence he is in a situation where the mechanisms of social facilitation or circularity are operative. He becomes a devout communicant. But in so becoming a communicant, something has been added to his original endowment. Whereas it was undifferentiated, it becomes differentiated, more specific temporarily, eventually setting a habit. The habit in turn performs the same office as the perception originally did in finding specificity of reaction for an undifferentiated trope. His original imagination is satisfied by his sanction of the uses of repentance, baptism, etc. Symbols sufficient to satiate his once crude longings prepare the perceptual images that help him to rationalize his new-found situation. These come from the group situation. They are the concepts of the members of the group and represent a common acquirement. They are mental attitudes which come into being by virtue of group life. The totality of these attitudes is its social mind. The acquisitions become attached to the original individual emotions and remain relatively permanent.

The individual is aware that he shares these attitudes with the other members of the group in question. The phenomenon of "consciousness of kind" is now a reality. Each member of the group carries this increment with him. The group may separate but the influence of the social sanction does not vanish and become inactive. The separated members of the group are still sustained by it.

The group reaction in this illustration represents nothing more or less than the case of several individuals similarly disposed in all respects acting in accordance with a common stimulus. It will, however, help us to understand the more complicated aspects of social response in connection with the dynamic rôle of such instincts as fear, submission, hope, aggression and the like. It is conceivable that this group response stimulated a tardily responding individual to imitate his fellows. The mere perception of this sort of reaction on the part of the majority, or the recognized leaders of a given group,

will provoke the same behavior on the part of an individual who may be indifferently disposed to react. A social situation modifies or directs the individual response. Ginsberg says: "The origin of social action is response to the stimulus of other persons and the nature of this response will vary with varying circumstances, and be determined like all other responses by their survival value."²⁹ This quotation describes the average social situation very well.

Such, then, is the general nature of group behavior. It lies at the very basis of what is commonly called public opinion. Votes for political offices are more often than not cast in accordance with its mandates. In these days of organized propaganda, scientific advertising, slogans and drives, it may be looked upon as a social force of the first magnitude.

SOCIAL MIND GROWS OUT OF ADJUSTMENT TO ENVIRONMENT

While a social or group mind cannot be maintained from a structural point of view nor yet from a logical point of view because a complete analysis of it leads back to individual habits and sentiments, it will remain a convenient term to use. It does express a real relation between individuals. It indicates that individuals in a human society are modifying their instincts or habits and so become mentally united on a common level. "Simon pure" instinct such as is found in the *ammophila* (species of wasp) represents individual mind in the mechanistic sense of the term. Yet an observer might after seeing a thousand of these creatures at work in a pickleweed patch erroneously conclude that they possess a group mind. The contention here is the opposite. The social mind in the sense here adopted grows out of disharmonies in environment, which of course includes the individuals comprised in the group. Those whose reaction patterns (feelings, sentiments, dogmas, prejudices, etc.) have been set up and practiced in accordance with an organization where shortly before there was no organization, possess a group mind. Group mind in the sense here used is therefore not an entity, but rather a process of becoming—harmony is growing out of disharmony.

A group mind represents a combination of the attenuated aspects of individual instincts. Groups thus united are always temporary.

²⁹ *The Psychology of Society*, p. 16.

Even the most solidly united groups are ever changing in respect to some of their fundamentals. Thus the Ku Klux Klan of our times started out with clear-cut principles of nativism and finally winds up in purely political activities. The Ku Klux Klan of Georgia is very different from that in Indiana. The Ku Klux Klan of 1868 began as a recreational enterprise and was soon transformed into a machine the purpose of which was to control the carpet-bagger.

The older notion of a group mind has not been very satisfactorily disposed of in the current literature on social problems. Popular writers are impressed with the behavior of individuals in crowds when they see therein exaggerated manifestations of typical mental reactions. They contend that something foreign to the nature of the heretofore sober citizen has seized control of him in the presence of a mob or crowd. A mysterious power is evoked, they think, and this they uncritically explain in terms of some hovering spirit. Literature written during the World War is full of it. The trouble with this problem has arisen mainly, it would appear, because of the tendency of most observers to insist upon categorical principles. Their method is dichotomous; this leads to an unwarranted simplification of the forces that actually determine individual expression or behavior. As a result of this attitude on the part of observers, they attempt to reduce the great momenta back of human nature to more and more simple terms.

The unity that obtains in social groups is of course a real one, although the permanency of such groupings depends upon a multitude of circumstances which for the most part belong to environment in its temporal and institutional aspects. The part played by propaganda on the part of social manipulators is also significant, as is the appeal that this propaganda makes to individual interests. We might summarize the principles back of the formation of the social mind along the line of those forces which are able, now and then, to provoke and organize the common habits of people, their modal feelings tinged with a modicum of reason and more highly colored by imagination, all of which take the form of rationalization. Upon this view, it becomes apparent that what have been uncritically called group minds, turn out to be "mind groups."⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Burns, D. C., *Industry and Civilization*, p. 278 (appendix).

The theory of mind groups disposes of a dangerous analogy. So long as we are content to use the group mind theory, we are in constant danger of endowing public opinion, organized sanction, and even militant propaganda with a sort of sacredness which it does not deserve. To say that "the voice of the people is the voice of God" prepares the way for a hierarchy of social controls entirely favorable to the unscrupulous wishes and designs of the leadership in power. The worship of authority comprehended as the governor of social institutions has led to ridiculous extremes. The ruling people have not only promulgated slogans such as "my country right or wrong," "one hundred per cent American," etc., but they have sought to secure their power by the passage of laws of which the "Alien and Sedition" laws more than a century ago are an example. Within the last decade, America has witnessed the "Red Crusade" and a continual exploitation of private opinion. In the face of certain imagined situations, fanatics have crystallized their self-created fears into social anxieties by the well known methods of appealing to the public in the guise of protecting its members at large. The semi-secret atmosphere which office affords lends support to these machinations, and the promoter at once escapes detection and reinforces his grasp upon his office.

The substitution of the term "mind group" for group mind is one way of disposing of the mooted question. From this point, the new term will be used.

The term mind group appears to be more useful in explaining the formation of psycho-social units as they actually exist, than do instincts. The group is already in existence when the individual begins his social life. Moreover it is the one big medium to which we may unhesitatingly ascribe the origin of social habits, attitudes, prejudices, fears and even vocational selections. The instinct theory can give only a meagre account of these things. It takes a strong individual indeed, in fact an abnormal individual, to pit his individuality against the mores which the group accepts. We must assume then that the individual is molded from without rather than from within.

When we consider the question of group formation, the term mind group assists in rendering a genetic account of social units. To the individual beginning his life as an infant, or to a less degree to the adult changing from one social environment to another radically

different, the social environment presents surroundings that may best be described as aggregates. The aggregate of human beings is the sub-stratum out of which smaller circles of organized individuals come into existence. The aggregate is of course loosely organized in the normal course of everyday life, but it can under pressure of powerful leadership, or exploitation of large group ideals in time of stress, take on for relatively long periods of time a corresponding coherency. Coherency is the most descriptive element of organization. Coherency may be accounted for from a variety of cooperating individual tendencies such as instincts, ideals, imitation, etc. The social units that have given the sociologist and psychologist so much concern, are never entirely unchangeable in size or coherency. The reason for this must of course be referred to individuality in the long run, but the concept of individuality must not be taken literally, for then we would have aggregates rather than groups which actually exist as something other than aggregates as we have defined the term. We cannot escape the conviction that social units may, at least in some phases of social life, be interpreted in terms of degrees of solidarity of the various sections of the aggregate. Individuals themselves possess a varying amount of awareness or consciousness of the group or groups to which they belong, as well as of the formation of other groups with which they are not in sympathy. There is theoretically no limit to the number of organizations with which the individual may from time to time become associated. Nor are there any very reliable methods for measuring the degree of coherency which many such organizations come to have. The social aggregate is a very fluid mind-stuff potential, out of which more stable and smaller mind groups are formed. This is because the individual possesses mental plasticity.

SUMMARY

1. Group mind theories in general center around the mistaken notion that social behavior owes its origin and characteristics to causes external to the individual. Extremely stated and applied, these theories are remnants of animistic principles once regnant in philosophy and general psychology. Such principles cannot be incorporated in scientific methods, for, either the manifestations are confused with causes, or a purely metaphysical presupposition is invoked to lend

substantiality to the principle itself, thus cutting off observation from the very beginning.

2. The several group mind theories of the older writers have served indirectly, through the study which they have provoked, to narrow the field of observation; in consequence, there is now a clearer conception of socio-psychological facts.

3. While group mind fallacies have dominated social psychology until recently, it is a mistake to exchange them for individual fallacies. If we begin with the stimulus-response principle now almost universally accepted by psychologists—a principle which can be applied successfully to any psychological fact—a more pregnant meaning of social environment is discovered. Response mechanisms are found to adhere to social causation. An individual is found to be an hypothetical unity, and if the psychology of social behavior means anything at all, it means that group interests, group practices, customs, etc., lend collective significance to individual reactions.

4. Psychical and social phenomena are not to be strictly separated. Individuals being similarly endowed with habit possibilities of various sorts, behave through these matured or maturing possibilities in relatively strict rapport with common stimuli emanating from group organizations, cultural products, etc. Thus individuals respond in groups according to common interests or habits. The term mind group may be employed for descriptive purposes.

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

A survey of the literature pertaining to social science reveals the fact that all students, from the very earliest to the most recent, have generally conceived their problems in terms of some sort of organization. In the case of the ancient philosophers, the forms of organizations that society was supposed to assume reflected the metaphysical principles which dominated their structuralization of knowledge of every sort. Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, especially, thought of society in more or less fatalistic fashion, as running through definite cycles. Plato conceived these cycles to be a succession of organizations commencing with aristocracy (the best), and degenerating into the respective lower forms of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and despotism, after which aristocracy was once more enthroned. Ovid's poetical mind created a cycle of four ages corresponding to a succession of metals (gold, silver, bronze and iron) and at the same time gave an allegorical interpretation of the fall of man. Later writers found descriptions for social organizations in terms of the observable periods of human life—infancy, maturity, senescence, or, as in the case of St. Augustine, the forms of society on earth were stages toward the perfection of a heavenly state.

While these early writers on social organization contribute nothing to our understanding of society today, in the scientific sense of the term, it should be remembered that some of them still find favor among laymen. For example, there are religious organizations today whose principles portray the "Second Coming of Christ" as the advent of a new social order. Many persons belonging to the laboring class hold the notion that capitalism represents aristocracy and that it must be supplanted by "Industrial Democracy;" they therefore consciously or unconsciously entertain some respect for the cycle theory. Such examples show that scientific students will have a long task in replacing fictitious conceptions by scientific.¹ In fact, it may be said

¹ Dealey, J. Q., *Sociology*, Chap. I, shows that such conceptions were not entirely abandoned by students of sociology until about the middle of the nineteenth century. This may indicate that scientific sociology began then.

that the present problem of social psychology, from a popular point of view, is none other than the consummation of this end.

Coming down to modern times we get a picture of the gradual abandonment of metaphysical in favor of scientific theories of social organization, just as we have noted the same process going on in other aspects of social psychology. The Darwinian theories of evolution apply to scientific social psychology as they do to many other departments of specialized knowledge, although some notions arising from them are also being radically revised. Darwin inspired such writers as Spencer to conceive of social organization in terms of living organism and so a host of analogies followed to confuse the social psychologist.

At the present time, the theories of most writers on social organization comprehend dual aspects, e.g., primary and secondary groups, permanent and temporary groups. A striking similarity of conceptions obtains, indicating that in the recent studies of social science there are at least the beginnings of law. Moreover, since social science has been progressing toward specialized studies, the various terms used are the nomenclature for special applications. The following table will help show this situation:

Classes of social organization

Giddings

1. Instinctive
2. Rational
 - a. Sympathetic
 - b. Congenial
 - c. Approbational
 - d. Despotic
 - e. Authoritative
 - f. Conspirital
 - g. Contractual
 - h. Idealistic

Ellwood

1. Natural
2. Artificial
 1. Involuntary
 2. Voluntary
 1. Primary
 2. Secondary

1. Institutional
2. Non-institutional

Ellwood further recognizes organizations more specifically psychological in character:

1. Instinctive
2. Habitual
3. Authoritarian
4. Democratic

Le Bon

1. Homogeneous
2. Heterogeneous
 - a. Anonymous
 - b. Non-anonymous

Miller

1. Vertical
2. Horizontal

Martin

1. Permanent
 - a. Coöperative
 - b. Struggle
2. Temporary

McDougall

1. Fortuitous
2. Natural
 - a. Those rooted in kinship
 - b. Those determined by geographical location
3. Artificial
 - a. Purposive
 - b. Customary
 - c. Mixed

Ginsberg

1. Organized
2. Unorganized
 - a. Depending upon physical contact or presence
 - b. Not depending on physical presence.

Bogardus

1. Priority (permanent)
2. Temporary

Dunlap

1. Fortuitous
2. Selective

Freud

1. Groups without leader
2. Groups with leader

Cooley and others

1. Primary
2. Derivative

Maciver

1. Community
2. Association

THE PRINCIPLE OF GROUP ORGANIZATION

The table just given suggests a determination of a common basis of social organization. A little study of the classifications will show that there is a rather consistent agreement that social organizations possess different degrees of coherency. Groups are said to be permanent or temporary, organized or unorganized, to take form under the direction of instincts or of intelligence, etc. Coherency seems to be the trait of organization which they are attempting to explain. Some writers have allowed descriptions of organizations to assume the position of causes of organization. In a general way, the planes and currents school exhibits tendencies in this direction. There are many causes for social coherency. Theories of social organization may be classified according as their advocates conceive of some force emanating from the individual, or some influence directing the groupings of individuals in consequence of association, or some regional or geographic factor which creates in the minds of individuals an ideal of locality, or finally voluntary and selective tendencies on the part of the individual which signify the operation of reason, or choice.

Some social psychologists have attached too much importance to the temporary forms of organization.² So long as they conceive of organization as determined by group influences exclusively, as for example, Durkheim, then organization becomes the primal subject matter of social psychology and the individual either becomes a practical non-entity or a false interpretation of the source of his individuality is proposed.

² Sighele, in his *Psychologie des Sectes* especially, has emphasized this point of view. LeBon, in his *The Crowd*, has followed Sighele in the main, while Freud in turn, follows LeBon. In a general way all those who emphasize the abnormal expression of suggestion, imitation, etc., are to be so classified.

On the other hand those students who focus attention upon the native tendencies of individuals (especially the so-called instincts) assume a pre-social disposition operating among individuals—an assumption that can give only a fictitious account of social organization. While behavior is individual, the ground plan for behavior is a system of acquisitions (largely) and these acquisitions are referable in origin both to the individual within whom they are laid down and the group relations which contribute to the type of behavior the acquisitions are capable of producing. It will be sufficient here to note the attitude which one recent writer takes in respect to the organizing power of instincts; this notation will serve at the same time as an illustration of what we earlier noted as a tendency on the part of psychologists to account for social psychology in terms of the same general hypothesis that is used to account for individual or general psychology. Gates³ says that instincts are responsible for social organization. He points especially to the gregarious instinct. This instinct is the one by which we are “impelled” to form groups, and on account of it “social activities and institutions are worked out.” He would classify the social instincts as follows: parental behavior, mating behavior, desire for social approval, and gregariousness.

Human grouping and human thinking go together. Both are developmental rather than preconditional. This can only mean that social organizations come to have for the individual various degrees of coherency, permanency and meaning for existence. If one attempts to classify rational attitudes and name them in accordance with the form of social organization that exists during the period of their operation (as Giddings does), he is attempting a classification no less capable of reduction to law than if he had set out to classify the myriad kinds of social situations which are capable of provoking and establishing them. From all this we conclude that the form of social organization is something of a creation (transitory or permanent) arising as a result of the interplay of an individual with his social, economic, or other environment which contains some interest.

To carry out the principle of coherency of social organization to anything like the completeness which its study deserves, is obviously a task that cannot be attempted in this study. The most that can be

³ *Psychology for Students of Education*, p. 145.

noted are some of the fairly easily recognized stages of organization. This is attempted by illustrations arbitrarily chosen. They represent different stages, though in no case can their degrees of coherency be definitely measured.

Three stages will be illustrated: the fortuitous groups, semi-fortuitous groups, and voluntary groups. For the first an everyday street situation has been chosen; for the second, the crowd; for the third a labor union. The criteria involved in the choice of stages of coherency will appear in the body of the discussions which follow.

THE FORTUITOUS GROUP

A group of people walking in the same direction along a busy city thoroughfare may be taken as an example of an accidental or fortuitous group. Social purpose in all such cases is feebly displayed by the several members of the group, so that an observer thinks they have no purpose as an organization. The several persons are observed as individuals going their respective ways in pursuit of personal aims and purposes. Some of the group might be in a hurry to attain a certain point at a given time; others would be attracted by window displays and stop for a moment now and then to satisfy their curiosity, later continuing their leisurely pursuit of destinations. The most fortuitous groups have some organization, however; the members obey in a habitual fashion the ordinary customs pertaining to public decorum. Members of the street group might be expected to turn to the right when passing a pedestrian approaching from the opposite direction; all of them would wait for the traffic signal before crossing an intersecting street. It would not be correct to say that in these cases there is a manifestation of social purpose in the ordinary sense of the term. The behavior is of course to some extent group behavior; it insures personal and public safety, makes for effectual progress in the pursuit of individual purposes. It would be enough to ascribe to the individuals in such a situation a form of behavior dictated by customary street habits. There would be enough similarity of behavior on the part of all to say of them that they were exercising their individual reaction patterns in response to common stimulus-patterns. Such behavior is however entirely on the habitual plane, and the group itself so far as it displays concerted reaction is highly transitory.

But in describing the habits exhibited in such a fortuitous group as has been chosen for an example, it must be recognized that habits here as elsewhere in the psychology of individuals are within themselves capable of classification in accordance with their degrees of fixity, the extent of their diffusion among the population commonly using them, and the constancy of the stimulus patterns which evoke them. It would therefore be proper to call these habits social co-enotropes, in order to distinguish them from the more firmly established forms of social behavior known as tradition. The individual in these loosely organized social aggregations is behaving reflexly; he may or may not be conscious at all times of the appearance and disappearance of other individuals upon the scene which momentarily attracts his attention. The shifting nature of the social stimulus produces an equally shifting series of attention foci, so that the response patterns themselves are transitory. Social attention is at a low ebb, and there is in consequence a minimum of strictly social influence connected with the reaction of the several individuals.

THE SEMI-FORTUITOUS GROUP

The crowd is chosen as an illustration of the semi-fortuitous type of social coherency because its significance as an organization refers to both accidental and selective reasons on the part of the individuals composing it. An individual may by sheer accident find himself in a crowd, and after being exposed to the stimulus patterns there presented to him, manifest a series of responses which may be interpreted as his contribution to crowd behavior. When these responses (as habits already formed in previous similar situations) lead him to associate himself with a group already or about to be formed, it is logical to speak of this initial move as individual choice or selection.

It is commonly agreed that a crowd organization involves the actual physical presence of a group of people. This does not mean that the several members of the group are equally cognizant of the presence of the others at any given moment, for they occupy different positions therein. Individual attention must necessarily differ in the degrees of focalization and the appearance and disappearance of marginal phases which in turn account for transitoriness.

It could be argued that the psychological facts accompanying crowd

behavior might be satisfied without physical presence. In such cases the term public is the proper term to employ. The difference between a crowd and the public is therefore a mere distinction between the degrees of attention which individuals exhibit in the two organizations. In the case of the crowd the stimuli are of course more direct and, as a result, the behavior is more readily evoked. Physical presence is therefore a specifying criterion, which is rarely ever compensated for by other stimuli, of a psychological nature, in the case of the public.

The members of a crowd must share in common a similar set of ideas or feelings, undoubtedly both. This is insured by the presence of a common object of attention. Again, the accidental and selective attributes of individual participation are important, for these attributes bring about, in the course of time, those phases of group behavior which are to be taken as indications of the coherency of the organization from time to time. A great deal depends upon the character of the common object of attention, as a mere stimulus pattern.

The two crowd criteria, physical presence and a common object of attention, exhaust the list of absolutely necessary criteria. It may be shown that they alone account for the coherency of such an organization, and that all other criteria that may be suggested are merely different aspects of them, being named in accordance with the specific elements of the instances described. One such descriptive criterion, from an almost inexhaustible literature, is here set forth.

Everett Dean Martin⁴ may be called the crowd intoxicated social psychologist. Gustave Le Bon is a close second. These writers especially, disillusioned in their search for intelligence among the masses, have reduced all human behavior (historically speaking) to crowd behavior. They speak of the "era of crowds," etc. Martin says that "a crowd is a device for indulging ourselves in a kind of temporary insanity by all going crazy together." The most important of the miscellaneous criteria which are emphasized by such writers, is the emergence of a mysterious "crowd mind," "mob mind" or "racial unconscious" which they describe as overtaking or descending upon people assembled. This over-mind is a sort of matrix for all

⁴ *The Behavior of Crowds*. Especially interesting as a psychoanalytical interpretation of crowd behavior.

sorts of behavior, usually irrational or "childish." In a crowd, common place jokes appear unusually amusing; platitudes are accepted as the veriest of truths; logical dilemmas embrace no middle terms; compromises are abhorrent; the phenomena of hypnotism go into action readily.

The emphasis placed upon crowd behavior is accounted for on the basis of its tangible factors as objects of observation. The crowd moves with appreciable degrees of progress toward attainment of satisfying adjustments; this is something not readily observed in the ordinary course of social behavior. Crowd studies enable the observer to focus attention upon the essential factors, to see them at work, to analyze their causes, and to make predictions. The relative ease with which all this is done, has led some to suppose that crowd behavior betrays something akin to purpose, and from this have concluded that societies of every sort are controlled by some rational or irrational motive. So clear do these supposed purposes appear, that it requires but little imagination to suggest that there is a mysterious kind of super-mind which takes hold of an individual once he becomes a member of a crowd.

This conclusion is erroneous. What has been called crowd mind, or in its more violently active form, mob mind, is not essentially different so far as processes of formation are concerned, from its highly respectable kin, "public opinion" and "voice of the people." In all these forms of social thinking, individual reaction patterns functioning in the presence of appropriate stimulus patterns must be regarded as the leading explanatory principle. Slow-forming public opinion may appear more rational but only because of the conservatism which settled groups display. To speak in a perfectly figurative sense, the public sensorium is widely dispersed and therefore feebly stimulated by even the strongest of stimuli.

Man has never quite decided whether to be a social or non-social creature. He has had to learn to be social, the gregarious instinct notwithstanding, wherever the organization which demands co-operation comes from other than selfish impulses. In the last analysis social instincts, if there are any, seem to be derivative forms of still older instinctive reaction patterns which are purely egoistic in all that they mean.

The fallacy that crowd or mob behavior betrays the presence of an overmind, is further revealed by the fact that the character of the behavior is calm or violent, depending upon the nature of the objects to which the individuals are exposed. The reactions in all cases are direct. The presence of the other members of the crowd and their reactions act together to promote expediency and uniformity of behavior. The individual, out of natural deference to his fellows, does not usually depart upon experimental ventures in adjustment; the customary patterns are the only ones that he will release freely in the presence of his fellows. Each individual may be said to possess, as a result of his social experiences, a number of well established defense patterns which operate to prevent his utilization of novel or trial methods of behavior. These are social inhibition patterns and in themselves are the strongest of all acquired reaction patterns. They were laid down in early childhood and were daily, almost hourly repeated in the interest of adjustment to social situations. In this wise the mysterious uniformity of behavior of individuals in the presence of their fellows is adequately explained. The individual in the crowd is not only reacting to a stimulus pattern in common with others, but he is at the same time reacting to the group itself, another stimulus pattern, which evokes a definite, learned response. Herein lies the explanation of uniformity of behavior which in turn accounts for the coherency of the organization.

It is profitable to review the data of crowd psychology since organizations of temporal and ephemeral nature have in late years been responsible for social situations tending to embarrass the development of society as a whole. Human society has never been free from dangers of this sort. It is not too much to say that crowd psychology is after all a necessary phase of the mental movement of groups in the process of adjustment to environment as a historical fact. Allport especially has well shown that the behavior of crowds cannot be adequately accounted for without reference to the developmental aspects of the personality of the individuals composing a crowd and responsible for its acts. On the other hand it seems likely that an application of our present knowledge of the psychology of group behavior might reasonably be turned to some practical account in checking the final, and as often as not, aberrant decisions which social

groups suddenly convert into action. Thus we may say that the psychological processes attending crowd and mob behavior are at once natural and always potential episodes in a chain of social reactions, the antecedents of which are other episodes in the psychological history of individuals. Crowd and mob psychology means merely degrees of coherence and temporal operations of human associations.

A special form of the semi-fortuitous organization is that which is commonly called the mob. This aspect of social psychology belongs in the realm of abnormal social psychology. It is hard to conceive of the so-called "mob mind" as being anything other than the collective attitudes of the group under the stress of circumstances that are able to focus attention to the point of dissociation. This highly focused group attitude may be accounted for on the basis of a disintegration of reaction patterns of the normal type. The habits being temporarily thrown "out of gear," prepares the way for feelings or emotions to assume an abnormal command of the situation. In every case where recently acquired reaction patterns are disturbed, emotions are aroused. The emotions themselves being affective in nature betray their relations with awareness even though such awareness belongs in the domain of instinctive processes. Such awareness though appearing settled because of the energy accompanying it, is really very unstable. Nothing short of "mob behavior" may be expected to result therefrom.

It is surprising how psychologists find the basis for mobs on the theory of a mob mind that is supposed to "break out" now and then without adequate causes. In those sections of the country where traditional attitudes (mental habits) control the social relations as conditioned by racial considerations, lynchings are more common, (*a*) because we have in those sections the human background of habits relating to race prejudices and their possibility of being more often disturbed, and (*b*) because of the lack of legal control in the actual dispensation of laws, that might serve to check the impulsive nature of those who indulge in lynchings. Given identical situations historically and otherwise, lynchings would be as frequent anywhere, as in the Southern states. Race riots in Northern cities due to the migration of negroes during the World War, have in recent years demonstrated the truth of this statement.

THE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION

Some social psychologists in speaking of degrees of social organization, are inclined to ascribe more to the organization as such or to some psychological process aroused in and due to the fact of organization, than to the natural coöperative traits of individuals. Thus McDougall⁵ finds that the patriot army represents the highest form of organization. His description of such an army portrays what he thinks are the characteristics of the most efficient organizations,—intelligence and morality. There is a “degree of intelligence and morality much higher than that of the average member of the group: i.e., the whole is raised above the level of the average member; and even, by reason of exultation of emotion and organized coöperation in deliberation, above that of the highest members.” It is hard to understand how a group of volunteers in a patriot army or any other organization, no matter how coherent it may become, can through organization create a psychological trait which does not exist in the psychological make-up of the individuals.

In contrast with McDougall's theory that higher degrees of social organization are accompanied by manifestations of the higher mental processes (reason) there is to be placed the theory that such degrees of social organization are to be known in terms of the lower processes (instincts). This view we have likewise found to be inadequate, generally because no one can tell where instinct begins or leaves off. Williams advances what might be termed a modified instinct theory.

The social relations of any group are determined, in the last analysis, by the motives of its individual members. These result from inherited traits that become adapted to life in the group in accordance with group attitudes and ideas. The human behavior with which the social psychologist has to do is due to action of complexes of instinctive tendencies more or less modified by experience.⁶

If we take the intelligence and morality principle which McDougall mentions with the principle of “instinctive tendencies more or less modified by experience” which Williams advocates, we arrive at perhaps the most accurate conception of the psychology of higher organization. People behave in a coherent organization according to

⁵ *The Group Mind*, p. 71ff.

⁶ *Principles of Social Psychology*, p. 3.

egoistic impulses; they also conform to their habits consistent with social sanction, social customs, etc. The genetic meaning of morality is conformation. Elsewhere we have referred to such behavior as response to social stimulus patterns. Dunlap has rightly shown this to be the basic principle of social organization of this degree: "In groups so organized there arises a factor embodying the ultimate, highest, principle of organization, that of obligation, which we may call moral obligation."⁷

This discussion of the coherent organization reveals two fundamental criteria: individual interests and social obligations. It is very hard to determine in any situation just how much of the sentiment of social obligation is ego-regarding and how much is other-regarding. Social obligation, real as it is, mobilizing the energies of men in the performance of acts which appear to hold nothing of strictly individual desires, is probably after all a sublimated form of them. We shall now very briefly consider the facts pertaining to a highly organized and efficient social group.

THE AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America represents the most coherent of social organizations. Its coherency is due to the fact that it seeks to mobilize the interests of its members; it has a 100 per cent organization in several of the large clothing centers, and claims to include more than 95 per cent of all workers in the industry.⁸ It was organized in 1914 as an insurgent branch of the older United Garment Workers of America. The following factors are the basic reason for the solidarity of the organization.

1. Trade idealism
 - a. Production as a social service, rather than profit
 - b. Emancipation from a capitalistic system
2. Democratic management
3. Democratic membership
4. Referendum voting for officers
5. Important issues discussed openly in mass meetings

⁷ *Social Psychology*, p. 223.

⁸ See Savage, M.D., *Industrial Unionism in America*, Chap. 7; *The American Labor Year Book*, Vol. 6, pp. 89ff; Tannenbaum, F., *The Labor Movement*; Fitch, J. A., *Causes of Industrial Unrest*.

6. A system of collective agreements with employers
7. Accepting responsibility for labor output
8. Establishment of an unemployment fund
9. The founding of coöperative banking facilities
10. Establishment of educational facilities
11. Coöperative purchasing of coal, ice, etc.

Highly organized groups are those built around the essentials of life pertaining to the individuals therein. Not nearly so many fundamental interests can be found in the fortuitous or semi-fortuitous organizations. A study of these interests betrays the essentials of those closed systems which have been previously mentioned as basic for the study of social psychology. A coherent organization may in fact be regarded as a well defined social situation. The social situation psychologically is the counterpart of social classes as organizations.

SUMMARY OF ILLUSTRATIONS

The three examples of social organization show that the basic reasons for social coherency belong in the realm of human interests. Physical presence may account for temporary coherence, but it has little or nothing to do with those forms of social organization which rightly deserve the name. Social organization should always be studied in the light of the individual as the bearer of the interests which are shared in a large measure by those who may be organized. Socialization is a psychical process, always becoming, never perfect. The forms of social organization are always relative to the adjustmental interests of the persons concerned. Class-mindedness or consciousness of kind are only summary descriptions of the organizations of groups; common interests and habits of response are the real organizers of society. Nor can we say that social organization is due to a specific impulse, such as gregariousness; impulses are too general. Wherever they are spoken of as the cause of organization, it can only be taken to mean that this or that impulse appears in the course of overt acts when the interests as a whole are threatened.

SUMMARY

1. Even the most cursory observation of society reveals organizations. These organizations are of many types, sizes, and degrees of

coherency. Students of sociology and social psychology have attempted to account for the phenomenon of organization by theories that may be classified roughly as (a) cyclical, (b) organic, (c) evolution and (d) psychological. A number of sub-classes are proposed, most of which are highly figurative expressions of empirical observations.

2. A causal determination of the nature of social organization must show why groups as such come into being and why they remain so for short or long periods of time. In other terms, some consistent principle for coherency must be established.

3. The focal points of coherency are individual habits and interests. Instincts seem to play a very small part or none at all. Habitual or customary forms of behavior will account for the more enduring types of organization, while intellectual processes make for their modification, creating smaller organizations within them. Organizations are therefore always being formed, revealing the dynamic character of society under the influence of recognized need for and ways of effecting adjustment to surroundings.

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CHAPTER VII

CULTURE

A casual survey of society as a whole reveals the presence of a great many forces, which operate in the round of social existence. The first thing to impress an observer, is the relatively smooth operation of all social institutions, such as the church, the courts of law, the educational institutions and the various local and federal departments of government. Looking somewhat closer he observes that his life is conditioned by other institutions of relatively private enterprise, such as banks, various common carriers, commercial establishments of every description, as well as many sorts of places of amusement. Upon assuming a differential attitude of mind, various languages, lodges, religious denominations and sectarian schools and colleges are identified. Still pursuing the survey he finds he is surrounded by mechanical inventions and appliances of every conceivable description: telephone, telegraph, radio, automobile, etc. Soon he realizes he is surrounded on every hand by a host of things ordinarily taken for granted.

Even when this casual survey is completed it is quite possible that he will not consider them as cultural products, remote and recent. Nor unless he is unusually analytical, is he likely to realize that all this world of public and private enterprise somehow conditions his own ways of thinking and behaving. Least of all is he willing to concede that the setting for the formation and direction of his personality was in operation even before he was born.

The fact is that everyone has become habituated to his environment. Behavior toward it appears instinctive because familiar situations are sufficient to provoke immediate, focalized and sustained attitudes. In consideration of this fact, it becomes apparent that the so-called racial instincts may be due to the character of the cultural scheme in the midst of which a people is reared. This statement of racial instinct should in every case be taken to mean merely an undifferentiated basal tendency upon which habits are

built, and that these habits are really all we know of tendencies called instincts.

If anyone inquires of a person just why he is a communicant of the Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian, or any other of the scores of different branches of religion, he probably answers that it is because that particular one is the best for such and such reasons. If he is asked why he votes the Republican ticket rather than the Democratic, he is likely to reply along the line of mooted questions of tariff, world court, reduction of income taxes, or the disposition of Muscle Shoals. He is likely to resent the implication that he is following habit or indulging in popular platitudes or exercising that mental process known as rationalizing. It is conceivable that he could become aroused about such matters to the extent of incurring lasting enemies. Only after meeting with opposition to the functioning of his orderly habits of mind, through the suspension of operation of railroads, coal mines, etc., due to strikes, is he likely to realize that he lives in a world of culture and that this world of culture is somehow endowed with lasting vitality; that it really never has been conquered and that it is transmitted from generation to generation with great regularity, and finally that whatever changes take place in any particular trait come perforce by way of compromise.

Culture has often been regarded too hastily as a matter of materials only. It should be recognized that psychological processes are intertwined with all culture both in its arrival and utilization. The content or idea of culture however is never a mental process. In general, mind is the attitude which the individual assumes, displays, or uses in the presence of cultural facts. Specifically the mental processes involved in this general attitude (i.e., the processes taken as a whole to denote tendencies to action) are the detailed mechanisms utilized in adjustment to social and cultural milieus.

Environment may be classified. Any amount of classifying and dividing may be indulged, so that distinction after distinction might empirically lead to mere enumeration of cultural products, specific climates, etc. A rough classification is: physical (climate, topography) plant, animal, cultural (institutional, mechanical) social (human) and imaginal. Upon this classification may be constructed that aspect of the psychology of society which the new history is bringing to light. But first it is necessary to state as briefly as

possible the central problem involved: civilization is the outcome of man's attempt to make himself at home, to adjust himself to environment. The present civilization is but the end result of the entire sweep of human events since man emerged from animality. The entire account, prehistoric and historic, is but a single story, of which the so-called stages of civilization are to be regarded as episodes. These episodes sustain causal relations. In short it can be said that the one big problem which has confronted mankind in his persistent maneuvers toward adjustment is: what he has done and what he has thought about what he has done. Psychical processes have attended his every move.

Since culture in a general sense is the modal "thoughts and deeds" of a group, the unit of behavior in the presence of cultural facts is a tribe, nation, or even continent. Having determined the culture group, anthropologists study the objects of its behavior specifically as culture traits, complexes and types. A trait is a single item such as a specific marriage custom, a typical instrument, article of diet, etc., peculiar to a given group. A trait is therefore understood to be a unit in a tribal or national culture. The term complex connotes a set of functionally associated traits, which provoke a series of appropriate acts. Sometimes, because of the practical difficulty encountered in making the finer distinctions between a trait and a complex, observers refer to them collectively as trait-complexes. A culture type is a still more comprehensive division of the round of life. A culture type may in general be thought of as a form of civilization. The problems involved in the arrival and continuity of culture can best be approached through the consideration of a trait-complex that has been operative among a certain type of people over a long period of time.

AN ANCIENT CUSTOM¹

In considering this trait-complex we must speak in terms of anthropology. The anthropologist employs a chronology somewhat

¹ The chief sources consulted are: Boas, F., *First General Report of the Indians of British Columbia*; Burkitt, M. C., *Prehistory*; Kidd, D., *The Essential Kaffir*; Howitt, A. W., *The Native Tribes of Southeastern Australia*; Osborn, H. F., *Men of the Old Stone Age*; Sollas, W. J., *Ancient Hunters*; Stow, G. W., *The Native Races of South Africa*.

different from the familiar type. He measures time in terms of culture stages. He uses years, centuries and even millennia as mere approximations. Beginning with the end of the old stone age and counting backward, the anthropological time (culture) chart is as follows:

*Paleolithic (Old Stone) Culture Chart.**

CULTURE STAGE	APPROXIMATE DURATION (B.C.)	DOMINANT RACE
Azilian.....	10,000 to 8,000	Grenelle
Magdalenian.....	13,000 to 10,000	Brunn, Cro-Magnon
Solutrean.....	15,000 to 13,000	Cro-Magnon
Aurignacian.....	20,000 to 15,000	Cro-Magnon
Mousterian.....	42,000 to 20,000	Neanderthal
Acheulian.....	80,000 to 42,000	Various Neanderthaloid races
Chellean.....	120,000 to 80,000	Piltown
Pre-Chellean.....	300,000 to 120,000	Pithecanthropus (?) Heidelberg

* Dates compiled from estimates by Keith, A., *The Antiquity of Man*; races from estimates by Whitnall, H. O., *The Dawn of Mankind*.

It is noticed that the periods of duration for the different culture stages become longer as they approach Pre-Chellean. This fact is in keeping with the rate of cultural accumulations, which come in time to reach a point when a distinct culture stage is recognized as such. Keith² comments on this as follows:

All evidence goes to prove that human culture follows the rule which holds for sums of money placed at compound interest; as time goes on the rate of increase becomes even faster. We have to remember too, that in these remote periods Europe was sparsely populated and that its few inhabitants had to struggle hard merely to hold their own.

In 1897 a famous old cave was opened for the first time since pre-historic men inhabited it some 20,000 years ago. It is the Gorgas cave situated at Montiejeau in the Pyrenees. Many remains of the ancient Cro-Magnon race of the Aurignacian culture stage were found. Among them are pictures which he had painted with his crude paint all along the sides and roof. The specific ones to which we here refer are outlines of the human hand. It would appear that the hands were dipped in paint and then pressed against the wall, leaving a clear

² *The Antiquity of Man*, p. 251.

outline. It was noticed that in many of the impressions, sometimes one and sometimes two or three of the fingers were mutilated; generally the first or first and second joints of the little finger of the left hand are missing. For a long time anthropologists were puzzled about this strange custom. It is now accepted as one of the things of common practice among the Cro-Magnons. Probably nothing would have been thought about this custom had it not been found among primitive men of the present day. This fact created a problem for social psychology and anthropology as well.

Travelers among the primitive peoples in different parts of the world have been reporting this custom for many years. Among the first written accounts is that given by George Barrow in his *Travels in the Interior of South Africa*, printed in 1801. Since then many other written reports have been given and in a few cases scientists have made a study of the custom in order to find why it was practiced. The significance of the custom as a psychological and ethnic problem does not become clear until its distribution is considered. It was at one time practiced by primitive tribes in almost every quarter of the earth: the Bushmen of South Africa, certain tribes along the eastern coast of Australia, the Mandan Indians of North America, three tribes of Indians in northwest Canada, the Tonga islanders of the southern Pacific, the Fiji islanders, and certain tribes in southern Brazil, Japan, California, Arizona, Peru, Egypt, Palestine, Arabia, Babylonia, Mexico and India.

One of the first questions concerns the motives for this practice. We cannot of course answer for the Cro-Magnons. The best we can do is to make some deduction if possible after investigating the reasons for this practice among living tribes. The known reasons are:

To bring good luck—Kaffirs, South Africa.

To ward off bad luck (death)—Indians, Northwest America.

To restore health to sick relative—Tongans.

To insure a safe journey to heaven, to express grief for dead relatives, to insure that a child will grow up (when mutilation takes place at birth)—Bushman.

To allow disease to run out with the blood—Pigmies, South Africa.

To mourn for dead chief—Fijians.

As an initiatory rite upon reaching puberty—Certain people in Japan (now forbidden by law).

To secure magic for aid in fishing—Kanakas, New Hebrides.

To gain control over fishing—Certain tribes in Australia.

Upon studying this table of reasons, it may at first be decided that all this mutilation is meaningless, because the reasons are of too great variety. But why has the custom lasted so long among these several primitives—a period of over 20,000 years? Again, why is it so widely distributed—practically over the entire earth? It looks like a deep-seated culture trait; perhaps it has some religious significance. In each of the reasons cited mutilation is associated with just the things that are generally associated with religious practices. We perform religious ceremonies when someone dies; the more illustrious the dead, the more ceremonies; we constantly implore health of the Deity; miracles make up a part of our religious faith; even as late as 1925 governors of two southern states declared a day of prayer in order to break a drought. In fact the reasons given for this ancient custom bespeak more unity than may be found among the religions of the world today. By stepping outside the ordinary religious realm for a moment, something akin to these reasons is found among our many superstitions. After all we have something in common with primitive peoples. This common something is mind, and its tendency to imagine—that is, its tendency to create a world that transcends the ordinary world of events for which causal relations are not obvious.

IMAGINAL ENVIRONMENT

On page 128 a classification of environment was given. In making a distinction between imaginal environment and the others, it is not intended to give the notion that imaginal environment is the particular environment which has to do with the creation of mind. The whole of environment is concerned with it and it is a debatable question as to the separate contributions of the classes named. At the same time imaginal environment is important. It is peculiar to man. It is that phase of his general environment which is in the realm of relative isolation from materials. The stimuli which urged him to create it came from a myriad of sources, all of which denote problems connected with the control of material things. In other words, given a mind with its human possibilities, man uses this mind to create his imaginal environment, which we may call a system of attitudes used in the presence of unexplained natural phenomena.

But here philosophizing might possibly take two directions. One might postulate that a Divine Creator started man off with his pe-

cular equipment—power to imagine. There is no real objection to this view, unless such a creation is conceived as it ordinarily is, as something final and complete at the time of creation. It is however reasonable to take another view and postulate an unknown force, a natural force, which seems everywhere to evidence expression; a force ever trying to produce a man that can cope with the environments that come and go, with all the vicissitudes of their changing set of elements—plants, animals, soils, weather, etc. Then the *Pithecanthropus* could be said to have vanished because he could not develop a mind that could imagine the necessary means of adjustments for his survival. He was not able to envisage his situation and its requirements. He was not able to invent so as to gain control over the hostile elements of his surroundings. Unless the Divine Creator is conceived as always evolving, the postulate of a natural force descriptive of the evolutionary development which man passed through, and is still passing through, gives a clearer conception of what has undoubtedly taken place. This hypothesis falls back upon Bergson's "élan vital." But both theories mentioned are frankly in the realm of metaphysics. It is beyond the scope of this treatment to consider the many proposed theories of mental origins. The chief concern is to indicate the possible and probable rôle of environment in all the aspects of mind, both as to its arrival and use.

PRIMITIVE MIND

The primitive mind is often spoken of as childish; writers sometimes talk about the childhood of the race. As a description of the primitive mind this expression is not free from objections. It does however give a working definition. It is not improbable that the Cro-Magnon man who lived some 20,000 years ago possessed a mental capacity which on the average compares favorably with that of the average man of today. It is conceivable that a great section of our present general population if placed in his environment would in a short time perish because they could not adjust themselves to it. But comparisons are frankly being made here without data. On the other hand it should be remembered that there are plenty of primitive people living today, so that when we are comparing primitive with modern man, we are not entirely speculating. The present day primi-

tives have been called our "contemporaneous ancestry." The comparison has been indulged for the purpose of suggesting that the main difference between primitive man and modern man, mentally, is a matter of habit, inherited experience, institutional guidance, institutional protection, etc. In Chapter I the fallacious arguments about differential race traits were noted. The arguments there brought forth will also serve in this connection.

The primitive man was obliged to cope with situations in which the causal relations of events were entirely unknown to him. He had no knowledge of the physical properties of electricity and the relation between the flash and the accompanying thunder. For him a great spirit must be speaking, must be angry; it must therefore be appeased. He had no knowledge of the psychology of dreams; therefore his soul or double must have been wandering while he slept. For all he knew the soul had merely been lost when death that strangest of all and most dreaded of all natural phenomena, appeared. It might come back if not properly "laid." All primitive burials attest to this belief and our modern funerals have something of the same superstition in them. Primitive man knew nothing of the laws of the reflection of light as explained by the science of physics; therefore his reflected image in the brook was for him another proof of his double or soul. In this fashion he came to create a system of causes and effects—an imaginal environment—which constituted for him an order of reality.

The creation of an imaginal environment was natural. It supplied the missing causes, which are for the most part clear to the modern man. The fact that we indulge in practices that hark back to these ancient times and the knowledge they contained, is a matter of tradition. At the same time the modern mind is only some measures ahead of the primitive mind; there are as yet things which are unexplained. Wherever this is so, the modern man also imagines his way through his difficulties; he assigns causes, connects them with a ceremony that will handle them for him and proceeds to rationalize about them. The one impressive thing about all primitive behavior is the preponderance of ceremony. Everything had its ceremony; it was followed with faultless detail. The primitive mind was a ceremonious mind because its knowledge was traditional. Primitive man consulted many oracles. If they did not respond it was his own

fault and therefore he saw to it that his conduct was properly ordered. This meant ceremony and ceremony becomes habit (tradition).

In the discussion up to this point the terms tradition and habit have been used indifferently. Certain distinctions should however be pointed out. Both anticipate and determine behavior, while they are at once continuous and changeable as time and circumstances dictate. Habit implies a drive; tradition implies a sanction. Tradition therefore is regarded as a social heritage, the observance of which is called social behavior. In following custom or acting in customary fashion, homage is rendered to a body of accepted norms of behavior more or less voluntary. Tradition therefore is a code, a mental content rather than process. Changes in habit are brought about by the establishment of conditioned reflexes; changes in custom are referred to as "fashion," "vogue," "style."

Culture seems to be the most vital thing on earth. A nation may be conquered by an invading army and the population in time may lose its identity through assimilation. Yet a part of the culture belonging to the conquered nation will in every case diffuse among the conquerors and survive. Culture conflicts are generally compromises. Wissler³ insists that little of any importance is ever lost. The vitality of culture according to Korzybski⁴ is the one big consideration which makes man the "time binding" animal par excellence.

The discussion of culture so far has served to bring out the following facts. Culture is cumulative, continuous, vital. It is intimately connected with mind and the mental level upon which it comes into existence is imagination, while its actual observance is a matter of habit. This shows that there is after all no fundamental difference between the mind of primitive man and the mind of the man of today. The ancient custom discussed has its counterpart in objects directing modern ways of thinking; this thinking is a grasping after causes among natural phenomena; wherever knowledge leaves off imagination takes up the task and supplies the missing data. The quest for causal relations is the mental phase of adjustment and the product of this cerebration becomes revelation or tradition. Observance of this traditional knowledge makes use of concepts which are in essence

³ *Man and Culture*, pp. 40-45.

⁴ *The Manhood of Humanity*, p. 21.

magic and luck; these in turn may be created if only the individual with the aid of his fellows will pursue the proper formula—ceremony.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONTINUITY OF CULTURE

The validity of the conclusions so far reached must be tested in the light of method. Independent invention was the first general method proposed to account for the similarity of culture among primitives. The earlier anthropologists looked upon the continuity of culture as a matter of parallel evolution. A given tribe of primitive people remaining isolated from the rest of the world, in the presence of the proper materials, would gradually work its way up through the rough stone culture to bronze and finally steel. While of course different tribes might conceivably run the course of different periods of time, they would nevertheless arrive at these higher stations and finally attain the stage boastfully spoken of as civilization. This is in brief the theory of independent invention. The psychological explanation is that there is among human beings everywhere a common humanness sometimes called psychic unity. It will be recalled that in Chapter III, reference was made to the theory of recapitulation. The two theories, psychic unity and recapitulation, are very closely related; the latter means the former in action. The theory of psychic unity is a partial explanation of the continuity of culture; some anthropologists giving it more prominence than others. It is a fundamental problem in the study of society.

The physical similarities between man and the higher apes are accounted for by assuming that they have a common ancestry—a humanoid stem from which they evolved in different directions. Man is therefore a distant cousin of the ape. Similarly it can be said that the different races of modern man are cousins less remotely related.⁵ Whatever original mental endowment man and ape share, must also be regarded as the common mind which corresponds to the common humanoid stem in a physical sense. In the same way, the mentality of different races of mankind may be accounted for. If they possess psychic unity and there is no doubt that they do, this unity refers to an ancient psychic stem; the differences between races (i.e., mental

⁵ Keith, A., *The Antiquity of Man*, pp. 710ff.

race traits) must be regarded as diversities which have accompanied the evolutionary process.⁶

These considerations place us in position to take up the ancient custom (digital mutilation). Can it be said that the common psychic stem is sufficient to account for its appearance among so many different marginal races? Will the same assumption account for its vitality as a human culture trait? Will the theory account for the variations taken on? Finally will this assumption give a clue to the origin of the religious impulse which is found everywhere in the human kind? The answer to these questions is apparently in the affirmative. At the same time the theory must not be overworked.

Most anthropologists use the psychic unity theory. At the same time they connect it with the second theory—diffusion. Wissler⁷ gives a clear statement of the diffusion theory, as follows:

From this vantage ground we may then sketch the provisional history of culture. It began with the first distinct human group, whose cradleland was most certainly Asia. Some of its first great inventions were stone-flaking, fire-making, twisting of string, the spear-thrower, the harpoon and the bow. Just when and how they came in, we do not know, but that they were inventions we may be sure, and as such, were occasional accretions to the slender but growing culture series. Yet man was expanding and differentiating, thus spreading out over the earth, carrying his culture with him. So at last the waves of the first great impetus from these initial inventions reached the outermost corners of the earth; but in the meantime many great and new advances were made in the motherland, most of which spent themselves long before they reached these outlying tribes of more primitive folk. So it went on and on, new trait after new trait piling up in the interior, each stimulating the other. Now we see how it is that the culture series can be a unit, or a true continuum, though any given line of racial descent may, by halting and occasional backsliding, get into an inferior position. In other words, tribes may come and tribes may go, but culture goes on forever.

⁶ Whitnall, *The Dawn of Mankind*, p. 17-18, says, "To realize that there is only one species of man, is the first step. It has long been accepted that this is so in the biological sense, but that is not enough. The thinking world must realize that the human kind is similar the world over, and that widely divergent habits and modes of conduct are but different expressions of a common mind. This mind has developed through the long periods of man's occupancy of the earth, through a similarity of human needs and human inventions. Isolation, climate, food supply, topographical features, and other environmental factors have joined together in developing the mind of man in diverse directions; yet the fundamental mind is universal even though its expressions are apparently unrelated."

⁷ *Man and Culture*, pp. 38-39.

So diffusion begins whenever a culture trait finds a new home either by contact or by borrowing. The rapidity with which a trait is accepted and used by a group to which it is exposed, all depends upon the appeal that it will make to the minds of the people in the group.⁸ Material culture traits usually make fairly rapid progress in their course of diffusion. On the other hand, it may require even centuries for the diffusion to become general. This is especially true in the case of purely mental culture traits, such as the introduction of a philosophical conception of life which runs counter to one of long standing. In such cases it must await the time when it can be assimilated with material traits. Then the material traits act as a vehicle for more rapid diffusion. The diffusion theory enjoys a good reputation among anthropologists. Elliot Smith and Graebner might be called extreme diffusionists. The former denied in toto the possibility of independent invention. "So whenever he observes a similarity between cultures, no matter if half the circumference of the world intervenes, he declares that diffusion is obvious and that the only problem presented is to discover how the trait-complexes managed to leap the gap."⁹ This is known as the Heliolithic Culture theory. The supposition is that an invention was carried by members of the inventing group from place to place dropping one trait in one locality and another in a different locality. Tozzer¹⁰ points out that this theory is untenable.

It is worthwhile to consider in this connection the tangential question of the universality of instincts previously mentioned. McDougall¹¹ while recognizing the influence of the culture aspect of psychology applied to society, evidences a tendency to favor "the common native foundation."

These primary innate tendencies have different relative strengths in the native constitutions of the individuals of different races, and they are favoured or checked in very different degrees by the very different social circumstances of men in different stages of culture; but they are probably common to the men of every race and of every age. If this view, that human nature has everywhere and at all times this common native foundation, can be established, it will afford a much-

⁸ See Bartlett, F. C., *Psychology and Primitive Culture*.

⁹ Wissler, C., *Man and Culture*, p. 107.

¹⁰ *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, p. 22.

¹¹ *Social Psychology*, pp. 20-21.

needed basis for speculation on the history of the development of human societies and human institutions. For so long as it is possible to assume, as has often been done, that these innate tendencies of the human mind have varied greatly from age to age and from race to race, all such speculation is founded on quicksand and we cannot hope to reach views of a reasonable degree of certainty.

The difficulty in accepting this interpretation of social forces lies not so much in the letter as in the point of view. McDougall in the work cited apparently attaches an unwarranted fatality to human progress, as determined by instinctive tendencies, a position inconsistent with social progress in the presence of other slow yielding forces. McDougall apparently senses the weakness of his argument since he interposes the subjunctive, "if . . . can be established." At all events he appears to see the situation in another light in his *Group Mind* published twelve years later. In this work he stresses organization. In attempting to fix the responsibility for the late World War on Germany he says:¹²

So long as that people might retain its former organization, which, I repeat, rendered it a menace to the civilization and culture of the whole world, its antagonists could only treat it as a criminal and an outlaw to be repressed at all costs and punished and kept down with the utmost severity. But, if it should achieve a new organization, one which will give preponderance to the better and saner elements and traditions still preserved within it, then, although it will consist of the same individuals in the main, it will have become a new or at least a transformed nation, one with which the other nations could enter into moral relations of amity or at least of mutual toleration, one which could be admitted to a place in the greater society which the League of Nations is to become. In other words, the same population would in virtue of a changed organization, have become a different nation.

This discussion is intended to direct attention to the apparently speculative character of so much of the literature on social psychology. Invariably it will be found that those who try to reason their way from the universality of instincts to social theory that may be applied to modern times, run into a cul-de-sac. Another example may serve to reinforce this contention. Thus Woodworth¹³ says:

The human individual is an animal, and some of his native traits are universal among animals. He is a vertebrate, and some of his traits, though not present in

¹² *Group Mind*, p. 22.

¹³ *Psychology*, p. 98.

all animals, are universal among vertebrates. He is a mammal, with mammalian traits; a primate, with primate traits; a man with human traits; a Chinaman or Indian or European with racial traits; belongs to a more or less definite stock or breed within the race, and possesses the traits that are common to members of that stock; and the same with family traits. The criterion of universality, in the light of these facts, comes down to this: that when all individuals having the same descent show a trait in common, that trait is to be regarded as belonging to their native constitution—unless evidence can be brought forward to the contrary.

But note “unless evidence can be brought forward to the contrary” and on the next page he concludes, after some examples which favor the acceptance of the cultural point of view are produced: “Enough has been said to show that the criterion of universality is one that needs to be applied with judgment.” Thus it becomes apparent that the place of psychic unity in the scheme of culture continuity is merely the foundation for the interest which a group will manifest in a new culture trait when once it has been introduced.

It may be concluded that the relation between primitive and modern man is something real; that an understanding of the former is necessary for an understanding of the latter. Society must be interpreted in terms of culture which has given rise to institutions. The society of today is chiefly institutional, whereas the primitive society was predominately one of ceremony. If it can be said that institutional life is the end result of reason, as shaped by our parliamentary bodies of representative government, then at the same time the fact cannot be escaped that those institutions had their beginnings in the ceremony and custom of the societies that have passed. The conclusions drawn begin to indicate what a tremendously complex thing the society of today is. The line of reasoning here established will be pursued in the next chapter and we shall try to account for a very significant movement which is affecting the modern world as a whole and certain communities of the United States in particular.

SUMMARY

1. Culture may be defined as the accumulated modes of group thought and behavior in the presence of familiar aspects of environment.

2. The modes of thought and behavior which the members of specific groups acquire are their cultural patterns. These patterns are

passed on as tradition from generation to generation with surprising completeness. However, means for adjustment to novel situations demand gradual modifications of patterns.

3. Groups come into possession of their cultural products by two general methods: independent invention and diffusion. In this way also compromises with existing patterns are made.

4. The basic human psychological processes concerned with culture in all its phases from primitive to modern man comprehend the limits of adjustment made possible by imagination in the light of experience.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

- BARTLETT, F. C.: *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, Chaps. 6 and 7.
GOLDENWEISER, A. A.: *Early Civilization*, pp. 15-20, Chaps. 15, 16, and 17.
KANTOR, J. R.: *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I., pp. 197-205.
LOWIE, R. H.: *Primitive Society*, Chap. 1.
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THOMAS W. I.: *Source Book for Social Origins*, Introduction and pp. 130-133.
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CHAPTER VIII

THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES

In the previous chapter an attempt was made to establish the thesis that human society might be studied in connection with the forces which emanate from environment. This is true for both selected and unselected types. We saw that it was possible to refer to the mind in its creation and modification as due to stimulation from environment, and the adjustment of individuals, singly or in groups, thereto. In order to get a glimpse of this origin, it was necessary to consider primitive man and the chief problems which students of anthropology encounter in their attempts to explain social origins. So far as could be deduced, it became apparent that the essential factor in the biological welfare of the sub-man and his development into homo sapiens, was the all-important capacity of adjustment. This adjustment may be interpreted as due to memory functioning through habits or instincts: to an observer removed so remotely from this humble origin as we, it is not impossible to surmise that these means to adjustments (inventions, traditions) came into being by virtue of an *a priori* human psychological disposition, or capacity. We found, however, that this trail was easily lost. Speculation about the relative importance of a definitely small number of possibilities brought us within reasonably close range of what must have been the essential nature of culture origins and the developmental processes. From this it was possible to conclude that habit formation was essential to adjustment and that habits¹ tended to be established and preserved as complex reaction patterns to environmental patterns; these habits appear as psycho-social structures. These habits, first being found to have a survival value, were passed on from group to group and became tradition. The problem in the present chapter is to consider the same sort of data in reference to modern society. In order to do so, it will be best first to consider some essential theories pertaining thereto and to use a specific illustration after these theories have been advanced.

¹ Habit is used here in the broadest sense of the term.

INVENTION AND DIFFUSION OF CULTURE IN MODERN SOCIETY

The problems of independent invention and diffusion are just as germane to modern society as they are to primitive. "Static society" results from a lack of impetus on the part of some groups to search for new means of adjustment. Inventions imply needs; inventions represent stages of relative progress which different groups exhibit. Wherever the members of a group are uniformly stimulated in respect to natural objects and the presence of climatic and other conditions which impel them to exert themselves in order to maintain existence, or to anticipate a state of future competence, invention becomes the guide to progress. On the contrary comfortable circumstances create static social conditions. The sum total of invention, tested and accepted by the group, becomes its culture. Invention, however, is the contribution of a very few people; others appropriate (grow into) these inventions. It should be said, moreover, that this borrowing is largely unconscious: it is merely a question of habit formations. For the rank and file of individuals who compose society today (and this has always been true), the round of existence is due to habit formation of a comparatively simple sort. Ordinarily they are not called upon to make an original invention (means to adjustment), merely because their environment makes no special demand of them, impresses them with no need for patterns which vary markedly from the familiar.

UNSELECTED AND SELECTED ENVIRONMENT

The argument adduced so far shows that society and environment are correlates. As previously indicated, a differentiation of environment yields several types, one of which is social. But every individual is born into his environment unselectively. So far as he changes environments at will, he may be said to select; so far as environment changes he is forced to adjust himself. One or both is continually going on so that the individual, and likewise those of his fellows who are similarly oriented and stimulated, experience a feeling of reality of their surroundings.

A view of what goes on around us may be stated as follows. The individual has no very clear awareness except in the presence of disturbed habits, or in situations for which he possesses no ready-made

patterns for adjustment. There is no exhibition of mind upon the pure habit level. Activities which are performed upon the habit level, purely, are sometimes carried forward without purpose. In one sense it may be said that no social object exists for the individual thus acting, and the question whether or not social behavior is at such times in progress, is a debatable one. Individuals surely differ in the amount of mind they employ; all depends upon the degree of dissatisfaction they find,—the problems (for them) which arise, by virtue of the voluntary or involuntary selections they are required to make. If we were to analyze environment so as to focus attention upon the purely human aspects of it, we would arrive at Dunlap's fundamental types of organization: fortuitous (accidental) and selective. Moreover, if we were to consider time and space factors as well, we would see the reason for what he calls contiguous and non-contiguous types of organization. Finally if we should attempt to classify these in terms of value, it would be possible to compare them with reference to their efficiency in the promotion of some social purpose.² In like manner it is possible to consider the various forms of social organization described in Chapter VI, and show that they all go back ultimately to environment—the universal medium of all individual and social existence.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CULTURE CONFLICTS

The conflict of cultures now noticeable in so many phases of social life has stimulated students to give some rational account of it. Ogburn³ supposes that "the various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate, some parts are changing more rapidly than others: and since there is a correlation and interdependence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires adjustment through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture. For instance, industry and education are correlated, hence a change in industry makes adjustments necessary through changes in the educational system." Korzybski⁴ assumes that some parts of our culture, e.g., the physical sciences and the social sciences, progress according

² Purpose as here used is value sought through adjustment.

³ *Social Change*.

⁴ *The Manhood of Humanity*, p. 23ff.

to different rates, which he prefers to reduce to mathematical terms: the physical sciences progress, geometrically; the social sciences, arithmetically.

Miller's⁵ figurative alignment of social organization along horizontal and vertical lines may be used in this connection with profit. He observes that civilization (i.e., culture complexes) tends to be established throughout a region vertically, meaning thereby that a well-established and widespread pattern becomes the inheritance of all people (relatively speaking), including the humble artisan and aristocrat as well. Races, nations and religious faiths stand out in the larger societies like so many columns. The same can be said for political parties and organizations of less importance. The vertical organizations are to be thought of as mind groups into which an individual is born, the reaction patterns peculiar to that group being unselectively adopted, and the behavior resulting therefrom is to be regarded as instinctive. On the other hand inventions and discoveries in every phase of human contact with and adjustment to environment give rise at first to horizontal organizations. A few appropriate the novelty, a custom begins to grow and in time becomes a social habit. Those members who are responsible for the acceptance of the novelty, were for the time being the members of the horizontal group; the vertical group at first rejected innovation, but finally accepted it as one of the settled acquirements, making it a part of their established custom so that high and low alike make regular, unstudied use of it. A few illustrations may help here. When bananas were first shipped to London they could not be sold or even given to the poor. Potatoes were denounced as injurious; salt-peter shared a similar fate when first imported from Chile—the first cargo was consigned to the sea; the first coal shipped to Philadelphia (1803) was used for constructing sidewalks.⁶

Discoveries of every sort are the recent acquisitions. It takes time for them to become established. Remembering what was earlier referred to as the compromise rather than conquest of cultures, it is clear that the horizontal organizations keep up a sort of warfare with the older vertical groups until a time when harmony intervenes.

⁵ *Races, Nations and Classes*. Miller's explanation is a novel variation of the planes and currents theory advanced by Ross.

⁶ Slosson, E., *Chats on Science*.

Until this point is reached, the members of society who accepted the newer adjustment features represent small classes within the larger social groups. The so-called fundamentalists and modernists of our day are good examples of the vertical and horizontal groups, respectively. The modernists are the champions of scientific discoveries; the fundamentalists, of well ordered and long established customs and beliefs.

The foregoing conceptions of the behavior of people in the presence of old and new cultural products are of course purely descriptive. We find in them no causal principle, although a psychological account would undoubtedly find a large place for imitation and suggestion as individual mental processes. It is safe however to adhere to the principle of habit formation.

TRADITIONAL AND DISCOVERED KNOWLEDGE

From the psychological standpoint, knowledge of every classification holds the essential key to mentation. Knowledge is the sum total of conception whether it arises out of the depths of wonder or arrives by the far more difficult route of experiment, repeated and verified. The problem of adjustment to environment is solved for each individual in the light of what he knows (customs and traditions) and what he can devise (discoveries). Clear cut specimens of social behavior belong to the latter. This means that reaction patterns are of both established and formative types. In a changing environment the latter gradually create the former. So from time to time situations arise when the former appear so well-established, so hallowed by sheer age, that they become reaction patterns of the most durable type, functioning on the habitual level. The individual sustains an emotional attitude toward these habits in their potential or active phases. If they have been laid down solemnly in the plastic years of life, repeated time after time by elders, and practiced by the majority of associates, woven into the social life of the community, and if finally they naturally appeal to the most ancient form of adjustment to environment, viz., imagination, such reaction patterns mean revelation. Such attitudes, like all habits, run their course when called into action, admitting of no variation in the course of responses.

But the conflict of cultures here under consideration cannot be adequately determined upon the individualistic basis. To do so is to miss the meaning of the conflict. We should view the whole question in the living sense, taking into account the historical as well as the present meaning of individualism. Culture conflicts are not merely individual maladjustments, though reasoning by statistical methods would carry out the analysis of social disturbances in terms of such units.

The social unit, in respect to culture conflicts, is much larger than the individual. The failure to realize the distinction between social life in its day to day relations on the one hand, and its cultural relations on the other, has led in some cases to erroneous conclusions. So the defenders and critics of both science and theology for example have erred in not seeing the relations which an individual sustains to his environment. Some scientists have gone so far in their abstractions of the individual, that they find it possible to take him as such and even to point out two compartments to his nature, one for science and another for religion. In this fashion they contend that there is no conflict between science and religion. On the other hand some religionists have so completely conceived their work as a matter of personal salvation that they have lost sight of society.

Returning to the vertical and horizontal types of social organization it is important to note carefully the psychological processes that take place. What have just been called tradition and discovery⁷ function along the same lines, but they succeed in establishing different mental levels. Instinct and reason are the names for these mental levels.

In the case of tradition the individual is carefully guarded from explanations of its meaning.⁸ Organizations and their guardians see to this. These must be taken on faith as Mathews observes: "Religion has been administered by those who found their authority in some source not open to men and women at large. Priestly control could not continue except as the representatives of such control in a church or its equivalent, have naturally opposed any attempt to account for its basis. Supernaturalism ceases when explanations

⁷ These two terms should be applied specifically, as in the present discussion to the conflict between theology and science.

⁸ Witness the recent anti-evolution laws in Tennessee and Mississippi.

begin."⁹ The same conception was stated by Draper:¹⁰ "A divine revelation of science admits of no improvement, no change, no advance. It discourages as needless, and indeed presumptuous, all new discovery, considering it as unlawful prying into things which it was the intention of God to conceal."¹¹

On the other hand discovery arises in the presence of some felt difficulty in adjustment, either because of the invasion of some hitherto unfamiliar relations of persons, their interests, and the innumerable exigencies of these interests, or in consequence of the immobility and unmodifiability of the established social-regarding and individual-regarding reaction patterns. Thus in the course of time the projective mental abilities of the more highly endowed members of society initiate their trials toward adjustment.

THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION

Present day sociologists recognize something akin to a crisis in religion. From the daily press, weekly and monthly periodicals, and pulpit come warnings which show that in some places and among certain groups there is something more than apprehension attached to the forebodings which these agencies point out. In some relatively isolated sections of the country there exists a suspicion that an organized attempt is being made to destroy the whole structure of religion as a social and moral institution. At the same time a sort of fanaticism appears among the more ardent humanizers of science. They fear that religious fanaticism is making serious inroads upon the prospects of science, although there is no doubt in their minds that science will in due time put religious fanatics to rout.

Ellwood says that "a crisis confronts religion in the modern world." He sees the necessity of a "New Reformation" which will make the Protestant Reformation seem insignificant. For this observer there

⁹ *Contribution of Science to Religion*, p. 382.

¹⁰ *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*, p. 62.

¹¹ a. Boyer's theory (early in eighteenth century) of inoculation against smallpox was declared by the clergy to be an attempt to contravert God's judgment.

b. Simpson's use of anesthetics (1847) in childbirth was denounced by the clergy as an attempt to circumvent the primeval curse of women. Happily Simpson found a reply in the 21st verse of the second chapter of Genesis which relates how the Maker caused Adam to fall into a deep sleep while He extracted a rib for the creation of Eve.

are four possibilities: a new form of Christianity, sheer atheism, agnostic scientific positivism, or a reversion of civilization to a lower level.¹²

The religious revolution of today is not as current happenings might suggest, a thing of recent years, although recent social events have served to bring its causes into fairly discernible proximity, and to betray its relationship to all those things which make up the round of life.

America has had the advantage of great material progress since earliest colonial days. This progress is due to the presence of natural resources which through exploitation (discovery, manufacture and distribution) have been gradually drawn into the round of our common life and activities. With such a material background we created a new social order, i.e., we have come by slow degrees to create and adopt new and entirely different culture traits. As Ellwood recently said, science "has largely created the conditions which favored the rise of democracy."¹³ The culture traits of our ancestors in their native countries did not satisfy their wants in a new and undeveloped country. Our colonial ancestors did, of course, bring many culture traits with them and used them as they could, but it was a situation where the invention of new cultures rather than the spread of culture by contact or borrowing became the chief method of acquisition. Contact with the mother country was not so close as it is today. So far as the earliest days are concerned, we might say more was appropriated from the Indian culture than was, contemporaneously at least, carried over in the Mayflower. Thus we came to use tobacco, tomatoes, potatoes, and some 40 other vegetables. So too we took up the canoe, snow shoes and even Indian methods of warfare. In another important sense it may be said that the very fact of adjustment to novel surroundings had a psychological concomitant. Our ancestors were not continuously surrounded by old customs, at least in the details of everyday life, and so were in a position to build their ideals from new contacts. Again the medley of races which came to this country had the important effect, through the clash of cultures which they brought, of emphasizing the individuality of reaction patterns. Here were the roots of our early insistence upon religious

¹² *The Reconstruction of Religion.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

toleration which in turn promoted a diversity of religious philosophies. That we in the twentieth century have departed from this toleration seems a mystery to many people. But the mystery is easily solved when we consider the growth of the idea of national unity in recent years (fast becoming a vertical group), and also the simple fact that in all nations of which we have any history, nationality and religious unity go together. The big thing in America has been, and still is, diversity of religious practice and ceremony. Instead of a state religion we¹⁴ have had many kinds. The present tendency toward church unity is the key to the revolution from a political point of view and the conquest of industry with its attendant development of mind groups has served to create a corresponding set of mind groups in theological matters.

But this does not exhaust the reasons for the conflict in religious philosophies in America. We are the inventors of the world; we are the usurpers of science. The contrast between traditional and discovered knowledge came sooner to us than to most other people. In the diversity of religious philosophy which we have developed and even cherished was a fertile field for the growth and appropriation of discovered knowledge (science). This likewise assisted the growth and differentiation of mechanical cultures. We were ready to apply it when it came, and even set up agencies for its further discovery. This might be called the spirit of America. This spirit at present is temporarily on the decline.

The same formula was observed in the case of primitive man. It is plain that primitive religion was built up in accordance with the same psychological laws. Religion for the primitive as well as for the modern man was stimulated from without the individual. He did not conceive of an ego that was constitutionally something different from the objects of his environment. All nature was alive; spirits were everywhere. Religion had not reached the plane of rationality.

It is possible to draw a single conclusion: religion is the chief culture complex of all societies. Being such it must possess the possibilities of change to correspond with changes in other culture com-

¹⁴ Augustus Thomas, the playwright, is recently reported to have told the Advertising Club of New York City that Mr. Bryan just before his death had prepared a Constitutional Amendment, the object of which was to make Christianity the official religion of the United States. (*Baltimore Sun*, March 4, 1926.)

plexes which likewise profoundly affect the lives of people. Here is the constant call for religious evolution. When the development takes place suddenly, we call it revolution. Both imply maladjustment. In fact the whole philosophy of social science may be summed up under the formula: specific vital needs and their satisfaction. This is but an enlarged picture of the behavioristic formula of stimulus and response.

RECENT FACTORS IN THE CONFLICT

The historical summarization just given may be found inadequate, since it does not come close enough to the groups at the present time. While there is justification for such objection, it must appear that the behavior of a group at any given definite and specific period can be understood fully only after it has been projected upon the background of its human culture in the making. At the same time it is possible to make a relatively clear distinction between the remote and recent aspects of the conflict and to point out what might be called immediate causes.

During the last two decades civilization has faced a tremendous task. This task has been no other than that of utilizing the accretions to culture. It would appear that these accretions have come so rapidly, and in such quantities, that they have served to defeat the aims and purposes which called them forth. In a word, there has been more ingestion than digestion. Applying this situation to the subject under discussion, it appears that the relatively recent attempts on the part of critical students of religion to intellectualize their investigations, to separate fact from fiction, have set the stage for the disrupting of individual and social reaction patterns. From this point of view it may be said that the dissolution of the older theological cultures now rapidly gaining headway, originated from within. It was merely a case of the popularization of the methods of science, when theological seminaries began to show respect for the meaning of facts discriminated, classified and compared. The scientific method of investigation can result in nothing else than accretions to knowledge. So long as these are kept from the masses, they have no meaning; the very moment they are introduced, adjustment is called for. But those who in turn are asked to make the short-cut to adjustment, suffer from the neophobia that accompanies the breaking

down of the resistance which habit formation encounters in habits already formed.

A second recent and direct source of disturbance to the settled habits of thought pertaining to the culture complex of religion is that of the public high schools and colleges. The school population has in fifty years increased several thousand per cent while the general population has increased between 200 and 300 per cent. Among the educators of the youth today, there is a general feeling that the public high school should be the people's college. In fact they have all but succeeded in making it such from many points of view. The high school is now the standard preparatory institution to all professions; its methods of instruction simulate those of the colleges, and even outpoint them in efficiency; its subject-matter is substantially the same, although admittedly dealing with the more elemental phases of the disciplines comprising their common curricula. All in all the modern high school is a better institution for liberal education than were the colleges fifty years ago. Public education is a powerful social force. It rapidly converts castes into classes, vertical organizations into horizontal organizations. Knowledge filters down from the learned strata to the unlearned strata of society; the result is its dissemination in the only truly socially significant way.

A third exciting cause was the World War. While there has been in the minds of many an over-estimate of this great social upheaval as the cause of the present conflict between science and theology, it is not too much to say that had the war never come, this conflict of cultures might have been postponed or even averted; the needed adjustment might have been made more gradually and therefore less dramatically. It is a curious fact that reconstructive periods are always followed by religious revivals. Catastrophes of any kind are similarly attended. It would appear that whenever any unexplainable happening takes place, it is the older reaction patterns that are first exploited in the interest of explanation and adjustment.

FUNDAMENTALISM

Fundamentalism is a stabilizing movement marking a reaction to the impact of a series of events which characterize and give direction to social change. Every great social movement has its fundamentalist phase. In the present discussion the term is applied to religion.

Fundamentalism is at bottom a psychological phenomenon and must be studied as such. It is rooted in habits and the emotions accompanying their blocking; it is therefore endowed with the usual attractive power of waves of crowd sentiment. It is complex, evasive and undefinable. Some students of the phenomenon think it a comparatively simple matter. Glenn Frank says:

We may study the phenomenon of Fundamentalism, we can hold its motives and its mental processes up in the light and attempt to understand them without burrowing our way through tons of theological literature and threading our way through mazes of ecclesiastical politics. Mr. Bryan is Fundamentalism. If we can understand him, we can understand Fundamentalism.¹⁵

"Bryanism" is a misnomer. It might just as appropriately be called "Sundayism." Fundamentalism as a social fact may be considered a permanent possibility—its like has occurred many times in the past.

The Fundamentalists declare that the science of geology is all wrong for it raises some doubts about the Creator and His created universe. They stand for a literal interpretation of the first book of Genesis and the entire Bible, its numerous inconsistencies notwithstanding. So Mr. Bryan¹⁶ says: "It is better to trust in the Rock of Ages, than to know the ages of the rocks." Here is a typical exploitation of a habit pattern. In a similar vein, Professor Price¹⁷ takes issue with the modern geologist because he finds no particular use for the story of the Flood. Price thinks the Flood will account for all fossils. The quarrel of these gentlemen with the liberal, is concerned with the authority and verity of the Scriptures. "The Bible is either the word of God or the work of man," says Bryan,¹⁸ "It cannot be the work of man for if it were he should now be able to write a better one unless he has fallen." The illustrations show the usage of the older reaction patterns.

Another concern of Fundamentalism has to do not with the findings of science but with a revival of the quarrels that have for centuries been waged among the clergy. These quarrels concern theology and

¹⁵ *Century*, September, 1923.

¹⁶ *The Menace of Darwinism*, p. 22.

¹⁷ *Science and Religion in a Nutshell*.

¹⁸ *The Bible and Its Enemies*, p. 7.

its disputed points: Among the specialists on this subject may be mentioned the Rev. J. W. Porter, of Louisville, Kentucky, The Rev. Mark A. Matthews of Seattle, Washington, Bishop Edwin D. Mouzon of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and the Rev. William Ashley Sunday.

The Fundamentalist-Modernist movement is merely a present-day manifestation of the struggle between two culture patterns. It is a social conflict which upon analysis, presents some curious relations between the proponents of the two systems. One continually stimulates the other: from the scientific angle, the presuppositions of religion have served the very important office of presenting new problems for investigation. Science continually challenges the verities of any philosophy, including its own, which sustains even a tangential bearing upon its discovered facts and their meaning. On the other hand religion, as a philosophy, grudgingly releases its tenets in deference to facts. In order to make these concessions with the least possible display of retreat, religious leaders resort to that curious form of reasoning elsewhere referred to as rationalization.

The persistence of rationalization as a method of adjustment would naturally suggest that it has some human value. Surely a phenomenon of such wide and frequent use cannot be dismissed with an air of disdain. If it is human it bears some relation to the facts which the social psychologist sets out to study; his study must include a place for it.

It would appear that the individual who looks to tradition, settled knowledge, for his adjustment does not care to have his philosophy cut up into segments. The analyzing processes of the pure scientist disturb his equilibrium, confound his associations, particularize his sense of oneness and subtract thereby something from its finiteness. Here is the differentiation between the mental types involved in this controversy. The follower of dogma is deductive; he has his conclusions to start with; his thinking is direct. On the other hand the scientist is inductive; his conclusions are generally always in the making; his thinking is mediate. Therefore the former attaches great weight to his conclusions, while the latter is skeptical of his conclusions.

The true nature of rationalization and the frequency of its use as a method of adjustment between the growing body of discovered and

the shrinking body of traditional knowledge cannot be understood by focusing attention exclusively upon the retreats which the church has been forced to make. Some of the attempts which scientists themselves make are just as absurd. Many scientists today try to find some way to bolster up the notion that there is no conflict between science and religion. In this attempt the more progressive churchmen and the more "discreet" scientists join forces. They say that "true" religion and "true" science are in harmony. If this term "true" could only be defined, there would of course be some meaning attached to the harmony of which they speak. So far as the history of the conflicts of cultures is concerned, together with the varieties of thinking which have accompanied such conflicts, there is no evidence that complete harmony will soon be attained. The basis for this "harmony" thinking is somewhat as follows.

First, there are some competent scientists today who project the meaning of their science so far into the realm of abstraction that they are able to draw a distinction between the facts of science and the attitude of mind which is supposed to direct its discoveries.¹⁹ Accordingly they say that science does not conflict with the tenets of religion, since all they claim as scientists is a certain attitude of mind. This rationalizing, for such it is, would probably be satisfactory were it not for the plain fact that science really has no social meaning until it is applied. Science is dynamic rather than static. The scientist must look upon his science as nothing other than refined common sense.

A second and closely related form of rationalization which must be laid at the door of some of our reputable scientists, is that of maintaining that there are two compartments to the human mind—one for theology, the other for science. This assumption however when put to the test must concede that there are two kinds of truth—religious truth and scientific truth. This assumption can be nothing but spurious.

A third, and in some respects, the most unworthy of all forms of scientific rationalizing, is that of going back to the confused writings of such men as Luther or Wesley and extracting individual statements

¹⁹ See Chapter XII.

which seem to indicate the anticipation of modern scientific conceptions.

Such harmonizings of conflicting cultures are in the long run sure to defeat social purposes because they are at best evasions. Students of social science must realize that religion is a social question and by no means an individual question.

The founders of our republic, beginning with no political traditions with which to compromise, insisted that problems of church and state should be put aside. Following this high resolve some states (e.g., Maryland) forbade the clergy seats in their legislative assemblies, some declared that prayers should not be offered therein (e.g., Kentucky) and Tennessee declared that all matters of education should be under the "fostering care of this Legislature" and that science and learning should ever be encouraged.²⁰ But the most liberally constituted state was the first to legislate against the findings of science.

Why have these changes come? The answer is that any values (culture patterns) when once accepted by a considerable number of the people of any group, are sure to emerge as a social fact. If the new culture patterns do not harmonize with the old, there will be a conflict. Neither legislation nor rationalization will suffice to establish harmony or to postpone indefinitely the day and outcome of the conflict.

The history of the adjustment between traditional and discovered knowledge is indeed long and continuous; critical periods are called "Aufklärungen," "Renaissances," "Reformations," "Awakenings," etc. It is a notable fact that the names for these adjustments refer to the institutions which in every case were the conservators of tradition.

Only in recent years has come a conviction on the part of scientists that they owe to tradition some assistance in the adjustment it must eventually make. It has resulted in a movement called the "humanization of knowledge."²¹ We are sorely in need of it for the gaps be-

²⁰ From the constitution of Tennessee (adopted January, 1796) which was adjudged by Thomas Jefferson "the least imperfect and the most republican of the systems of government adopted by any of the American states." Ramsay's *Annals of Tennessee*, p. 657. This reference was kindly furnished by Judge John Randolph Neal.

²¹ See especially Robinson, J. H., *The Humanization of Knowledge*, Preface.

tween generations of school pupils create a lag in the progress of educational dissemination. It is impossible for public education to keep pace with scientific accretions. Many of our most alert scientists find that they have more than they can do to keep up with the advances made in their own specialties, be they ever so circumscribed. So it comes that discovered knowledge moves rapidly away from its less mobile sublimations, preparing for a day when revolutions or even crises must come.²²

SUMMARY

1. The right for social psychology as a pure science employing the methods of natural science, to consider cultural products among its categories of subject matter, is a disputed point. The discussion in the present chapter indicates that mental processes are inevitably associated with culture, and that therefore any science which explains the origin and usage of cultural products bears an important relation to group psychology.

2. The individual's adherence to the mores of his associates, is predominately a matter of personal habits. These habits are sustained by appropriate emotional congruity and group sanction.

3. The culture complexes which belong to specific groups are interrelated. They are however sufficiently distinct, as complexes, to render them observable as such. Some of these complexes are closer to the daily lives of the individuals comprising a group than are other complexes, so that the former are subjected to gradual and more frequent adjustments than the latter. In such cases a conflict of cultures may, when sufficient disparity accumulates, break out.

4. The members of the group in which a conflict of cultures obtains, become organized in defense of their several attitudes in regard to the elements of the cultures in conflict.

5. Individual rationalization finds an important place among the mental processes brought to bear upon the situation. Habits and their emotional concomitants constitute for each individual a situation in which conclusions have already been reached.

²² Dewey holds that "intelligence but throws a spotlight on that little part of the whole which marks out the axis of movement." *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 262.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

- DINSMORE, C. A.: *Religious Certitude in an Age of Science*, Chaps. 1, 2, and 3
ELLWOOD, C. A.: *The Reconstruction of Religion*, Chaps. 1, 2 and 6.
GIDDINGS, F. H.: *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 13, pp. 784-791.
NORTH, C. C.: *Social Differentiation*, Chap. 4.
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WHITE, A. D.: *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*,
Vol. I., Chap. 1.

CHAPTER IX

THE CONFLICT OF GROUPS

In the preceding chapter we were concerned with conflicts arising as a result of attempted adjustments to environmental situations that comprehend a closed system of ideas of cultural values. These ideas or values are mental contents (representations conditioning behavior) shared by large groups of people. These values came into being by virtue of the mental processes of the ancestors or founders of the groups that cherish them. Of course these values undergo changes from time to time in accordance with changing adjustmental needs. They appear as relatively stabilized thought habits and as such are a second place removed from the active and reflective mental processes of the individuals who react in accord with them.

In the present chapter it is proposed to consider a type of conflict that includes both the cultural element and another element which may be described as personal participation; this element may be regarded as active behavior to distinguish it from potential behavior as represented by ideals. It introduces personal conflict as distinguished from the conflict of ideals and values. Of course a conflict of ideals always tends to incorporate personal physical participation. The distinction is slight, as many distinctions in social psychology must necessarily be. While conflicts between large groups are relatively impersonal, it is to be remembered that at such times group leaders make their appeals to individuals; the individual is asked to consider the conflict as a personal matter; he is persuaded to contribute in various ways to the financial, industrial and moral requirements of the situation; personal bravery is rewarded by medals and other marks of distinguished service; finally, the sacrifice of life in the cause of the group is considered the highest of personal contributions. It is probably safe to say that no war could be staged between groups unless some active means for insuring the mobilization of individual personal participation were employed. Fortunately or unfortunately, there is a cultural background upon which to lay the foundation for this enterprise. This cultural foundation is a relatively direct cause

of the conflict; just what the real value is, is a matter of some conjecture, although it surely outweighs the personal. The present chapter is intended to illustrate a form of social behavior which lies midway between that illustrated in the preceding chapter and that in Chapter XI.

I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR

*The institution of war*¹

Many people have the notion that war is something of an accident, occurring now and then for some special or altogether unusual reason; the blame for it is laid at the door of some unruly nation or race of people. Thus they hold that preparedness is a practical matter operating as insurance against outbreaks of international strife. Preparation for war as insurance against its ravages, requires the continuous support of all the people, yet war is an "anachronism." But is war an anachronism? So long as this point of view is entertained, it seems reasonable to suppose that there is nothing more to be done about it but to be prepared for it and fight it out when the time comes.

Accepting the accident of war fatalistically, there are those who say that it has its benefits for mankind, possesses certain selective values, etc. According to Professor Hankins, war "is at once a powerful tonic, an energizing stimulant, and social purgative. . . . In fact war has served historically the immensely important service of testing the survival value for the social group not only for its mental and physical capacities but of its economic, political, moral and cultural practices and institutions."² Ruskin declared that nations "were born in war, and expired in peace." Many writers have

¹ Ginsberg draws a distinction between institutions and associations as follows: "War is an institution in the sense that it is a recognized method of settling disputes of a certain character between the associations we call States. It is really these associations that create armies, i.e. more limited associations in order to achieve the ends which the war is entered into. Institutions are always definite forms of social relationship—but sometimes they are immediately related to a clearly defined association, but at other times they are embodied in some form of social behaviour related to some very general association." *The Psychology of Society*, p. 122-123.

² *Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 8, p. 471.

subscribed to such theories. All this is of course mere speculation; it can only mean that such rationalizing attempts to make a virtue out of something that appears, in the absence of any other explanation, to be a necessity.

If a long time view is taken of the history of the recurrences of periods of warfare among the nations, it becomes apparent that war is no mere accident. No amount of experimentation seems to dampen national enthusiasm for it; war itself seems to be the institution and preparation for war appears to be the way to indulge the institutional usages of war. What nations have continually maintained the best preparation for war? What nations have engaged in war most frequently? With whom have the several nations carried on war, and what traditional combinations of nations does history record? Answering the last of these questions first, we find that England has warred with Germany against France; again she has warred with France against Germany. America has warred against England; America has carried on war against certain nations, as an ally of England and other nations. The reader may draw upon his knowledge of history to enlarge the picture of traditional enemies. The answers to the first two questions may be deduced to some extent from the following table of nations with large standing armies. For one thing it will be found that these nations that have been well prepared to insure peace, have engaged frequently in war.

*Years of peace and years of war among modern nations**

NATION	PERIOD	YEARS OF WAR	PER CENT OF TIME ENGAGED IN WAR	YEARS OF PEACE	PER CENT OF TIME ENGAGED IN PEACE
Austria.....	1450-1900	161	36	289	64
Denmark.....	1500-1900	90	23	310	77
England.....	1100-1900	419	52	381	48
France.....	1100-1900	373½	47	426½	53
Holland.....	1600-1900	106½	36	193½	64
Poland.....	1500-1800	145½	49	154½	51
Prussia.....	1600-1900	102½	34	197½	66
Russia.....	1500-1900	238½	60	161½	40
Spain.....	1500-1900	257	64	143	36
Sweden.....	1500-1800	136½	34	263½	66
Turkey.....	1500-1900	232	59	168	41

* Compiled from Woods and Baltzy, *Is War Diminishing?*

The late World War has served to attract the attention of students for the purpose of considering the causes of war and the steps that nations may take to prevent it. There has been more study given to the subject of war than ever before; peace societies, parliamentary bodies and private and public educational leaders have never before been so active in stirring up sentiment against war. War is to be "outlawed," "outreasoned" and "outeducated." The study of war removes some of the sentimental suppositions about it and establishes the fact that it is not only a social evil but also a social problem. The scientist's first line of attack in the move to outlaw war, is to seek its causes.

The causes of war

The immense literature on wars, past and present, devotes a great deal of space to causes and their classification. We shall have space for representative causes only. A complete enumeration, while it would reveal a surprising diversity of opinion interesting as such, would for the present treatise (if not for all treatises) be worthless, since about all that can be said for them is that they are mere opinions.

According to Atkins³ the causes according to their relative importance are:

1. Economic conditions
2. Imperialism
3. Ambition of reigning houses
4. Religious intolerance
5. Passion for liberty
6. Love of fighting
7. False philosophy of life
8. Militarism.

Elihu Root⁴ finds three categories:

1. Differences between nations as to their respective rights.
2. National policies, embracing the extension of trade.
3. Feelings of suspicion and distrust between nations.

Much of the literature of the past decade emphasizes certain inborn tendencies, instincts common to all infra-human and human life,

³ *The Maze of the Nations and the Way Out.*

⁴ *Documents of the American Association for International Conciliation*, May, 1909, no. 18, p. 58.

which have for their satisfaction, indulgence in fighting. On the human level war is regarded as the organized and institutionalized expression of these instincts, which are very generally described in terms of self-preservation. Fighting among animals and war among human beings, therefore, are the natural ways to make the proper adjustments for continuation of individual and social existence.

The one big instinct, at least the one that is most often referred to is fear. Generally it is the group that is referred to as the fearing agent. A few representative statements will suffice. Alberdi⁵ speaks of "the mutual fears of every state." Fear gives rise to rumor thus setting the stage for actual hostilities. Armstrong-Jones⁶ holds that when wars break out, it is the fear instinct that first makes its appearance. This is easily observed since the national mind is condensed and laid bare. Fear is thus seen to be the driving force of the group mind. Von Freitag-Loringhoven⁷ speaking for Germany in 1917 said: "In this war, the consciousness that our national existence is at stake, has raised us above ourselves." DuPicq⁸ some fifty years ago spoke of fear as the alpha and omega of war.

Fear is also spoken of from the individual point of view. Hocking⁹ and Kuyvett¹⁰ concur in the opinion that fear is the bedrock of morale. "To be afraid and go forward; that is the real stuff of heroism" (Hocking). Eltinge¹¹ says "fear is the strongest influence that governs man's actions." He thinks that fear of bodily harm begets desire for liberty; fear of the unknown begets race antipathy; fear of starvation is back of all economic questions. Eltinge also finds that fear gives birth to patriotism, in which sense it has a social bearing.

Another group of recent writers finds that the most fundamental instinct in human nature is the herd instinct. Those psychologists who hold to the theory of a group mind as something mysterious operating within the group, are as one in advancing this instinct to explain why the people come together and how they behave after they

⁵ *The Crime of War.*

⁶ *Journal of Mental Science, London, July, 1917, pp. 346-389.*

⁷ Baron, *Deductions from the World War*, p. 36.

⁸ *Etude sur le Combat.*

⁹ *Morale and its Enemies.*

¹⁰ *Over there with the Australians.*

¹¹ *Psychology of War*, p. 132.

have come together. All their descriptions naturally recount the familiar crowd traits—irrationality, desire on the part of the crowd to expand, seeking of differential advantage by injury, etc. Trotter believes that this instinct is so fundamental in human nature that most of us are not able to recognize it; for this reason psychologists have not given it the attention it deserves. It is so universal in all our behavior that it has the power to “confer instinctive sanctions on any part of the field of belief or action.”¹² He understands that patriotism is merely a derivative of the herd instinct. Le Bon¹³ speaks of it as the “call of the blood.” The same social behavior is considered patriotism by Veblen. “Patriotism is of a contentious complexion, and finds its full expression in no other outlet than warlike enterprise; its highest and final appeal is for death, damage, discomfort, and destruction on the party of the second part.”¹⁴

A third important instinct stressed by a number of recent students is national honor. Perla¹⁵ has given the best study of this instinct (or emotion). He believes it is the old feeling associated with dueling, conducted on a national scale. Although nations are convinced that war is economic stupidity, they readily throw all such considerations aside when a question of their national honor is raised. He says “national honor is the fundamental ‘casus belli’ and the challenge of reconstruction;” it has caused almost every war.

Perla goes into detail and works out what he calls the “law of national honor,” which he expresses as follows: “The sensitiveness and intensity of a nation’s honor increases directly with a recognition of its relative military strength, and inversely with the consciousness of the strength of an opposing military power.”¹⁶ Self-preservation is a derivative of this law. National honor fluctuates according to a nation’s ability to wage war. If a nation is poorly prepared, relatively, it exercises more care in respect to the things which it will deem affronts to honor. He uses the doubtful James-Lange theory of emotions¹⁷ to explain all this sensitiveness in regard to objects that will

¹² *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 31.

¹³ *The Psychology of the Great War*.

¹⁴ *The Nature of Peace*, p. 32.

¹⁵ *What is National Honor?*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁷ James, Wm. *Psychology* (Briefer Cause), Chap. 24.

evoked the honor emotion and concludes that there would be no such feeling if all the nations would do away with their armaments. The military power of the group corresponds to the visceral changes in the individual.

It is pertinent to the conclusions yet to be drawn to find out if possible just what national honor is in itself. Perla's answer in brief is that since it is an emotion, it is its own justification for being. He quotes James in support of this theory. James characterized an instinct as "selbstverständlich" (see Chapter III, p. 52). Attention has frequently been called to the metaphysical presuppositions which clutter up the whole field of social psychology. Such an explanation of emotions certainly belongs in the category of metaphysics. Later on Perla discusses "the tyranny of a phrase." He finds that honor is an "abstract principle." But it "becomes hallowed and consecrated by centuries of blood and suffering which it has called forth since men began to fight for honor. . . . We have transferred the cumulative emotion of a series of intense experiences to the term national honor, so that it has become a tyrannous phrase invested with the magic power to shape our moral thinking."¹⁸ Thus it appears that national honor instead of being an instinct or emotion, is nothing but a social stimulus pattern. It is something that the people have learned, rather than something they have inherited.

Perla's study has been considered at length for the purpose of exemplifying the tendency of psychologists to deal dogmatically with social problems. One object of the present study is to lead the reader to recognize the analogical reasoning that finds its way into so many accounts of society. One more example will be considered.

Professor Pillsbury dealing with the same problem in general as Perla, finds after evaluating the "sympathetic instincts" in human society, that hate is the one big force which will account for group conflicts. Society originated in conflict, and the instincts that were dominant during such periods are responsible for the tendency of men to form organizations, even nations. He goes back to the paramecia and draws a parallel between the behavior of these lowly creatures and man. The paramecia flock together because they dislike to be alone. This dislike however is purely mechanical. They stay

¹⁸ *What is National Honor?* p. 141.

together because they respond negatively to a medium which differs chemically from that created by the expulsion of carbon dioxide from the bodies of the group. Then he draws what might be taken to be a momentous social fact. "If we generalize this, it would mean that society develops not from a liking for society but from a dislike of the surrounding medium. That which drives the individuals together is the dislike of the outside forces rather than any fondness for the company of which they are members."¹⁹ Thus hate is the cause of war, because the outside groups correspond to the distasteful medium of the paramacia.

A full discussion of instincts as the cause of war would amount to the addition of pages of descriptive and critical remarks, and after all explain nothing. Follow an instinct to its roots and it will be found unanalyzable from habit, referable to behavior in very general terms at best, i.e., capable of application to a wide variety of forms of social behavior. The fact is that one may choose any instinct, e.g., fear, and by a clever selection of illustrations arrive at the conclusion that nations consummate peace treaties because of it. Fear may thus be called a result of war instead of a cause. Or again one can marshal his arguments to show that the herd instinct creates and sustains church organizations—a conclusion that no devout communicant would tolerate. Instincts are worthless explanations of social institutions. The following additional instincts which various writers have professed as causes of war are offered to show at once the selective methods of their proponents and the truth of the above critique: race antipathy, will to power, ethical impulse (quest for justice), claustrophobia (struggle for freedom), desire for excitement, instinct to fight, oedipus complex, sadism (instinct to cause suffering).

The foregoing discussion of war and its causes could be enlarged upon ad infinitum. Other causes which have been proposed and favorably accepted by many people are:

1. Decadence of religion²⁰
2. Unconscious urge for completeness as an ideal²¹

¹⁹ *Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism*, pp. 65–66.

²⁰ M'Leod, T. B., *The World War and the Road to Peace*.

²¹ Powers H. H., *The Things Men Fight for*.

3. False education^{22, 23}
4. Reversion to lower stages of civilization^{24, 25, 26}
5. Climatic influences^{27, 28}
6. Struggle for and misappropriation of economic power^{29, 30}
7. Rhythmical phase of social development³¹
8. Armaments³²

It should by now be clear that war is a very complex social problem; there is no one cause of war. It has like most social problems, many components; it can be studied best during war; its pursuance implies a complex reaction pattern.

Where do the masses, for they do the fighting, dying, providing for armaments and paying of war debts, acquire the frame of mind (reaction pattern) which finds expression in war? In the first place, war, as has been said, is an institution. As such, it is one of the most deeply rooted culture complexes there are. It takes rank with religion as something that concerns all the people all the time. In this respect it has precedence over education and popular government. When it gets under way all other institutions are swept immediately into position to render it service. In fact it may be said that religion, education and government are continually in its service. The religious body which assumes a negative attitude toward war, especially in war time, is not very highly regarded by the masses; conscientious objectors do not enjoy an especially high reputation; pacifist political parties do not make much headway.

In the second place, from the time an individual begins to take his place in the round of life as a social being, he learns to regard war as something belonging to life, something that is somehow necessary. His first histories exalt the glories of war; he finds statues to generals and monuments to regiments in public parks and buildings.

²² Harrison, F., *National and Social Problems*.

²³ Barker, L. F., *Mental Hygiene*, October, 1918, pp. 557-81.

²⁴ Crile, G. W., *A Mechanistic View of War and Peace*.

²⁵ Hall, G. S., *American Journal Psychology*, Vol. 25, pp. 149-200.

²⁶ Nicolai, G. F., *The Biology of War*.

²⁷ Huntington, E., *Climate and Civilization*.

²⁸ Royce, Josiah, *Race Questions, Provincialism and other American Problems*.

²⁹ Hankins, F. H., *op. cit.*

³⁰ Adams, Brooks, *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. x, pp. 103-148.

³¹ Maeder, Alphonso, *Guerison et Evolution dans la Vie de L'Ame*.

³² Wellman, Walter, *The Force Supreme*.

A question of some importance is suggested. Are the masses with their reaction patterns being exploited by "war lords?" To a very limited degree. Those who at any given time are the national leaders who declare war and peace, are similarly constituted mentally. They do not use men and money as means to private ends, although sometimes the mere tipping over of a wine glass or the accidental assassination of a prince is enough to start a war. War is a psychical phenomenon; it can be attached to anything. The immediate causes are released stimuli; the real causes are to be found in the cultural products which give rise to sentiments and feelings which in turn provide the power necessary to insure the exercise of custom.

The prospect of peace

The most practical of all questions is: Can there be permanent peace? The answer in brief is that there can be permanent peace by preventing the establishment of war habits in the minds of the youth. But this is practically impossible. War pictures, songs, poems, stories, will go reverberating down to many generations yet unborn. It does seem likely, however, that in the course of a few hundred years this cultural background may lose some of its attractiveness. Cultures do change, but they are never conquered, never completely eliminated. The best immediate thing that can be done is to set up counter reaction patterns for peace. The modern educator with his long-time program is on the right track. There should be more international communication of an educational sort. There should be less exaltation of arms and of the men who are chosen for army and navy life. They should be considered temporary servants, rather than traditional leaders. There should be international courts set up to crush international disputes before they can call forth the reaction patterns of war or create them in the minds of the leaders and masses as well. Peace as a permanent thing is far in the future.

Conclusions

The foregoing is a discussion of one type of group conflicts. If we examine the causes of this type of conflict, it is found that no agreement exists in the minds of different writers as to what these causes are. They are complex. Many factorial conditions prevail during

the formative, crucial and declining stages of war periods; these and many other stages that might be identified sustain appropriate mental states in the minds of the individuals composing the groups in conflict. Instincts there are, but as an explanatory principle little can be ascribed to them, except as they constitute the tangential background of individual predispositions. Ideals, as a general term are more expressive, yet they alone cannot be taken to mean the efficient cause of war. Taking instincts and ideals together we come upon a combination of backgrounds that provides for the resurrection, creation, and modification of habits which grouped into complex reaction patterns, may be taken as the efficient principle for explaining this type of behavior.

II. THE APPLICATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT

The foregoing account of the psychology of war may be taken as a descriptive formula for the understanding of all group conflicts. It matters little what names may be applied to group conflicts, for the behavior displayed is human behavior; if the term human behavior means anything at all, it means thinking and acting in accordance with human psychological possibilities in the presence of relatively artificial situations. Whatever moods, dispositions, ideals, habits, etc., may be mentioned in accounts of group conflicts, these same representations and processes are found wherever conflict occurs; as such they constitute its psychology. Looking at the problem of group conflicts in this way it is clear that a classification of types of conflicts would amount to names of social situations provoking such behavior. A very brief account of another leading type will suffice.

The psychology of race prejudice

Race prejudice is a product of civilization. Except for a certain amount of racial antipathy among the early Greeks, Phoenicians and Jews, history records very little racial antipathy until within the last hundred years.³³ The literature on the subject in recent years would appear to lend substantiality to Huntington's contention that race prejudice has become "embedded in the world's equipment of ideas."³⁴

³³ Bryce, J., *Race Sentiment as a Factor in History*.

³⁴ *The Character of Races*, p. 3.

The reason for this situation is clear. Modern means of communication, travel, trade, etc., tend to break down the isolation that previously existed between races. The world is fast becoming a community. Trade and travel mean an increased distribution of populations, which tend to center in the larger cities of the different countries.³⁵ Under these conditions rivalries of all sorts come to the surface, and taken in a collective sense are interpreted by conflicting groups to mean race differences. Different standards of living, different cultural ideals, etc., may be regarded as the generators of different mental patterns which are really all that can be set down as the basis for race prejudice. Taking the habit principle into full consideration, it is clear that what is so often referred to as an elemental fear on the part of members of different races for one another, is misleading.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

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³⁵ See especially Steiner, J. F., *The Japanese Invasion*.

CHAPTER X

SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Psychological processes, both individual and collective, are hard to analyze. The inherent difficulties lie in the very nature of the social situations which the psychologist sets out to study. Since society is dynamic, its aspects are continually passing from phase to phase. The individual psychological processes functioning are therefore conditional rather than absolute. It is therefore to be expected that the psychologist will be impressed with the obvious features of the moving situations; as a result he will arrive at relatively simple generalizations. Social psychologists have for the most part avoided the very problems that throw most light upon their science. They have studied the well-established forms of social organization, discoursed at length upon the spectacular aspects of group action and established (or at least attempted to establish) the laws of individual inborn tendencies, habits, etc. Generally it has not occurred to the social psychologist that some of the laws that his science must one day reveal, are to be discovered by the historical method, and that any conclusion drawn from a given social situation should be compared with similar situations, before the generalization is accepted.

Social psychology has the disadvantage of not being able to repeat observations in detail. The only attitude that the psychologist can profitably assume is that which regards every psycho-social phenomenon, however insignificant in appearance, as something vital, something important for the derivation of his laws. Repeated observation of similar phases of social movements, while containing in each case factors that are at variance with those of the next case, will reveal certain elemental factors that are constant; these elemental factors are more closely associated with causes than are the less frequently occurring factors. What is insignificant in one social situation may be significant in another. Upon analysis these factors will be found to take their rightful positions. The present chapter will consider two social movements that have taken place many times in the history of societies.

Following the theoretical laws laid down by Znaniecki, we shall consider them examples of "mobilization" and "stabilization" of social tendencies. The laws are:

(a) If an actual or possible change in the course of a stabilized action appears to produce a series of desirable new experiences which seem to constitute an axiologically positive scale and are relatively positive as compared with the foreseen consequence of the original action, there develops a desire for new experiences along the line of activity indicated by the change.¹

(b) If in the course of an unstabilized activity the new experiences which this activity produces appear to form a negative axiological scale in such a way that every subsequent experience assumes the character of a relatively negative value as compared with the preceding experiences, there develops a desire for stability in the given line of behavior.²

The first will be illustrated by an account of the South Sea Bubble; the second, by an account of the "millennial hope."

Znaniecki studies behavior arising from attitudes in the individual. It is proposed in the present discussion to give these theoretical laws an extended application, and therefore to regard them as fundamental laws of group attitudes and behavior, notwithstanding the strict limits that must be placed upon all group mind theories. Here sociology draws upon psychology. While sociology studies consistently group behavior, psychology investigates individual behavior. But these two sciences share complementary positions—they cannot be distinctly set apart although it is possible to set up study aims and purposes which may regard them as separate sciences, i.e., separate divisions of observable phenomena. In the last analysis sociology combines with psychology, for it studies the forms that units (individuals) assume in aggregate relations after these units have first been studied by the psychologist as the bearers of psychical possibilities and probabilities.

Two points must be made clear: (1) If it is assumed that social psychology may be studied from the standpoint of groups, then some of the details of a psychology of the individual as such are considered secondary to those that are displayed in group life. Group responses suggest a number of problems: Just how is one individual influenced by another? What is the effect of a forming psychological group

¹ *The Laws of Social Psychology*, p. 125.

² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

upon an individual or a group that becomes a part of the psychological group? These questions were disposed of in Chapter V under the hypothesis of a mind group. In this chapter we consider social movements in the gross, study groups as though they were individuals acting by virtue of simple mechanisms. Individual persons lose their identity; groups take on specificity. (2) In this connection the method employed in strictly psychological investigations is abandoned to some extent. The problem will be approached from a historical point of view. Social psychology is in one sense history for it is in the study of social situations as episodes of history that the psychological processes appear. An introductory example will help to explain these two points.

After describing in general the rush to Florida, F. P. Stockbridge³ says it represents "history in the making." He proceeds to define that "urge which impels this vast horde to migrate Florida-ward every year." In general, climate and fertility of the soil are the objects stimulating action. He analyzes further, giving a splendid account of the movement from the standpoint of material attractions: the development of railroads, the influx of money, Florida as a playground, the elimination of malaria, etc. Then he tells us that there is a pioneering instinct: man wants to "create," to "emulate his pioneer forebears" who "carved out a clearing in the wilderness." Stockbridge jumps immediately from the developmental attractions to instinctive urges. Apparently he is unaware of the fact that the pursuance of interests is all that can be said to define the course of instinctive behavior.

One might ask: If there is such an instinct in man, why was it so long in finding Florida? The plain fact is that our knowledge of man, historically, demonstrates that he is ever seeking to gain competence without labor. If there is an instinct it could, with far more faithfulness to facts, be called an acquisitive instinct. Man scents material gain and follows it. This is a "mobilization" of energies for better adjustment.

Miss Shelby's article,⁴ "The Florida Frenzy" gives other facts: a

³ *Current History*, November, 1925, pp. 178-185.

⁴ *Harpers*, January, 1926, pp. 177-186. Also see in this connection "The Florida Madness," an editorial in *The New Republic*, January 27, 1926.

three-weeks widow goes lightheartedly to Florida and invests everything the third day; a man buys ten thousand acres not knowing where it is located; the highways are crowded with cars in which whole families move on to seek wealth; some go without telling their plans to their neighbors. Does not this secrecy of plans reveal at once the fact that competition is undesirable and that their motives are not in line with settled business practices? No one seems intent on staying permanently in Florida. The truth about the Florida rush seems to betray the selfishness of man rather than reveal merely migratory or creative impulses. These conflicting accounts are singled out for the purpose of showing the tendency of different writers to account for the same social movement in very different terms. There is no doubt truth in both views of the Florida rush, but a comparative study of similar movements alone will reveal the essential mental processes involved. We shall now consider the psychological background of the dual processes of stabilization and mobilization, after which an example of each will be given in more detail.

ASPECTS OF MOBILIZATION AND STABILIZATION

Social psychology has to do with action. A given individual in a given social situation behaves in accordance with what he predicts may be the behavior of other individuals. If he buys Florida real estate it is on the strength of a prediction that someone will in turn buy the same real estate from him. The investor endows an unknown purchaser with potential action. The individual behaves as he does because he can imagine what others may do.

When his behavior is set going, it begins to center around what he consciously or unconsciously feels are the central aspects of a course to be pursued, the outcome of which is an ideal of some sort. If the ideal is nothing more than doing what others do under similar circumstances, the behavior appears as imitation; if the ideal is to follow the line of least resistance to the obstacles which all social situations imply (they are never exactly the same), we can call the behavior habitual; if the series of adjustments which groups of people concerned with a given situation make, fail to lead to predictable ends, they begin to stabilize their actions, i.e., to construct ideals which facilitate prediction. The norms of behavior thus stabilized will

account for the relatively smooth operation of social action. Each individual acquires the specific habits which apply to normal and customary ways of acting. Relatively minor changes in stabilized forms of action present no serious difficulties. Slight adjustments require slight modifications of habits.

Environmental forces are no respecters of the habits of men; there is no unity of purpose in the minds of men, except in those activities which are relatively immediate, in the sense that they contribute to elemental common needs. In a highly differentiated society, such as grows out of an industrial economy of life, groups of people are formed around the ideals of their respective differentials. But as time goes on, the accumulations of maladjustments increase the tension in the minds of age-groups and differential-industrial groups. The plasticity of individual nervous systems is lessened with approaching age and fixed positions in the general economic order, although there is still the haunting ideal that still other and more satisfactory adjustments may yet be made. If into such a situation there be injected some unusual stimulus, e.g., some widely advertised scheme which promises to realize a cherished ideal at one trial, a mobilization of effort to find a way to the adjustment is initiated at once. The slumbering dreams of the individual are awakened; reason falls victim to rationalization and credulity in anything is possible. Rumor, which in a social sense is always the betrayer of wishes, conscious or unconscious, changes from fiction to reality.

In the case of wars, natural disasters and the like the relatively recently acquired habits are of course generally disturbed; they seem to lose their power; the individual is perplexed and dazed. There is nothing to do but to fall back upon ancient formulae for behavior. The things he cannot accomplish for himself seem to be far in excess of the things he can predict. In all such cases he is driven to desperation, loses interest even in some of the very essentials of life, shifts the responsibility for his plight to others, and ceases to look to himself as responsible for the future adjustment. At such times there are those who are then able to turn his attention to supra-individual adjustments. There is a body of lore which these inciters may draw upon to direct and give sanction to a proposed course of action.⁵ Adjustment takes direction in the interest of stabilization.

⁵ See in this connection Mecklin, J. M., *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 24, pp. 353-372.

Under such circumstances society is in danger of a temporary standstill. It can be shown that post-war periods are always periods of stabilization in one or more social activities.

Mobilization, from the social point of view, is a general turning toward activities which promise better adjustments. It cannot be called a youthful fling. Most mobilizations, like stabilizations, are carried on by the same type of persons—those who have become impatient of their lot; there is no age or economic differentiation, at least no statistics on these points; often they are the very ones that might be expected, because of their poverty, to hold on to the little they have rather than risk it in a new venture. Nor are they the dullards in the world. College professors are good prospects for oil stock. Government clerks who are well on in service so that a nominal retirement competence is not far off, turn it all aside and take the risk of gambling on an immediate future. Such social movements are called “crazes,” but they are nothing but potential actions loosed. No doubt there is some element of suggestion in the violent mobilizations which have come and gone through all ages and all countries, but to apply such a term is to seek a simple statement for a very general release of long repressed hopes. Suggestion is contributory because it is in line with what is desirable. At all events the hypnotic character which Sidis⁶ insists on, in his cases of religious revivals, demonophobia, stampedes, financial crazes, etc., is not to be identified as socially pathological. A person cannot be hypnotized against his will; neither does a group go into a financial craze unwillingly. All these social movements are normal in origin, and their phases are normal expressions of human tendencies.

THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE (ILLUSTRATING THE LAW OF MOBILIZATION)

The South Sea Company⁷ was an outgrowth of a plan to discharge the English national debt. In the year 1710, when Robert Harley became Chancellor of the Exchequer, the debt amounted to more than 9,000,000 pounds, an enormous sum in those days. Public credit had been severely strained by the war, and had been further affected

⁶ *The Psychology of Suggestion.*

⁷ See especially Melville, Lewis, *The South Sea Bubble*; Also *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. 6., pp. 175ff.

by the dismissal of the Whig ministry. Harley's plan was to incorporate the proprietors of the national debt in order to carry on trade in the South Seas. It was the popular opinion that such a plan would result in immense riches being brought from Peru and Mexico; though hotly debated, it passed both Houses and received the royal assent.

The scheme fired the imaginations of the people; though they knew little about America, it became an Eldorado, a country strewn with gold and jewels. Then too, the rumor spread that Spain would cede four ports on the coasts of Peru and Chili. This added fuel to the imagination; great profits would be realized from the sale of their manufactured goods for the wealth of the mines of Potosi and Mexico.

Books were opened for the subscription of the first stock, 9,500,000 pounds. This amount was subscribed in a very short time. The Company received the direct patronage of the royalty, for in 1715 the Prince of Wales consented to become the Governor and was succeeded by George I. During the years between 1711 and 1719, the Company enjoyed a certain prosperity, but somewhat less than had been expected. Spain did not give the cessions that she was expected to, nor did she live up to the cessions she had made. Cargoes were confiscated on pretexts; heavy duties were laid on cargoes that had been explicitly exempted; the second annual ship was ready to sail when war was declared between England and Spain. In all, the project was not a huge success, though a great deal of interest was still manifested in the Company.

At the beginning of 1720, a change took place. In France John Law was in high favor because he had put into effect a plan to pay off the public debts of France. He had inaugurated the Mississippi Company for the purpose of colonizing the province of Louisiana, and had undertaken to pay the public debt by giving Mississippi stock to the proprietors. The company had taken over the French East India, China and African companies. It seemed to be flourishing. The infection spread into England. The South Sea Company now wanted to take over the entire national debt and even pay for the privilege. They offered to take over the debts, and besides, pay the government 3,500,000 pounds. However, the Bank of England offered to do the same thing and pay the government 5,000,000 pounds. The Company then offered 7,567,000 pounds which was

accepted. The stock of the Company was now valued at 43,000,000 pounds with credit for as much more. It is obvious why the government accepted, but not quite so clear why the offer was made. The company probably hoped to secure more monopolies and privileges; by getting the government behind them, the stock would rise to such an extent that a small amount of stock would pay a large amount of annuities. In a few weeks about one half of the proprietors of annuities had become shareholders in the company. Stock had started to rise, from 128½ in January to 300 in March. In April, 2,250,000 pounds of new stock was issued at 300. By May, stock had risen to 550, 890 in June and to 1000 in July.

During the rapid rise of the South Sea stock, stock-jobbing was the principal subject of conversation. South Sea was all the rage and fashion; it was talked everywhere, and nearly everyone was dealing in it. Exchange Alley was the greatest resort; unless in South Sea one was not in fashion. The annuitants waited no longer, and nearly all came into the company. The buyers were men and women of all ranks, even including the royalty and the clergy.

The success of the South Sea Company inspired a great many unscrupulous business men to go into the speculating game to reap a little harvest themselves. To this end, all kinds of "wild" companies were organized and floated. Many were sound in basis, and later developed successfully, but even in these cases, it was generally the object of the promoter to take advantage of the spirit of gambling that was abroad. Money seemed to be no consideration; millions were asked where thousands would have been ample, but the stock was usually oversubscribed. Within a few months hundreds of "bubbles" were put on the market with a capital of about 300,000,000 pounds. This in a country that a few years before, had despaired of ever paying the National Debt, a sum small in comparison.

It became a parlor game in which astute promoters duped noblemen of the highest reputation into acting unconsciously as decoys. Even the Prince of Wales was to serve as governor of one of these fake companies. However, all the people were not taken in, and there were some pessimists as well as optimists. There was much written in sarcasm about the speculators; even plays were staged in which the characters were called Bubble, Cheat-all, Mississippi, Bite, Africanus, and so on. Newspapers pointed out the folly, and not

even when a paper announced that at some (sham) address, "on Tuesday next, books will be opened for a subscription of 2,000,000 pounds for an invention for melting down saw-dust and chips, and casting them into clean deal boards without cracks or knots," did the people stop in their mad speculation. Some men, after noticing how many insurance companies were being organized, decided as a practical joke to establish a Company of Insurers. The books were opened, and the people flocked in. Later, their money was returned. These jokes all failed in their purpose, for they were scarcely more extravagant than some of the real bubbles.

One Company demanded 1,000,000 to produce "a wheel for perpetual motion." Another asked 3,000,000 for the indefinite object of "trading in, and improving certain commodities of the produce of this kingdom." Other concerns were formed "for the more effectual making of bays in Colchester and other parts of Great Britain," and "for buying, and fitting out ships to suppress pirates." Sir Richard Steele wished to bring fresh fish by sea to London. Sir Richard Manningham wanted to plant mulberry trees and breed silk-worms in Chelsea Park; a clergyman was carried away by the idea of bringing jackasses from Spain in order to propagate a larger kind of mule in England, for which purposes he acquired marsh lands near Woolwich. There were many companies formed for insurance; finance; land and building; fisheries; water, river and harbor exploitation; mining; manufacturing of lute-strings, sword-blades, oils, salt and sugar; trading with all parts of the world; an "undertaking which shall in due course be revealed;" and many other miscellaneous subjects.

After going over the 1000 mark in July, South Sea Company stock began to fall in August. At the high point, the "insiders" began to sell out and make their clean-up. The company used every trick to stem the tide of disaster; it loaned huge amounts of money on its own securities, but instructed its brokers to purchase stock on behalf of the company. The annuitants who had subscribed their public securities in exchange for South Sea stock at 800, began to voice their grievance and demand release from their bargain. Of course, they were refused. The company now took a bold step and announced "that the next Christmas dividend on the stock and subscriptions in money should be 30 per cent, and that a dividend of not

less than 50 per cent per annum be made from and after Christmas next, in half-yearly payments, for not less than twelve years, upon the whole stock and subscriptions." This sounded magnificent, but as the third and fourth subscriptions were issued at 1000, it was only a 5 per cent dividend. Stock rose slightly but did not hold. The directors of the company became alarmed and tried to amalgamate with the Bank of England and the East India Company, but they were not successful. The air was full of rumors favorable to the company; stocks rose and fell as the rumors appeared and were disproved. By the last of September stock was down to 175, and later became almost worthless.

THE MILLENNIAL HOPE (ILLUSTRATING THE LAW OF STABILIZATION)

The millennial hope is a never-failing speculation. It is by no means an infrequent question, initiated by a few cranks and devoid of adequate causes. Nothing however incongruous, spectacular or "irrational" is without its adequate cause. The millennial hope possesses its own peculiar psychology; this is because of its affinity with economic and extraordinary environmental conditions in general.

The literature on the subject is immense; one might almost surmise that the conditions which have throughout the centuries called it forth in such abundance, could be characterized chiefly by a deep-seated passion in the soul of man to exchange the ills of this world for eternal blessings. At all events it shows with no uncertain force the fact that we are ever respectful of our older culture traits, especially those referring to the religious instincts of man. Certain very constantly recurring social and economic situations are associated with the exercise of this hope. The chief of these are:

1. A general group feeling that man is waging an uneven warfare with the evil forces in the world and that deliverance from them is to be conceived in a compensatory future existence. The depth of this feeling is attested by the fact that the earliest philosophies we know anything of ascribe the creation of the world itself to a conflict between good and evil forces.

2. Natural disasters—floods, earthquakes.

3. Economic distress. A revival of the hope may be taken as a symptom of economic unrest, so faithfully does it concur with such periods.

4. The leaders who have as their audiences the ignorant elements of the population, are always a larger group than many suppose.

Case defines the millennial hope as follows: "According to this hope, in the more or less distant future the course of human history is to be suddenly halted by divine intervention, when all evil will be abolished and the earth completely renovated. The Christ will establish upon earth a new kingdom of blessedness to endure one thousand years; hence the designation, 'millennial' hope."⁸

Among the first things known about early man, is his belief in a world to come. With this to guide his behavior, we find him making preparations for it. He could not understand death any more than we can envisage our own dissolution. The dawn man must have been tremendously impressed with the unexplainable (to him) phenomena of nature in the forms of lightning, floods, sounds of the wind, the alternate lengthening and shortening of his own shadow as seen in the sunlight, and perhaps above all, the strange nature of dreams. Early man's imaginal environment was immense and potent. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the presence of a strong and vigorous imagination which raises man above the brute creation, was among the first of the determiners of the psychological make-up of evolving man. By the same token we can say that this oracular-like trait which connects the phases of existence wherever facts leave off, must itself be called the chief spring of mentation. The mind of the dawn man was child-like; he was continually hard pressed in coping with his environment. His analytical powers were crude, his mistakes were many, and he paid a high tax for the experimental knowledge which he acquired. This he passed on with all the force of instinct to his posterity, and not the least of it was the hope of better times to come—this of course referred to the hereafter.

Nothing save the crudest conjectures can be set down about the dawn man's conception of the world to come. Something more authentic can be said of the first civilized man. The nature myths of the Babylonians, Greeks and Persians portray the outlines of what later developed into the millennial hope. As may be surmised, they took the form of a deliverance at the behest of some great ruler or prophet who was to be the author of salvation. The cult while prac-

⁸ *The Millennial Hope*, p. 2. See this excellent study for more detailed information.

ticed to a less extent in Egypt, was present there in times of political turmoils which came more frequently toward the beginning of the Christian era. Until then, Egypt because of the ease of life in the fruitful Nile valley, was devoid of such speculations. It is from the Babylonians that we seem to get our first orientation to the hope as a culture trait. Here is the first story of a Deluge. All flood stories, or similar catastrophies, mark a changing order of things. In Babylonia alone, though its counterpart is found in practically all other early myths, we have the formula for the chief ingredients of the early Christians' conception of cosmic cycles or world orders.

The Jewish hope was particularly cherished. They placed their hope in Jehovah, who as a national god, assumed complete control over supernatural forces. A new era of the Jewish hope came with Noah, who was to be the savior of the elect through a commission from Jehovah. Jehovah's plan now became known in a general way. The world must prepare for a long period of evil before the day of ultimate triumph for the chosen people. As time went on, one after another of the ancient prophets determined the course of national expectation, probably largely as a matter of practical politics in times of changing political situations that necessarily follow the fortunes of war.

The early Christians were naturally influenced by the Jewish tradition. The Jews were heavily taxed by Rome about the time of Christ. This led to two distinct political revolts, 66 to 70 and 132 to 135 A.D. The Jews had gained a new national conception of their deliverance; it included playing a personal part in a revolution. It seemed to them that Jehovah had grown tired of fighting their battles alone. By their side was another group that believed they would be better off by assuming a quiescent rôle; the advent of the Kingdom would occur at a divinely appointed time without the intervention of men and the display of arms. These were the early Christians. Their primary duty was to live righteously lest they be found unworthy of the Kingdom that was to come. This was a very important decision upon the part of the followers of Christ and had a great deal to do with the attractiveness of Christianity.

There was a reason for this attitude. After the crucifixion of Christ it was noised about that he had been seen, or had appeared to certain of the disciples. This changed the whole matter of the hope

so far as the followers of Christ were concerned. They read into his quiescent and passivist attitude the suspicion, later to become a dogma, that he was himself the Deliverer. At first the longed-for deliverance was supposed to come very soon. Some of the early Christians were disappointed on seeing that some of their numbers were dying off before the day came. Paul allayed their anxiety by telling them that the dead would be especially favored.⁹ Paul frequently expressed his belief that the reward was near at hand.

John in the book of Revelations completed the details of Christ's coming. The hitherto unmentioned period of 1000 years was introduced. As the Millennium draws to an end Satan will be loosed once more for a final rule for a brief period before the final coming of Christ. This theory of a final short reign for Satan has been through the ages one of the oft-seen approaches to the final trumpet. Out of the early Christian imagery, fused as it is with Jewish fancies of the hope from their political or nationalistic point of view, we get the following:

1. The destruction of some beast
2. The return of the Jews to their land
3. The 1000 year reign of Christ upon earth
4. The reinacted brief reign of Satan
5. The final and complete end of the world when Christ appears in a cloud and takes up the elect with him to heaven

As time went on the Christians became content in the hope of a personal translation to heaven after death. Moreover Christianity as a cult became more powerful so that early in the fourth century it was an allowable religion and began to take its place in the world of politics. The idea of a personal reign by Christ for 1000 years slumped into the background and was revived only now and then, though rather regularly. It is one of the revivals that have visited us regularly, and we must regard them as the reflex actions of the

⁹ "For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first. Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord." I. Thess. IV: 15-17.

coenotropic minds of the masses in the presence of some disturbing factor. Millennial speculations were projected farther and farther into the future so that they lost some of their stimulating power.

According to the Septuagint Mundane Chronology, it was supposed that the end of the world would come around 500 to 550 A.D., since that would mark the close of the 6000 years since creation. The millennial 1000 years would then set in and complete the mystic number of seven, so often used allegorically in Revelations. Moreover these seven millennia would compare well with the seven days of the week since a thousand years is as a day in the sight of the Lord. The people began to get nervous. The scare came and went. A new interpretation of dates was needed, and so the time of creation was changed. Finally in 1650 it was dogmatically placed by Rev. John Lightfoot at 4004 B.C., October 21, at 9 a.m. Meanwhile it had occurred to some to make the most of the year 1000 A.D., since Augustine had interpreted the millennium as having begun with the career of the earthly Jesus.

After the exhaustion of these dates, disappointing as they were, the hope shifted to the basis of social conditions and the calculations of newer dates began to take on a regularity that squared with the "signs of the times." The search for the anti-Christ became a dominant passion. The revivals of the millennial hope during the past thousand years have also coincided with the establishment of different branches of religious faith. The Reformation set the stage, as have all the semi-reformations since; all religious revivals, however small, have partaken of the same function—a revival of the hope. Some of the more recent reformers and the dates they have set for the millennium are:

James Albert Bengel—1836

William Miller, Hans Wood, William Cunningham and others—1843-1844

R. C. Shimeall—1847

William Whiston, William Cogswell and others—1864

Edward Bickersteth—1868

J. A. Brown—1873

William Hales—1880

Russell—1914

SOME TYPICAL SUBJECTS DISCUSSED BY MILLENNIUM WRITERS

William Lind¹⁰ a former minister of the Dutch Reformed Church in New York asserts that "every person that reflects at all, must see that the most extraordinary events are taking place, and is naturally led to think on their connection and consequences. . . . Wherever therefore we are not guided by plain scripture, we do no more than conjecture." He points out the following signs of the millennium which he thought would come in 1840:

1. The presence of the sense of civil liberty. (Here we see plainly the sociological and political doctrines of the times at work. Our nation's founders were so jealous of their civil liberties that they sometimes advocated things that did not fit into the minds of the clergy. Religion was placed as far as possible from the affairs of state.)

2. Deism—then a new doctrine. Deism was a philosophy of liberal interpretation of who and what God is. It corresponded, psychologically, to our term, modernism. Deism began in England about 1700 and in the course of time took on many forms, all tending toward a liberal and rather individualistic interpretation of God. Though Lind despised Deism, he accepted it as a sign of a future pure religion, which would prepare the people for the end of the world.

3. Popery (Catholicism). Lind thinks that Popery is one of the beasts that John mentions.

4. The social struggle in France. He says this social upheaval is in the image of the beast. He thinks the dark times, politically, show unmistakable signs of daylight just ahead, and this of course could be nothing but the coming of Christ.

5. Science and commerce, which at that time were booming. This comports with the Biblical saying that "men shall run to and fro"—one of the signs of Christ's coming.

Elias Boudinot,¹¹ calling himself an "American layman," marshalled an endless array of Biblical citations to support his theory that the end was near. The following social and political conditions seemed to influence him:

1. The second war with Great Britain which had just closed.
2. The nations in Europe were in deadly combat.

¹⁰ *Discourses on the Signs of the Times*, p. 9.

¹¹ *The Second Advent*.

3. World politics were in a turmoil.
4. The Jews were looking toward Jerusalem.
5. Popery seemed to be failing—the beast was being killed.
6. The great revival of 1800 which was still in the minds of the people.

About fifteen years ago, there appeared a great deal of literature on the hope. In 1912 Asa Oscar Tait wrote *Heralds of the Morning*. It is a great book of propaganda—propaganda of fear. His aim seems to have been to stir up the element of fear that resides in the human soul.

After the outbreak of the World War, the literature became voluminous. Calculations were all recast, this time with a certainty never held before. In 1922 J. C. McFeeters in his book *America in the Coming Crisis* tells us to return to the scriptures for the signs of the times. After interpreting the twelfth chapter of Daniel where reference is made to three distinct periods called “times” or “days” he concludes that we may look for the end of the world by 1945, though it may of course come sooner. The great war shows that we have better times ahead and these are of course to come just before the end.

W. E. Blackstone¹² lists the signs of the millennium as follows:

1. Prevalence of travel and knowledge. In Daniel, XII: 4, we read: “Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased.”
2. Perilous times. In II. Timothy, III: 1, we read: “This know also, that in the last days perilous times shall come.” Blackstone for one surmises that the recent discoveries of oil and gas may be a preparation for the big fire that is to consume the world.
3. The return of the Jews. Many writers of recent days show a great concern here. They see the Jews prospering and they assume that this can mean nothing short of their preparation to retake the Holy Land.

Perhaps the best summary of all the signs of the coming of the Lord is in a book written in 1922 by Paul Eugene Hagin. His summary will hold for all writers of the present century:

1. The partial restoration of the Jews to their land
2. Spiritism—trying to communicate with the other world

¹² *Jesus is Coming*.

3. Modern scoffers
4. World wide evangelism
5. The crime wave
6. Violence
7. War
8. Misery among the rich—divorces, etc.
9. Feminism
10. Rapid travel
11. Increase of knowledge
12. The decreasing power of the Roman church

February 6, 1925, was the last appearance of the hope on a noticeable scale. We may safely predict that it will crop up again. Some calamity, some war, drought, or other circumstance affecting the lives or feelings of many people will be the exciting cause.

The several foregoing citations to speculations of this nature represent, needless to say, the veriest of irrationality. In the mind of a scientist they have no value whatever. At the same time the student of social psychology should recognize that such literature, voluminous and perpetual as it is, finds its way to the masses and influences their thinking tremendously. A great deal of the vitality of the Fundamentalist movement is due to such literature and its continued repetition in isolated pulpits.

CONCLUSIONS

To the reader the two illustrations of types of social movement may appear as mere historical accounts rather than anything approaching social psychology. In one sense this is true. These illustrations are presented with a single purpose: to show that individuals by virtue of their cultural surroundings come to possess certain fairly definite attitudes that may on occasion be provoked, and that if provoked are bound to influence their acts. We have in these illustrations an extenuated meaning of culture. Any number of social situations obtain in the daily lives of people in which the reactions, back and forth, between (or among) them are conditioned by their mental attitudes associated with tradition. On the other hand individuals at times are behaving along the line of ideals of achievement. These ideals of achievement grow out of their several personal "philosophies," which condition to some extent the behavior

the individuals display in the presence of one another as each attempts to influence the acts of the other.

The South Sea Bubble is an illustration on a large scale of that sort of tendency which an individual displays in the presence of situations which give promise of realizing personal ambition. The millennial hope is an illustration of a tendency which individuals display in the face of situations which provoke despair.

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CHAPTER XI

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERACTION

I. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CULTURAL AND INTERACTION PSYCHOLOGY

The cultural products of groups, i.e., forms for political action, religious institutions, settled methods for defense or aggression, organized industrial customs, courts of law, means for transmitting experience from one generation to another (education),¹ dress in general, customary foods and their forms of preparation, shelter, etc., all arrive in the interest of satisfaction of needs and desires. These are at first wants, then customs, i.e., they represent individual habits acquired in the process of socialization.² They are followed more or less unerringly by the group as a whole. One may properly think of them as group activities. The more stabilized such customs (social habits) become, the less do individuals tend to think about their reason for being, and what is called action becomes less problematic and accordingly less "active." In the present chapter we turn to a consideration of social behavior in the light of adjustments for which the way is not so fully prepared in advance. The term social interaction will be used in the present discussion in order to draw a distinction between responses based upon individual reflection (imagination, reason, etc.) and those (as in the previous chapters) that imply habit or sanction.³ Of course habits and sanctions fuse with reflectively-toned adjustments, promoting, modifying or checking them from time to time. The term interaction should be taken to mean behavior going on in the realm of immediate social problematic environment as distinguished from cultural environment; this implies behavior of individuals toward one another

¹ Education has rightly been taken to mean a reconstruction of experience looking toward social values which in a changing society calls for an increase in individual efficiency in adjustment (Dewey, interpreted).

² Reflection about this process reveals the reasons why some sociologists are able to distinguish primary from derivative group organizations.

³ This special definition, while perhaps not the best, will be used throughout this chapter.

rather than behavior of individuals in the presence of no human factors. The term "interpersonal reaction" as employed by some is identical with the definition of interaction in this chapter.

It is well to approach the study of the psychology of social interaction on the theory that it represents actual or potential conflict. The fullest meaning of social adjustment can be understood only from the viewpoint that an individual or group which attempts to influence another individual or group, meets in the course of adjustment, some resistance which is to be overcome. For pedagogical reasons it seemed best to postpone certain aspects of the discussion of this point until appropriate illustrations of different sorts of psycho-social adjustments were presented. Chapters VII, VIII, IX and X prepared the ground for the present discussion.

INTERACTION AND REFLECTION

We are now in position to study the social situation from the active as distinguished from the relatively passive point of view. It is in this type of social behavior that consciousness or awareness plays a leading rôle whereas in the illustrations of cultural conflicts and war, consciousness played a minor rôle; in the mobilization as illustrated by the South Sea Bubble reason was of a low degree. In those types of behavior, habits (habitual wishes) acting reflexly, tended to obey the law of all habits, viz., to run their course within the scope of marginal attention. But as will be seen, in the case of individual adjustment to situations that contain problems, attention must be focused, even strained. Contrary to Allport's insistence that consciousness is secondary to behavior,⁴ we must now be prepared to consider behavior secondary to consciousness. As for those psychologists who find no place for consciousness, either because they say they do not know what it means (Watson), or again because it belongs to a class of psychological terms characterized by their ambiguity (Weiss), we can only say that they have forsaken the psychological ranks to that extent. The actual efficiency of attempted adjustments to social situations characterized by interaction is much less than that of adjustments going on under the guidance of

⁴ "Psychology is the science which studies behavior and consciousness. Of these two terms behavior is placed first because it is an explanatory principle, and therefore fundamental." *Social Psychology*, p. 1.

habits, instincts, social sanctions and the like. Moreover in those cases where the individual is totally unable to predict the responses which the other individual may make, there may be a total suspension of action. Behavior as an explanatory principle in such cases breaks down to some extent for prediction is less accurate. Meanwhile mental processes may still be active. Of course the behaviorist may take it up at the point where reactions are patent, but for his explanatory principle he must have access to the latent mental processes which are preparatory to it.

Social interaction situations

Social interaction situations, then, are those which may be viewed apart (temporarily) from general environmental factors. For some they are the only type of situations to which the social psychologist may turn as the proper subject-matter of his science.

A survey of modern psycho-sociological literature, particularly in America and in France, will convince the reader that the great majority of social psychologists, however variegated their abstract definitions of the object matter of their science, study chiefly, if not exclusively, those very data which we have defined, i.e., experiences which human individuals and collectivities have of other human beings taken individually or collectively, and acts directed by individuals and collectivities toward those human beings whom they experience with the purpose of modifying them, of provoking certain responses. . . . (The) social psychologist ought to investigate all such data, and none but such.⁵

Dunlap⁶ would limit the problems of social psychology primarily to "reactions to other human beings."

The task of defining social interaction systems to comport with the theories constructed by Znaniecki and supported by Dunlap is one of the hardest with which the social psychologist has to deal. There can be no doubt that these psychologists, in thus attempting to direct attention to a particular class of stimuli and responses, which belong to the field of social psychology as distinguished from cultural psychology, are correct. Some definite set of phenomena must be selected if social psychology is ever to become an exact science. But even these psychologists were obliged to qualify their definitions of subject matter to some extent. Thus, Dunlap after classifying

⁵ Znaniecki, F., *The Laws of Social Psychology*, p. 58.

⁶ *Social Psychology*, p. 14.

the three types of individual responses: (a) reaction to one's own organism, (b) reaction to other human organisms, (c) reaction to other environmental factors, and pointing to the second type as that with which social psychology is primarily interested, is obliged to add: "Social psychology, therefore, deals not with a specific social type of reaction alone, but with the social factor in all reactions."⁷ It is impossible for any theory to satisfy at once the requirements of scientific rigor and to account completely for the facts of mental processes and contents involved in social interaction.

*The criteria of social interaction situations*⁸

The problem of defining social interaction may be simplified by enumerating some essentials. Let us suppose that two men A and B are the persons involved in the situation. A and B are attempting to influence each other to perform some act. At the same time they are conscious of:

1. A value (peculiar to each—maybe an interest, ideal, principle or thing of worth).⁹
2. Some means for attaining the value (usually the psychological center of the situation).
3. A and B have had different experiences with similar problems; each brings his past experience to bear on the present situation. They sketch in advance the way they would have the situation unfold.
4. A and B schematize each other as the situation unfolds, changing their acts as they change conceptions of each other, or as they grasp the significance of other factors which appear in the course of action.
5. Unexpected minor problems are likely to arise postponing for a while the whole progress of action, leaving the situation unresolved. It may be resumed later; if not, the interaction ceases altogether.¹⁰
6. Each comes to evaluate himself and the effects of his acts upon his future.¹¹

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁸ The chief criteria only are set forth here.

⁹ Similar to Znaniecki's "axiological problem."

¹⁰ Similar to Znaniecki's "axiological obstacle."

¹¹ Znaniecki's "reflected self."

II. AN ILLUSTRATION OF SOCIAL INTERACTION¹²

We shall now illustrate the psychology of interaction with a skeletal account of an actual situation. The situation was studied by a psychologist during the entire time of action—July 11 to August 11. The situation involves two chief characters whom we shall designate as A and B and two minor characters, C and D. They are as follows:

- A, a professor in a university
- B, a salesman in an electrical shop
- C, friend of A's
- D, owner and manager of the shop

The numbers throughout refer to the interpretations which follow this account.

On July 11 about noon, A accompanied by C was passing the shop. A noticed a window card advertising a sale of electric fans. A, whose room had been uncomfortably warm for some days previous, decided to take advantage of the reduced prices (1). He and C entered and began to inquire about fans. B brought forth the "last" \$10 fan which was offered for sale at \$6.90 as advertised. B represented this as being the last in stock and congratulated A on his good fortune in thus being able to get so good a fan at so low a price (2). B guaranteed (orally) to refund the price of the fan if it was not satisfactory, giving A a sales-slip which in itself was merely an acknowledgement of a sale (3).

A took the fan to his apartment and set it going. It ran for about an hour and then stopped suddenly. All attempts to start it were in vain. A began to discuss the question of "crooked" dealers in general with C. Together they went back to the shop only to find it closed until the following Monday (July 13). Meanwhile A felt sure he would be able to return the fan on July 13 and receive his money. But when he presented the fan in exchange for his money B refused on the ground that A did not return it immediately. This of course was impossible since the shop had closed soon after A and C left with the fan on July 11 (4). He did, however, in time

¹² The student is asked to study this illustration by referring throughout to the previous paragraph on "Criteria" and the succeeding paragraph called "Interpretations."

offer to exchange for a higher grade fan and allow A \$6.90 on it (5). A refused all offers and demanded his money. He asked to see D, but was told that he was on a vacation and would not return for about ten days. A dropped the matter and assured B that he would wait until D returned; meanwhile he left the fan in the shop (6).

A went back August 11 and asked B for D. D who had been sitting in his office in the rear was seen to leave by a side door (7). B reported that D was out at a bank and would return in a few minutes. A and C walked about the streets for about thirty minutes, making their plans to meet D. A and C agreed that A should change his tactics (8). A had been very outspoken in his conversations with B, even vehement. When A at length met D he talked very mildly, assuring D that he knew that he (D) would be glad to refund the money; that he understood how anxious a salesman (referring to B) was to sell goods, etc. (9). D refused to make the exchange, saying that A had a good buy, etc.; A kept on talking very mildly. When in the course of the conversation, D remarked that A was not the rough talker that B had represented him to be (10). A remarked that a man in his profession (11) could not afford to be crude and expressed surprise that he had been so represented. D then inquired of A his name and calling. A gave his name and informed him that he was a professor in the local university. D excused himself for a moment and went to another part of the building. (It was later learned that D had gone to a telephone to verify A's name and calling (12).) Soon D returned and refunded the \$6.90 and begged A's pardon for the seeming injustice, but assured A that he merely wanted to get the matter straight (13).

Interpretations

1. A recognizes a value. He proposes to trade with B. See criterion no. 1.

2. B's attempt to influence A to perform an act—to buy a fan. His guarantee exemplifies the "instrumental process." See criterion no. 2.

3. The situation now closed in the eyes of B; in the eyes of A it was still in progress. He means to "try the fan out" and if found to check with B's verbal guarantee, will consider the situation closed. Still an instrumental process or means for A. See criterion no. 2.

4. This is of course a pretext offered by B. We may call it another example of an instrumental process, for B is in a sense reselling the fan to A (though he does not admit it), i.e., he is trying to influence A to perform a certain act—to buy a fan. See criteria nos. 1 and 2.

5. B is reinforcing the instrumental process begun under 4 above. On the other hand in offering to exchange it for a higher grade fan he envisages a situation even better than the original one since there would be more value in the exchange than in allowing the situation to close with a \$6.90 sale. A, on the contrary, takes this to mean that B is weakening. A imagines he is making headway with his adjustment. See criteria nos. 1, 2 and 4.

6. The manager being absent, all action is postponed—a minor problem is introduced; it must be removed. See criterion no. 5.

7. D is employing an instrumental process, viz., trying to evade A and thus postpone reopening of the situation. D is acting toward A, though he has never met him. The entrance of A was merely signaled to D by B. B had previously told his side of the situation to D. B of course would like D to keep out of the case for B wants to appear in the eyes of D as one capable of doing business without the intercession of his employer. See criterion no. 6.

8. A in thus planning for his anticipated meeting with D is employing an instrumental process. See criteria nos. 2 and 3.

9. A actually using his planned process of appearing calm. This has its effect, for D was expecting to meet a "hard customer." (B has told D that A was such, for D admitted it to A as we shall see.) This calmness on the part of A also presents a minor problem for D. See criterion no. 5.

10. A's instrumental process bringing results. He pictures D as weakening. See criterion no. 4.

11. A reinforcing his instrumental process and at the same time bidding for his social standing as a university professor to be brought into the situation. See criterion no. 6.

12. An instrumental process on the part of D to verify his schematization of A. See criteria nos. 2 and 4.

13. D has his future sales in mind as they might be affected by the reputation A would give his shop. See criterion no. 6.

III

Social psychology in its present stage of development is beset with uncoordinated theories growing out of two sorts of philosophy—idealism and realism. From time to time one or the other has come to the fore in radical terms. At the present time radical realism is directing modern thinking. Both have failed to produce a consistent science of social psychology; the reader should by now be prepared to draw a few general inferences in respect to the pre-suppositions which any writer on social psychology advances: (1) social psychology can never rely entirely upon the native structuralization of the individual, for he is never the same individual after having been exposed to different social situations; (2) society too is always becoming and what may be called the social product is a reality, as are the physical and mental attributes of the individual; (3) these two factors, the changing individual and the changing situations, are basic. They must be harmonized.

Social imagery

We may attempt to harmonize the aforementioned factors on the theory of social imagery. Each individual from a motivated active point of view is seeking to adjust himself to situations which imply competition. Each individual pictures himself as such with human limitations for achievement, some of which he is fully aware of, and others that he does not suspect in himself. On the other hand each individual pictures himself as a member of a group to which he responds in a fashion that corresponds to his image of society as a whole. These two images are continually at odds, depending in degree upon the amount of active mentation involved in their structure or function. A few examples will help to make clear the psychology of interaction as imagery.

The President of a Republic, who until his accidental assumption of office, had no church affiliation, formally allies himself with a liberal body within a few weeks after assuming the reins of government; candidate for city mayoralty becomes unusually active in church work just before and during the period of his campaign for office; a United States senator, functioning as an avowed "dry" immediately modifies his stand in favor of a referendum to the people

when an avowed "wet" is nominated by their common constituents; a young man subject to the draft in the late war changes his status as an arts student to that of student of divinity in order to claim exemption; another, about to be called, enlists for the dual values of selecting the branch of service he prefers, and of parading before his fellows as a patriot. Everyday experience yields countless examples of the same socially significant acts—acts which involve the interaction of individual and social images.

The mere enumeration of examples of social imagery, will not afford the rigorousness which science demands. The question comes: what reliable basis for explanations of social imagery may be assumed? The use of the term social imagery may be unsteady if one is to think of it as a force of some sort functioning as a mental element. It is similar to the term image as used in individual psychology, which implies an ability to recall a past experience, to recognize the experience in a more or less faithful association of events in time and space orders. Since for individual psychology the imaginal endowment is coextensive with sensory endowment, social imagery is coextensive with social forms, traditions, etc.—a much larger sensorium¹³ than individual psychology can undertake to study. Social imagery is therefore to be understood in terms of retrospection and prospection. The individual behaves in the light of past experience and also that which he fancies the situation, still to unfold, may contain.

The prospective factor in social interaction amounts to an incorporation of a virtual (i.e., imagined future) situation into the present situation. Two individuals or two groups may be involved in a situation the details of which are known to both so that the social interaction which goes on, is a series of checks upon the activities of each other. Each side attempts to keep its movements covert awaiting a time when the opponent is "off guard," whereupon a final effort is made to resolve the situation. All complicated situations tend to produce such a series of interactions.

Virtual situations are images. Sometimes they are carefully pictured in advance and become as pictures the basis of action. A complicated chain of instrumental processes is set going before actual

¹³ But see the discussion of the organic theory of Society in Chapter I.

interaction is attempted. The incorporation of the virtual and actual situations may be illustrated by the following hypothetical example: The executive officer of a corporation is told by his subordinate officers whom he is accustomed to regard as his proper and reliable advisers in matters pertaining to the details of management, that a certain employee of long and faithful service is now a detriment to the organization. This information comes as a mild shock to the chief executive; he has always respected the employee in question, but is willing in the interest of the welfare of the corporation to dispense with his services. The subordinate officers are aware that they cannot urge their recommendation upon the grounds of personal inefficiency of the employee. Thus they resort to an incorporation of a virtual situation. They urge that the retention of the employee stands in the way of friendly relations with another corporation whose administrative assistance they know the executive officer prizes very highly. This knowledge becomes in the eyes of the subordinate officers the basis for an actual situation; they plan to instrumentalize it, i.e., to make the virtual situation actual. They picture the delicateness of the virtual situation and judge that their reports about it will be sufficient for an executive order removing the employee. In this way they hope to resolve an actual situation in their favor without actually engaging in social interaction with the employee.

The progress of social interaction from one situation to another which requires that the imagined future coalesce with the real present, is in keeping with the entire psychical life of all aware individuals. The old figure of a stream of consciousness (James) applies to social awareness and the various forms of social experience become a series of "substantive" and "transitive" stages of social interaction. These stages have their central cores but social psychology has not advanced far enough to say what their laws of formation are. Moreover, it appears they may never be known. After considering the various attempts of both science and philosophy (as separate disciplines) to fathom realism and idealism as used to interpret human behavior, Znaniecki concludes:

The failure of every one of these attempts is logically unavoidable, since the concrete empirical totality of personal experiences and activities is an inexhaustible, unlimited, disorderly, indefinitely variable multiplicity. It is impossible to circumscribe any particular set of data from among all those that constitute the world

of the individual subject and oppose this set as constituting his personality to the rest of his world as to the objective environment of this personality. Everything in the world as given to the individual has a subjective, personal aspect, just as everything has also an objective aspect—and this subjective aspect differs from individual to individual. The concrete personality is not distinguished from and opposed to the world; it is involved in the world, is interwoven with everything the subject experiences, is an inseparable component of all that is real and all that is ideal for him. What an individual experiences, does, or thinks, is not in him, but is or occurs in the world that is given to him, among the objects with which he deals.

The human world—and we know no other—is the totality of all those experiences and acts that, on their subjective side, constitute all the numberless human personalities that are and were. For the individual this totality is the world, an objective immensity of things and processes; it is supra-personal because in its content and meaning, in its form and function, in its extension and duration it transcends indefinitely every particular personality. The personality is poorer than the world; and yet it is rich enough and complex enough to baffle every effort of scientific systematization.¹⁴

Categories of changes in social interaction

Notwithstanding the conclusions just reached some students have in recent years advanced a number of useful terms which although borrowed from individual psychology in the main, are useful expressions of the categories of social interaction. They are as follows:

1. *Inhibition.* Inhibition implies a more or less complete blocking of the customary forms of mental orientation toward the objects comprehended in a closed system. There can of course be any degree of inhibition, but from a psychological standpoint the inhibition must be general enough to change radically the attitude which the individual brings to bear on the problems created by the inhibiting agent. A slight inhibition such as could be resolved by the subject through some additional effort of the same general type or by waiting for its normal disappearance (since it might not be forceful enough to maintain its place in the closed system) would be at most an annoyance. A psychological inhibition must be of sufficient strength to continue as such and at the same time require some compromise with it. A series of slight annoyances may however in summation amount to inhibition.

Inhibition applies to all types of mental processes; generally the

¹⁴ *The Laws of Social Psychology*, pp. 299–300.

habitual reaction patterns if inhibited give rise to the keenest dissatisfaction. Impolite table manners, for example, are sufficient to arouse in a cultured hostess profound and lasting feelings of disgust toward an honest but rustic guest. A clergyman in the pulpit would be regarded by the congregation as insincere if his poise, mien, language or even tone of voice were the same as he had used the previous afternoon at the Sunday School picnic. Inhibitions are always to be evaluated as such in connection with specific situations. Inhibitions to orientations in which the higher mental processes are involved are not usually followed so quickly by feelings of unrest or disappointment. The law of trial and error applies in such cases and the subject repeatedly tries to effect the desired adjustment, and even ascribes his lack of success to his own ineptness rather than to unsurmountable difficulties inherent in the situation itself.

There are rare occasions however when all means to orientation are inhibited, i.e., the whole gamut of mental processes is blocked. After the tornado which on the afternoon of March 18, 1925, swept through southern Illinois and Indiana, the surviving population in the path of the storm was unable generally to render assistance to the injured for several minutes. Though they were uninjured they were dazed by the sudden and strange environment in which they found themselves. There were no customary habits to fall back upon, nor did they possess the "wits" to comprehend what had happened. The spell of blocked reaction patterns gradually wore off, but as one after another of the adjustments which the situation demanded was attempted, the same inhibitions conditioned behavior. During the period of clearing up the devastated area, social castes were practically eliminated, the dead were spoken of as "gone away," and in a few cases bereaved parents held on to the lifeless bodies of their children, refusing to believe them dead.

Inhibition may be summarily disposed of as due to a change in or want of ordinary patterns for response to situations. On the pure social level (interaction with another individual or group) there is a failure on the part of the subject so inhibited to envisage the attitude, to schematize the personality and motives of the social object. The nature and course of social interaction between two persons or groups will depend upon how each envisages the other (for both are at once subject and object) in respect to motives and instrumental

processes. At the same time persons as subject and object are indissolubly associated with an indefinite body of non-social objects which in the course of experience become pseudo-social, or which again in the prospect of values to be gained direct the activities of each other. Non-social objects are in some degree virtual social objects.

2. *Rationalization.*¹⁵ Much of what goes for reflective thought in all actual human situations has been called rationalization—a process of reasoning which makes use of images as premises. Rationalization is often referred to in uncomplimentary terms as if it were indulged primarily by ignorant or primitive people. This judgment is sometimes unwarranted. Rationalization is at once a much used, natural, and even valuable mental process. Inhibit the functioning of a habit and perplexity results; inhibit the operation of a well laid rational plan of procedure and rationalization intervenes, to draw nearer to the imagery of a readjusted plan. Rationalized schemes for orientation become norms when verified by experience. In other words rationalization is the first step toward reflective or scientific thought, the forerunner of experimentation.

Suppose a case in which a person has laid plans for a course of procedure which if carried out will secure for him a desirable orientation to the situation at hand. Upon these prospects he builds his hopes, sees the situation begin to unfold favorably. He is eager to see the plan in actual operation and as the time approaches for the actualizing of his virtual situation the individual displays an uneasiness which betrays the character of all untested adjustmental efforts. All problems of social interaction, i.e., all problems that for their solution are contingent upon the changeable character of other persons, give rise to such behavior on the part of the social subject. The man of wide and varied contacts with other men will not be beguiled by the supposition that human nature is a consistently predictable entity which may be depended upon to respond to idealized or virtual situations. The individual will do well when faced with a social problem, to separate the contradictory situations, i.e., the actual and the virtual, for in mental anticipation actual situations are often colored by the virtual. What happens to the individual who

¹⁵ See Perrin, F. A. C., and Klein, D. B., *Psychology*, Chap. 4.

has not taken this precaution? Faced with an unexpected turn of events which shatters his hopes, he may abandon further attempts to deal with the situation, recast his plan for a second trial (rationalize), or may by a curious form of further rationalization declare that he is not disappointed. If the last attitude is assumed, it is a case of the weakest sort of will, a personality that is changed by the glitter of passing pictures. Whatever success he may attain is due not to his own management but to the erstwhile latent favorable factors in the situation itself; these may mean success even if nothing is attempted. Sometimes there is virtue in postponement for the solution of situations depends upon two factors: (a) the natural course of events inherent in the actual situation and (b) the guidance of the rational subject in anticipating this course of events by coöperating with it as events unfold. Thus reason as distinguished from rationalization begins to assume its rightful place in the solution of problems.

Some social situations however are associated with organizations of persons and postponement may take the form of misplacing the responsibility for failure. A group of men working for the success of a common enterprise may assume a nominal responsibility for the proper performance of their several parts, but in the end lay the failure of their acts upon the recognized leader. Delegated leadership is therefore a hazardous venture, because it tends to set the stage for a divorcement of reason and judgment with changing situations.

3. *Emotional release.* Genetic psychology assumes that the "natural" man ultimately constructs the fabric of social life. He is pictured as a "savage" whose native predatory impulses are continually striving for release.¹⁶ It is frequently said that civilization tends to repress these native impulses; that after a time they break loose in all the fury of primitive rage, initiating revolutions and wars; that to some degree these repressed impulses may be "sublimated," but that this process is never very completely done, so that an analysis of daily social interaction among persons reveals the same savage impulses at work. It is germane to the modern presuppositions of the instinctive basis of social psychology so prominent in the literature of the past quarter of a century as well as to the philosophy

¹⁶ Fielding, W. J., *The Caveman Within Us*; Robinson, J. H., *The Mind in the Making*; Sorokin, P. A., *The Sociology of Revolution*.

of evolution out of which it has grown, to examine briefly these assumptions.

In various connections throughout this study we have found reasons to doubt in part these contentions. From the evolutionary point of view it must be noted that there is little left of the natural man in the many ramifications and superimposed strata of human achievements called culture. We do not see a "natural" man in modern social organization. His nature is largely an acquirement so far as his objective acts are concerned, although so far as unspecialized subjective feelings are concerned the natural or primitive man does appear within him as a subjective self. Consider any phase of social life as it exists today and individual reaction thereto; the subjective man, i.e., the natural man is a rare individual; wherever it crops up we have a genius with all the force of an "evolutionary nisis" back of his character and acts, but these acts are in every respect directed toward some further achievement which is essentially in advance of present social achievements. The genius always lives in advance of his times. But the unsocial side of man is the real problem; his egoism, selfishness, trickery and dishonesty with his fellows are more a matter of failure to conform consistently to the demands of a changing situation than to a matter of some "caveman within us." The natural man is best observed in early childhood. There is found an honesty which is rarely observed in adults. Civilization keeps one guessing just how to get along with it; otherwise we could not be justified in the expenditure of so much energy in education and reëducation.

Thus the psychology of repression and release needs to be reinterpreted. A very small (relatively) irritation between persons or between a person and his society is enough to disorganize the ensemble of harmonious attitudes of one toward the other. These disharmonies belong not to a caveman but to a civilized man perplexed. Habits are never separate reaction patterns; attitudes are not several psychic tendencies. They belong to a unified individual. Disturb a part of this unity and the whole is disorganized temporarily. An eruption of long repressed emotions is merely the progressive disintegration of a complex of cultural acquirements, an unraveling of the thread of habits.

4. *Social conformation.* Perhaps one of the most noticeable out-

ward manifestations of socialization is that of conformation of which there are as usual all degrees. Ordinarily the conformist is a weak personality since his conformation in its initial stages is a sort of compensation for some inherent weakness. As the subject grows into social situations of a given sort conformation tends to become a habit, while the ageing non-conformist becomes a relative conformist as a result of his increasing ability to differentiate fundamental and accidental social values. He dismisses as of little consequence things which he formerly held to be important. Age tends to polarize interests and to eliminate all except the vital. The non-conformist ordinarily tends to become a social recluse except in general social situations which have outworn their usefulness; then the non-conformist may rise rapidly as a leader in a movement which in itself contains the elements of change. In such cases the non-conformist is credited with leadership of which he is essentially undeserving.

The phenomenon of conformation is so universal that its functioning is sometimes referred to as due to some human instinct. Ross would reduce all conformation to the principle of suggestibility or "psychic resonance" and ascribes a leading rôle to the prestige of leadership. "Many a man thinks he makes up his mind, whereas, in truth, it is made up for him by some masterful associate or by the man who talked to him last."¹⁷ The Freudian school, making as it does, so much of sublimation as a functional ambivalent of repression, has in recent years tended to enlarge upon its scope. Sublimation for the Freudians originally meant "the directing of sexual cravings toward other aims of a non-sexual nature."¹⁸ This standpoint has been radically enlarged by Jung whose conception of the libido is less circumscribed, while Freud himself in his later works indicates a wider application of the function of sublimation.¹⁹ Znaniecki²⁰ prefers to use the term "social sublimation" in a modified Freudian sense, but throughout his discussion he treats the psychology of this sort of socialization as we do here under the category of conformation.

Social conformation must be regarded not so much as the thing *to do* (Ross) or again as the gradual release and satisfaction of

¹⁷ *Social Psychology*, p. 12.

¹⁸ Tridon, A., *Psychoanalysis*, p. 257.

¹⁹ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*.

²⁰ *The Laws of Social Psychology*, p. 170 ff.

repressed impulses (Freud), but as something that *must be done* if an individual wishes to maintain a comparatively peaceful social life. It does not require an expert psychologist to detect in the behavior of most men a tendency to submit to the demands of the "status quo." Personal safety is the motive. The more wealth the individual has to conserve, the more cautious he becomes; the more weaknesses he possesses, the more fearful he is that they may be discovered. Conforming to the will of temporary leadership is an easy way to make the most of one's resources. One might suspect mental eccentricity in a person of wealth or prestige who pursues a non-conventional course, except in those cases where an avowed conformist takes up some accessory occupation or sport, purely avocational in nature, to which he turns with enthusiasm during periods of rest from his wonted occupation. His non-conformation then partakes of the nature of school-boy pranks; no one pays serious attention to it. Sublimation may be used to explain such behavior, but it cannot account consistently for the normal social life of men.

The social life of all active men requires that they at times depart from the customary; it may be an adventure departing markedly from an old regime. The adventure is full of possibilities for either success or failure. The individual in such cases exerts every power within him to enlist the commendation of the larger society to which he is responsible, or from which criticism may come. He seeks a basis of conformity through the method of changing old ideas in favor of the new which he has set out to actualize. In all such adventures the psychology of interaction is a matter of propaganda. Every gain is heralded to the proper social clientele as due to the wisdom of the innovator, whereas it is actually a natural unfoldment of the situation. On the other hand every disappointment is either minimized or referred back to the lagging impedimenta of the situation. The net result is generally something better, but compromise is the actual descriptive term to be applied to the character of achievement.

SUMMARY

1. The psychology of interaction (interpersonal behavior) is the chief category in the science of social psychology. A definite science of social psychology, if such there can be, will be confined to this

category. All attempts, so far, to do this have been unsuccessful, for either they divest the individual as a social unit of consciousness as a mental fact, or they make consciousness take a secondary place beside observable behavior. Both assumptions do violence to facts.

2. Social interaction implies mental activity in the pursuance of thoughtful classifications of other persons and their behavior. For this reason social interaction is to be distinguished from social behavior in the presence of cultural products which merely arouse and determine the operation of habits, sanctions, or customs.

3. The criteria for social interaction situations are: recognition of values, the instrumental means for securing them and provision for continual readjustment as events transpire. Usually a typical social interaction situation may be described in terms of some leading end or purpose known as its axiological determiner. Generally, but not necessarily, a social interaction situation is found to contain minor problems that in consequence of their potency to retard the course of action, may be called obstacles.

4. Social interaction situations are further characterized by two distinct phases that imply the operation of corresponding mental processes. These phases are identical with the actual and virtual aspects of the moving situation. The mental processes concerned with these phases of the situation are respectively judgment, and imagery as a basis for inference. All the mental processes recognized by individual psychology may however be brought into action.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

FOLLETT, M. P.: *Creative Experience*, Chaps. 3 and 4.

PARK AND BURGESS: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. 6.

SOROKIN, P. A.: *The Sociology of Revolution*, Chap. 2.

SPYKMAN, N. J.: *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, Book II, Chaps. 1 and 2.

ZNANIECKI, F.: *The Laws of Social Psychology*, Chaps. 2 and 4.

CHAPTER XII

METHODS

In Chapter II, it was shown that the study of any science may take direction from two fundamental points of view—subject-matter and method; in other words, sources of data and ways of treating them. The ambition of every special science is to circumscribe or define the limits of both categories. In the case of social psychology we saw that the question of subject-matter is not yet settled; indeed there appeared to be reasons for some to surmise that an entirely new science with still more diverse sources of subject-matter may one day demand admission and that this new science will embrace with what are now included in social psychology, a number of other divisions of knowledge. On the other hand such a procedure is strictly opposed by the tendency for scientists to specialize; this means that divisions will be kept separate rather than brought together. Social psychology may follow the example set by general psychology which is really many special sciences in one. In this case social psychology may be considered the matrix of several disciplines known as the social sciences. Arguments as to whether social psychology should be a psychology growing out of sociology or out of individual psychology, or again whether or not it should be looked upon as a part of general psychology, are advanced by different writers in their attempts to define it. Expressions such as psychological sociology and sociological psychology are commonly found in the literature and these indicate something of the confusion that exists in the minds of many as to the boundaries or scope of social psychology.

In turning to the question of methods for social psychology, it should be clear that they must necessarily await some clarification of the subject-matter aspect. There is much confusion regarding the methods because of this situation. The integral relation of subject-matter and method sometimes leads to a confusion of them. As has already been pointed out some of the classes of general psychology may be included under either subject-matter or method; this is es-

pecially true for what is known as genetic psychology. A similar confusion finds its way into social psychology, but in this case the confusion while actually detrimental, is less so than in the case of general psychology. The present volume is not free from this objection. Another example of the confusion is to be found in Ellwood's study.¹ He includes under the subject of methods the following:

- a. The anthropological or comparative method
- b. The historical method
- c. The social survey method
- d. The method of deduction from biology and psychology
- e. Philosophical assumptions and a priori methods

It will be seen at once that anthropology especially is a division of knowledge rather than a specific method, although there may be special ways for treating data in this field not found in other divisions of knowledge.

In another recent commendable study which sets out with the purpose of clarifying the problem of method, the author² discusses four methods in current use in social science, all of which he finds inadequate in some respect. Lindeman maintains that there really is no social science, because of the relative futility of the methods which have been employed. All four methods fall short in one important respect: they cannot satisfy the requirements for prediction. He finds that the social scientists have not fully realized the necessity of prediction as a scientific aim. Disclaiming any responsibility for the "discovery" of the way to insure predictability, he is content to see the uncertainty of prediction diminished. His criticisms in brief are:

a. The older historical method while admittedly a clue to prediction cannot be relied upon because it does not take a proper futuristic attitude. To say that history repeats itself is not sufficient; it is not even correct. Such a statement of the course of events creates "blind spots" which shut off a full view of the social horizon.

b. The analogical method is a mere makeshift to escape the neces-

¹ *The Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 31ff.

² Lindeman, E. C., *Social Discovery*.

sity of experimentation; it leads to subjectivism which endows half-truths with unwarranted certainty.³

c. The logical method, as old as Aristotle, still persists in the older institutions, e.g., Law, dismissing in wholesale fashion many of our most urgent social problems.

d. The statistical method with its worship of averages, modes, correlations and graphs, cannot lead to social prediction; a zealot may place almost any interpretation upon an array of figures.

We cannot here enter into a full discussion of Lindeman's criticisms. It will suffice to say that his criticisms refer to these methods in their antiquated forms, and that their progressive aspects are generally embodied as parts of the two general methods we shall consider—natural science and historical methods.

The problem in the present chapter is to clarify the conception of method, even though we are obliged at the outset to admit inability to do so completely. The problem may be stated as follows: Is there some one method which will satisfy all special divisions of knowledge, i.e., all the sciences? Some scientists claim that it is possible to rely upon one method, even though this one method must be considered as hypothetical in part. Others claim that there are different orders of nature to which natural phenomena belong and for this reason each order demands its own method. To be more specific, it is urged by McClure⁴ that there are three such orders: (a) the physio-chemical level which is concerned with the realm of matter, (b) the biological level concerned with the realm of life, and (c) the cognitive level concerned with the realm of mind. The mechanistic

³ Lindeman's criticism of the analogical method is only partially valid. It would appear that whenever analogy is used, it is a case of trying to explain one set of facts by another set of facts, the two belonging to divisions of knowledge the bonds of which are not well established. So long as sciences remain unrelated in some respects, analogical reasoning may well be used to describe facts that are not yet completely understood. Lindeman's criticism is however valuable when applied to certain figures such as that used by Porteus and Babcock to explain the difference between individual and group behavior: "The difference between individual and group behavior is simply the difference between a small flame and a large fire. The crowd's tendencies are merely the tendencies of the individual reinforced by imitation and raised to the *n*th degree. There seems no need to assume the existence of a group mind." (*Temperament and Race*, note, p. 326.)

⁴ *The Logic of Reflection*.

method is adequate for the first of these categories, but inadequate for the second and third, because something more than end result is implied in the realms of life and cognition. For the realm of life, adaptation is the added factor, while in the case of the cognitive realm adaptation and meaning are involved. Thus in shifting from lower to higher categories of existential phenomena, mechanism gives way in part to empirical facts.

THE AIMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The methods of any science are discovered, refined and employed in the satisfaction of certain needs; these translated into the language of science are known as aims. The aims of social psychology as it stands today are:

- a.* To refine its methods of observation, in order
- b.* To reduce empirical observation to law, in order
- c.* To predict social behavior and therefore to direct expected behavior

Usually the first step is to limit the field of observation. Individual psychology has followed the example of the more settled sciences, such as physics, chemistry, mathematics, etc.; i.e., it has divested itself of metaphysical postulates. Social psychology is just beginning to do this and in consequence individual and social psychology are emerging as the same discipline. At any rate the same psychological nomenclature is beginning to be common to both.

THE NATURAL SCIENCE METHOD

There is at the present time a growing conviction that the natural science methods are applicable to social psychology. The two generally used by the natural sciences are the method of logical analysis of abstract conceptions and the method of experiment.

The method of logical analysis is in current use in mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, etc. It differs from the experimental method only in that it is a refined stage of the same process. After certain investigations have been performed and the result verified experimentally, tentative hypotheses are proposed which upon further investigation yield acceptable final results that may be embodied in formulae for laws. The method of logical analysis of abstract conceptions begins at this point. Deductive reasoning is then employed

for the study of phenomena. Natural science thus comes to have what are called initial assumptions. Thus in physics there is the formula:

$$\text{Efficiency} = \frac{mc(t_2 - t_1)}{mct}$$

It means that the efficiency of an engine may be determined by finding the quotient of the difference between the temperatures of the boiler and condenser, and the absolute temperature of the boiler. The formula is an abstract conception of the relation that obtains for a given class of elements (facts), a machine with given attributes (structure) in proper relations with a natural element (heat) in such and such quantities. From such a relation of facts knowledge is deduced by formula or law. The formula will hold (i.e., logically) for all facts of the same class sustaining the same relations. The formula is the logical outcome of experiment. Grant the now created initial assumption (the formula) and the method of logical analysis is used to determine what is sought (in this case, the efficiency of an engine).

The universality of the experimental method for establishing initial assumptions depends entirely upon the generality of the facts which are empirically observed. If the facts of empirical observation are very numerous, as in the case of electrons in physics, or light years in astronomy, or bacteria in biology, or stimuli in certain kinds of psychology, it is possible to formulate a law in each case where the facts on the whole behave in a uniform fashion under known conditions. It does not matter much to the physicist if he loses track of a few thousand electrons during a given observation; the astronomer uses light years in a perfectly general sense; the geologist in the same way calculates time by depositions. The tendency in natural science is toward abstraction, i.e., it ignores chance individual cases.

THE MECHANISTIC HYPOTHESIS

The foregoing account of the method of natural science will help in understanding the mechanistic conception of psychology, which is very popular today. The mechanistic conception is an extenuation of the natural science method or rather it may be said that the natural science method leads ultimately to a mechanistic hypothesis. Because of its popularity it seems worth while to examine it briefly.

In the first place the mechanistic conception of life is by no means a recent one. According to popular notion, it is a novelty not to be taken seriously. The mechanistic conception of life (and therefore mind) goes back at least to René Descartes (1596-1650) who proposed a theory of animal automatism.

I desire, I say, that you should consider that these functions in the (bodily) machine naturally proceed from the mere arrangement of its organs, neither more nor less than do the movements of a clock, or other automaton, from that of its weights so that, so far as these are concerned, it is not necessary to conceive any other vegetative or sensitive soul, nor any other principle of motion, or of life, than the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire which continually burns in the heart, and which is in no wise essentially different from all the fires which exist in inanimate bodies.⁵

Similar statements of this conception of life are to be found in the writings of many philosophers since his day.

The mechanistic hypothesis is a perfectly valid one. It is a model hypothesis for a science of nature. The following quotation from Weiss illustrates the mechanistic conception of life as understood by the extreme behaviorists of our day:

The catagories mind, consciousness, awareness, purpose, volition, sensation, image, feelings, etc., have failed to establish the degree of phenomenological specificity which is essential for a uniform program of scientific investigation. If a group of psychologists were asked to define, describe, and explain what they understand by the term consciousness or mental, the reports would show such divergences that a scientific quantification would be impossible. This lack of agreement is increasing rather than decreasing.⁶

Thus despairing, he finds nothing in the universe of natural phenomena with the requisite specificity save electrons and protons. Yet he admits freely that the electron-proton theory is metaphysical.

Of course the electrons and protons are metaphysical constructions which belong to the same category as "the thing-in-itself," "neutral stuff," "elan vital," "psychical force," but when we are faced with the problem of adopting a fundamental assumption toward which the analysis of human behavior might regress, the physicist's electron-proton ultimate reality has the advantage, (1) that it can be stated in the most effective language responses (mathematics) that have been developed, and (2) that it can be synthesized into atoms, molecules, protoplasm, animals, man,

⁵ Quoted by McClure, M. T., *op. cit.*, p. 444, from Descartes, *Traité de l'Homme*.

⁶ *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior*, p. 387.

social organization. On the other hand the ultimate realities of the professional metaphysicians seem incapable of synthesis into anything more unified than is implied in the term uniqueness, which can neither be demonstrated nor defined. This is the reason why I adopted the electron-proton type of metaphysics as best adapted for the study of human behavior.⁷

NATURAL SCIENCE METHOD APPLIED TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

But what happens for the social psychologist when he uses the natural science method for studying, let us say, the cultural products of groups? He finds that whereas there are certain similarities to be observed that will hold for all groups, there are also group differences which he must consider, and which if unaccounted for, leave big gaps in his work. He cannot afford to handle groups of people as the physicist does electrons—human groups are too few in his world of natural science. So long as the unit in social psychology is the individual, he can throw some of them aside, ignore them. But in some aspects of psychology he is studying groups, tribes, nations.

In the case of the phenomenon of digital mutilation described in Chapter VII, we traced an observation practically around the earth, and found that it held for many groups in primitive society. We saw also that there was some variation in the reasons for the practice. These variations could be called group differences. We could say that psychic unity might account for the facts in the beginning, but it would not account for the variations. These variations were vital to the groups, a part of their very lives in the task of adjusting themselves to their respective environments. In other words the fact of mutilation and the fact of its variations (values) constitute two different orders of phenomena for the psychologist who is studying cultural products. The social psychologist at once recognizes that the natural science methods will not work in such cases. He draws a distinction between abstract universals and real universals. Whereas the physicist may use abstract universals the social psychologist must use real universals. Real universals apply to actual concrete cases. In studying cultural products, the groups creating and maintaining them are the units.

If the social psychologist should confine himself to the natural science method, he would have a relatively incomplete account of

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

the psychology of groups; he would be limited to the common psychological processes of individuals. He could determine that the individuals possess a nervous system; he could study stimulus-response patterns as possessed by individuals; he could study common stimuli. But there he would stop. The spirit of the group would be inaccessible to him. He would be forced categorically to deny that there is a group mind or even what has been called elsewhere in this book, mind groups. The reason why certain writers, e.g., Espinas and Durkheim could use the natural science method and arrive at the conclusion that there is a group mind over and outside of individual minds, is due to their presuppositions,—some extra-individual factor was introduced and represented as a functioning factor when aggregates were formed. The natural science method today cannot accept their presuppositions.

The life of a group as expressed in its cultural products is a real object. Taking away any item of it would be analogous to taking away a nerve from an individual. Therefore groups must be studied as individual objects. This means that so far as the social psychologist is concerned with the cultural product of groups, he is using a historical method (an empirical method).⁸

THE HISTORICAL METHOD⁹

It is apparent that individual psychology per se is inadequate to explain social psychology. Individual psychology, in giving an account only of what is common to all individuals, accounts for processes but it cannot account for values. It has however maintained the position either that it can furnish the knowledge of groups

⁸ At this point, the student may profitably read Williams' *The Foundations of Social Science*, pp. 442-444.

⁹ The historical method should be regarded as an approach to the study of social psychology in terms of relatively large segments of behavior. Reference was made to segmental methods in psychology in Chapter I, p. 6, and in Chapter II, pp. 39-40. Chapter VII illustrates this point of view, as does the discussion of closed systems in this chapter. The segmental aspects of social psychology are not however limited to historical considerations. The so-called Gestalt psychology advances a similar if not identical approach to the study of individual mental processes as such. See in this connection, Koffka, K., *Psychological Bulletin* Vol. 19, pp. 531-585; Köhler, W., *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. 32, pp. 691-723; Follett, M. P., *Creative Experience*, Chap. 5.

outright, or that social psychology is ancillary to it. Its usual course of explanation is to say that man has a social self that functions in the presence of other people. While this is so, there is the additional fact that must be considered—the social self of any person is a self to be accounted for by group contacts. His social habits were established in the group where the meanings of these habits comport with their accustomed functioning.

As long as the theory of instincts was the presupposition in common use, it was assumed that individual psychology was an adequate science for the task. It could presume to use the natural science method. But the instinct philosophy is gone; it has only the most general application. Certain it is, there are no unit instincts. Again when the theory of habits came into prominence, it was still possible for individual psychology to proclaim its right to tell what goes on in groups. The habit psychology is far better as such than the instinct psychology. It insists upon the recognition of another order of nature which had not been considered before in its best or fullest sense—environment. Before habit psychology became popular, environment was used to account directly for differences in races.

The environmentalists found that climate, location, etc., condition the following: ethical codes, music, literature, language, temperament, size of groups, marriage forms, religion, industry, economic welfare, migrations, etc. Habits were found to be multitudinous, ever changing. The transitoriness of habits implies a transitoriness of stimuli; i.e., environment is always changing. The next step was to classify the external stimuli (environment). One of the classifications to which environment will yield is that of the culture which is created by people in the presence of many types of ends. Culture is the thing men everywhere have built up, the thing that has meaning for them, the thing they work together to change or maintain as it is, in the interest of better or continued existence. The method of classification to which the psychologist must turn has a wealth of possibilities. The study of social psychology from the standpoint of classes of environment has only just begun.

The historical method is a method of wholes; i.e., it approaches the classification and definition of its subject-matter, i.e., individuals and their group products, in an attempt to see both in their respective entirety. At the same time it proposes to account for the

behavior of individuals as responding associated wholes stimulated, urged, and driven into associated reactions which are adjustments to whole environments. This interaction of elements (the whole-individual and whole-environment) is dynamic. It recognizes that what is known at one time as a whole-individual may be something else as a responding (thinking, feeling) whole-individual at another time, though housed in the same body, possessing the same mental powers in general. It is conceivable that there are as many whole-individuals in the personality of John Brown, let us say, as there are permutations and combinations of whole-environmental patterns to stimulate him. Remembering that his human associations are parts of this multiform environment we get some notion of just what John Brown is or may become. It is a different John Brown who takes part in a Fourth of July celebration from the John Brown who goes to a funeral on July fifth. The chief reason for ascribing a given character to John Brown or for being able to predict his behavior under given situations, is that we carry in our minds a multiple picture of him in the presence of such and such situations. These situations obtain rather regularly, although never identically, so that for us as observers, future events stand out as probabilities.

The case is not different when we consider groups. Our John Browns grow into society (rather societies) just as they grow into their bodies. Given a group of humans constantly associated, the individuals become like one another. They seem to display a common spirit or group mind simply because they possess common reaction patterns, and common stimulus patterns. They behave in general very much the same because of their common habits in the presence of common situations. Thus unanalyzed observation is back of the older theories that tribes are primary social organizations; others have looked to the family as the primary group. Members of families are conscious of their relations to each other; so are the members of lodges, churches, and penitentiaries.¹⁰ Those who take a larger view of society speak of national minds. What is really seen is the

¹⁰ Dougherty, G. E., *The Criminal as a Human Being*. Mr. Dougherty has shown that criminals in penitentiaries tend to form into groups according to the type of crime for which they have been convicted, or according to the years they are to serve. The long time servers look upon the short time servers with a certain amount of scorn.

constancy of environmental wholes; it may be due to something native to the group—some purely human trait.

The inadequacies of the methods of the natural sciences are:

1. The cultural products of different groups, while they may be classified in general, assigned the same names, cannot be taken to mean the same for the various groups which support them. Since these cultural products do not mean the same, it follows that the mental characteristics of the several groups under observation in respect to a given cultural product, must be different. The conclusion therefore is that groups possess their own peculiar mental characteristics (behavior patterns).

2. Cultural products bear no constant relations among groups. If this were true the degree of civilization at a given time would be the result of a gradual process of development from lower to higher stages. Some of the older anthropologists held tenaciously to this view. Recent anthropologists can find no evidence for the necessity of a hierarchy of cultural achievements to explain the arrival of groups from one stage of civilization to another.

3. Facts relating to group psychology in the light of cultural products are of a different character than are those facts in the natural sciences which conform to a law of strict association of causal relations. This does not mean that these facts are causeless, but that their causes are too numerous to be analyzed and classified in such manner as to provide for them in consistent formulae or laws.¹¹

THE VALUE OF THE HISTORICAL METHOD

The historical method suggested for the study of social psychology is not immune from objection. It may be urged that the cultural products of a group, representing as they do specific values in the minds of the individuals concerned, lead back ultimately to subjectivism, the very thing that science attempts to evade. A solving of the difficulties associated with the acquisition of knowledge as implied by this objection would lead far afield. It will be sufficient to suggest that the difficulty is not different from that encountered in the study of personalities generally.

¹¹ There is a hierarchy of facts; some have no reach; the scientist who has ascertained them has learned nothing but a fact, and has not become more capable of seeing new facts. Such facts, it seems, come once, but are not destined to reappear." Poincare, H., *The Foundations of Science*, p. 544.

Dennes is perhaps the most ardent supporter of the historical method. Some of his conclusions might lead the advocates of the natural science method to repudiate the historical: "The aim of group psychology must, then, remain 'theoretical,' for any admixture of 'practical' purposes would hinder its fulfillment of the essential requirements of all science, viz., that it be theoretically valid, that it be knowledge."¹²

The contention now to be made is that theory, if valid as such, leads to something more than theoretical knowledge.¹³ Theoretical knowledge of the cultural products of historical groups leads to practical knowledge of the tendencies to social behavior. The cultural product method provides the social psychologist with his first instruments for obtaining reliable knowledge of group life. It is not argued that the natural science method is wrong, but rather that it with the historical must go forward together. At any rate social psychology is a science of the behavior of individuals in the presence of those elements of their environment to which they have come to attach value. An individual (and likewise specific groups) may be depended upon to act (or at least to tend to act) in deference to his or its social and cultural milieus.

In studying the culture of specific groups the investigator is making the same provision for furthering his knowledge of social psychology as an employer does when he makes inquiry of the personality of an individual before he employs him. We may say that in both cases this theoretical knowledge influences social tendencies; it leads to social behavior of definite sorts; it has a practical bearing. There are of course, as we have said from time to time, more limitations to be placed upon cultural products as indicators of group personality, than upon the same cultural products as indices of individual personalities. Groupings are not so unified as the individual.

So far the problem of method has been examined from two very different points of view: the individual as a unit, and the group as a unit. The first point of view in the extreme sees in the individual a relatively bunched, relatively stabilized, whorl of electrons and protons; the second sees in the associated individuals a type of unity

¹² *The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology*, p. 179.

¹³ Cf. Wolf, A., *Essentials of Scientific Method*, Introduction.

which in itself performs as if it were an individual. Group characteristics appear to betray (in cultural products) a spirit quite as distinct, let us say, as that of general attitudes or personalities so often ascribed to individuals; we are to understand that groups possess group personalities. The older notion of a group mind is not identical with it, for those who seek to know the characteristics of a people, or group, are as one with the behaviorist in rejecting metaphysical over-minds. The criticism of the first point of view is that it leads to the same sort of metaphysical assumption, in the interest of methodological rigorousness, as was found to be untenable for the acceptance of group mind theories. Both the group mind psychologists and the individual behavior psychologists use the method of natural science. On the other hand those who prefer to use the so-called historical method are not entirely satisfying. When they tend to limit, as Dennes does, the usage of the historical method on the ground that "the aim of science must be an aim entirely other than the prediction, the reformation, the control, or any other practical manipulation of the course of events in actual societies"¹⁴ it would appear that social psychology is not an exact science; whatever the aims of group psychology may be, rigorous prediction is not one of them. Are we to abandon this ideal? Are we to admit that psychological laws are impossible? Must the data of social psychology resolve itself ultimately into the metaphysics of an electron-proton theory, or a metaphysics of subjective values? Is social life too changeable to be studied? Some such assertion has been made.

ZNANIECKI'S CONTRIBUTION TO METHOD

A somewhat more satisfactory approach to the problem of method in social psychology is found in Znaniecki's *Laws of Social Psychology*. To begin with he looks at the subject-matter of social psychology from what appears to be a mediating position between the two views just considered. He does not try to escape the natural science method, but rather embraces it in combination with the historical. To some this may seem an impossible task. All depends upon the presuppositions one prefers to use in accounting for the most obvious aspect of normal psychical life. This obvious thing is consciousness,

¹⁴ *The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology*, pp. 177-178.

which for all practical, as opposed to metaphysical reasoning, may be defined in terms of experience. Znaniecki therefore uses consciousness, image, memory and all the other orthodox terms, for "the study of organic behavior has proved entirely inefficient in reaching the higher manifestations of culture."¹⁵ When Znaniecki uses, e.g., the term consciousness he is not concerned with discussions of it in general. In thus defining his position he is spared the trouble, to begin with, of attempting to resolve disputations, even though Weiss might charge him with "intimidation of metaphysics;" nor does he need to be concerned with the secondary position which Allport insists consciousness must take beside behavior. Consciousness is not distinguishable from behavior for its "limits are determined in the very course of investigation."¹⁶

The central point of Znaniecki's method of observation is social action. "Social acts are specifically those individual or collective acts whose purpose is to influence human beings, i.e., to modify persons or groups in certain definite ways."¹⁶ Social action is described as a relatively closed system. Social action is not reducible to the simple terms which generally characterize the efforts of those who endeavor to determine the laws of social behavior or social interaction. We have seen that Tarde would go back ultimately to one thing, imitation; Durkheim, to collective representations, after first getting rid of their antecedents; McDougall would confine his ultimates to a limited number of instincts; etc. Znaniecki's intention is to determine some practical starting point in the whole chain of antecedents and consequences, which gives promise of rendering a strict account of social behavior from that point forward.

Simple or complex, the social action is a relatively closed socio-psychological system.

It is closed in the sense that, viewed from the standpoint of the acting subject, it constitutes a definite whole, more or less clearly isolated from the rest of his experiences and activities. The significance of his social act is in his own eyes determined by the response the act aims to provoke: whatever the psychological antecedents of his present activity, the essential points for him at the moment are that he now attempts to achieve something more or less definite, to exercise a certain influence upon a particular human being or collectivity of human beings, and that

¹⁵ *The Laws of Social Psychology*, p. 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

if this attempt is carried to the desired end, he experiences the response as the result purposed by his act. Of course, if he reflects about the origin of his present behavior, he finds that his act is in some way the outcome of some other, his past, activities and experiences; but while he is acting, this past history does not matter to him; it is the present purpose and its achievement that matter.¹⁷

Upon this basis of society as a moving phenomenon of individual tendencies to action—action going on in the sphere of consciousness (though he does not disregard the unconscious) of the individual, he is able to account for the groupings, the behavior, the changes in situations, etc., which are so complicating for social psychology.

For those who are inclined to look at social psychology from the various points of view discussed in the several chapters of this book a combination of methods will commend itself as a practical expedient. We have seen that although the individual is the unit of structure, the unit indeed of all mental processes more or less inter-related, from the lowest to the highest, the physical, social and cultural complexes of environment are not strictly to be set apart. Behavior is relative to these and many other distinctions which can be made concerning the total and persistent possibilities of stimulation and adjustment thereto. At any rate some such point of view is being approached by the several specialists who are working in related branches of science, all of which have something to offer for social psychology as a synthetic science. The new history is going to psychology for explanations; individual psychology is approaching the same thing in its recent work call "Gestalt" psychology; "reconstructive thought" in philosophy is headed in the same direction.

It is perhaps too soon yet to say how or to what extent this new conception of method will affect social psychology. If it helps to bring the present status of social psychology out of chaos, it is valuable; if it has nothing to offer in the way of systematization there is nothing lost, for social psychology has never really found itself either in respect to subject matter or method. This much is apparent: some psychologists have allowed their method to do violence to what appears, from a common sense point of view, to be the subject-matter of social psychology. Weiss can be interpreted in no other way, stimulating as his theories are, consistent as he is notwithstanding.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

A similar complaint may be laid at the door of all extreme behaviorists, although one cannot make specific criticisms of the behaviorists as a whole for their varieties are too numerous. Again it must be assumed that social psychology will include in its aim some provision for prediction of social behavior under typical environmental situations. Some refinement of method consistent with empirical observation from which every science takes its origin is of first importance.

THE STATISTICAL METHOD

The statistical method which owes its formulation to the genius of many men, prominent among whom was Lambert Adolphe Jacques Quetelet (1796-1874) sometimes referred to as its founder, has in the last half century practically revolutionized the social sciences. The fact that the statistical method is now applied to every field of inquiry that endeavors to be exact and objective, warrants the conclusion that it is an important part of the methods already discussed. The truth is, there could be no scientific method in the modern sense without statistics.

The one great achievement of the statistical method is the science of averages, of which there are several varieties. Natural phenomena of every sort in the vegetable, animal and human worlds are found to obey fairly well defined norms of growth, variation and decay. Prediction is reduced thereby to fairly accurate laws. No method has been so influential as statistics in wresting science from speculation, although at times the statistical enthusiasts have been guilty of reading unwarranted generalizations from statistics. As an example of what may seem to some to be one-sided conclusions reached by the statistical method, we may cite Sir F. W. Herschel's declaration (1850) that man is entirely a creature of environment and that if he possesses free-will, it is non-perceptible. The environmentalists discussed in Chapter I, especially Buckle, shared this view completely. A study of the influence of statistics would reveal that many of the theories of social science in general are based upon conclusions drawn from statistical calculations.

At the present time statistical methods are employed in investigating the following social facts:

1. Population facts in regard to quantity, quality and composition
2. Socio-ethical facts
3. Socio-economic facts
4. Socio-political facts
5. Socio-psychological facts:
 Lynchings, revivals, panics, fashions, crazes, booms.
 Constructive coöperative effort.¹⁸

SUMMARY

The following conclusions may be drawn from the discussion of the methods for social psychology:

1. Method and subject-matter are correlated. If it is proposed to consider some method to be used in the investigation of socio-psychological facts, a definition of subject-matter must first be understood.

2. The method of natural science which all pure sciences employ and which social psychology attempts to employ, has two developmental phases: (*a*) experimentation (observation of concrete facts), and (*b*) logical deduction from abstract conceptions. The former leads to the latter, i.e., the formulation of laws (abstract conceptions) follows from controlled and refined observation.

3. The subject-matter of social psychology may be viewed from two standpoints: (*a*) group psychology that considers the behavior (and mentation) of the group as a unit in the presence of its cultural products, and (*b*) the psychology of interaction, i.e., the study of mental processes which individuals (or groups) experience in attempting to influence other individuals (or groups).

4. Looking at the subject-matter of social psychology from the first point of view, the historical method is appropriate. This method corresponds to the experimental or empirical method which was found to be the first step in the formulation of abstract conceptions.

5. Looking at the subject of social psychology from the second point of view, the natural science method employing abstract conceptions is appropriate. In this case the cultural products and all the mentation which individuals or groups display in regard to them cannot be included in the closed system whose determination is a prerequisite to the use of the perfected stage of the natural science method.

¹⁸ For a detailed account of these categories, see Dittmer, C. G., *Introduction to Social Statistics*, pp. 15-16.

6. The classification of subject-matter to correspond with the usability of the two aspects of the natural science method suggests a division of the subject-matter commonly included in social psychology, into two main parts: (a) group psychology and (b) social psychology.

7. The ways for studying the facts of social psychology, viz., anthropological, historical, survey, analogical, philosophical, statistical, or whatever they may be called, are not methods in the strict sense of the term. They are at best useful devices, empirical in nature, discovered at various times by students and used by them and their followers in the interest of refined methods of observation.

8. Methods to follow strict logic, progress from concrete devices to abstract conceptions. Thus the metaphysical conception of subject-matter so often pointed out in the previous chapters, originates in the minds of scientists in their attempts to formulate consistent general laws. The reasons are now apparent for Durkheim's "collective representations," Bergson's "élan vital," Weiss' "electron-proton" assumptions, etc. Metaphysics arises from ways of dealing with facts rather than from the known nature of facts. Subject-matter and method are inseparable in the structuralization of science.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

- DENNES, W. R.: *The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology*, Chap. 8.
 JOAD, C. E. M.: *Mind and Matter*, Chap. 2.
 KANTOR, J. R.: *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29, pp. 674-687.
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 SPYKMAN, N. J.: *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, Book I, Chap. 6.
 THOMAS, W. I.: *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 434-445.
 THURSTONE, L. L.: *Psychological Review*, Vol. 30, pp. 354-369.
 WEISS, A. P.: *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior*, Introduction and Chaps. 1 and 2.
 WILLIAMS, J. M.: *The Foundations of Social Science*, Chap. 24.

CHAPTER XIII

THE LAWS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

A rough distinction between individual and social psychology is now apparent; individual psychology attempts to define the processes of the normal human mind, to show their combinations and to reduce the observed operation of these combinations to law. Social psychology, using and postulating these same processes, attempts to define the social habits and attitudes that originate in them by virtue of group relations, to show their combinations and to reduce the observed operation of these combinations to law. In earlier chapters it was pointed out that the mental processes of both individual and social psychology have been variously conceived. Also we have seen that a variety of methods has been employed in studying them, and that only in recent years have social scientists refined their methods with a view to the fuller discovery, more exact classification and more faithful interpretation of social facts.

The founders of social psychology are in every case the men whose work ultimately contributed to the laws of the science, as accepted today. The problem in the present chapter is to survey these historic attempts at law determination, and from this survey to indicate so far as possible what future attempts having the same purpose may yield. It is admitted that reliable laws for a science of social psychology are as yet undetermined.

FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF NATURAL OR SCIENTIFIC LAW

An understanding of the origin of scientific law requires a consideration of the relation of nature in general to our knowledge of it. A few fundamental points are to be kept in mind:

1. Natural phenomena are not causeless; there is no chaos. What is spoken of as chaos is merely a faulty understanding of some portion of nature. As knowledge is advanced, chaos is diminished.

2. The segmental empirical realities of nature are of different kinds or orders because they appear to us in different ways and with dif-

ferent meanings; for this reason we say that there are different kinds of laws for the different sciences or divisions of knowledge.

3. If all nature were completely investigated and completely known, we could then, and only then, possess a unitary, consistent and rigorous body of scientific laws. This would be a body of laws conforming to the philosophy of monism which the psychological implications of mechanism seek to establish, in contrast with the philosophy of pluralism, which seems to characterize the meaning of experience.

4. Such a body of laws must ever remain an ideal rather than a reality of knowledge, for nature appears as something always changing; this means that all natural laws are laws of change in the sense that knowledge of any segment of nature is never complete; relative knowledge is all we possess.

5. In the case of the social sciences, we are studying a segment of nature that possesses a relatively greater complexity than that of any other. Social science is unique in its relation to so many other sciences. Moreover a part of what is included under the social sciences (as distinguished from the natural sciences for descriptive convenience) is relatively artificial. Man makes his environment as he lives in it.

6. Social psychology as a subdivision of social science in general, attempts to discover the laws that hold for the psycho-social nature of social units. This division of social science has tended in late years to regard the individual as the social unit, whereas in the early stages of this new science, the unit was generally regarded as a group of individuals. At the present time there is no settled agreement as to the implications of this transformation of the meaning of psycho-social units.

The foregoing general propositions are basic for an orientation to the extremely complex science of social psychology. They indicate something more than the mere descriptions that have characterized so many expositions of the subject. Throughout this volume continual reference has been made to the importance of laws for social psychology—it is really the place to begin in a study of the subject. When its laws are discovered, social psychology will be a science; when the nature of social laws is appreciated, the study of social psychology will be facilitated. But it has been necessary in the

present volume to traverse the field of social psychology in the light of the literature we now possess, before considering this the most important of all its aspects.

THE OUTCOME OF DIVISION AND CLASSIFICATION

Science begins with division and classification of phenomena. For centuries men of science have followed the method of segregating for special study some particular set of phenomena. The classification of the world of phenomena has itself been a science. As knowledge is discovered, attempts are continually being made to place it in its proper class. But at times men found knowledge that did not appear to fit into the established classifications. In such cases one of two things happened: (1) the new knowledge was forced into an existing class, or (2) a new class was assumed. Philosophical considerations generally accompanied both of these procedures. There is no escape from philosophy. Those who pretend to ignore it are overlooking the very foundations of science, namely, a full consideration of the place division and classification sustain in reference to the structuralization of the several sciences.

The first classifications of phenomena were of course rather easily established. The world of phenomena was regarded as animate or inanimate. Later it was recognized that the animate could be classed as either organic or inorganic. Again it was recognized that phenomena might be classified according to the means employed in observation. A distinction was made between phenomena that were perceived by the senses and those that were perceived by mental faculties or powers. Such a point of view yielded material and mental worlds. The assumption of a psychic world as distinguishable from a material world gave birth to psychology, variously conceived in its historical development as a science of the soul, a science of the mind, a science of mental processes, a science of consciousness, or as at present the science of mental activity or the science of behavior.

Various forms of coördination of one class with another eventually yielded the following: (1) inanimate, (2) inorganic, (3) organic and (4) psychic. At the present time the existence of a psychic world is hotly disputed. The out and out mechanist would do away with this class, leaving the first three classes only. But it is recognized that there are certain phenomena pertaining to the social life of man

that do not fit readily into these classes. It is urged that there is another class that may be called social. Attempts to classify the social phenomena with the organic have not been successful. At the same time, mental attitudes on the part of individuals and groups of individuals seem to be intimately associated with social life and culture in general. Even if a class called psychic or mental is done away with from the point of view of individual behavior (and it is doubtful if this can be done), it forces itself upon us when we consider individuals in association. The creative evolution of Bergson lends support to what has been recognized as an "emergence" principle. Mere relations seem to be sufficient for the appearance of new or dormant attributes that were in turn responsible at least in part for the character of social units and their resulting behavior. Some have tried to reduce these problems by insisting that we have been shut off from a true science of social psychology by the assumption of group mind theories. They have been called group mind fallacies. While that position has undoubtedly been of great service, there is the question of individual mind fallacies as well. It would appear that one may go to extremes on either point of view. At all events it does seem reasonable to suppose that knowledge of all phenomena may yield to classification as follows: inanimate, inorganic, organic, psychic and social. Moreover there seems to be reason to assume that the psychic and social classes may be coördinated into one class, called psycho-social. Those who would dispute this classification must first point out where individual behavior can be distinguished from social behavior. Throughout this study we could not specifically make such a distinction. Psycho-social phenomena constitute the field of social psychology as it exists today.

The foregoing discussion should be sufficient to indicate the position social psychology holds among the several recognized sciences. Are psycho-social laws possible? An affirmative answer has already been assumed, for the attempts that have been made to establish such laws have not been fruitless.

STATIC LAWS

Auguste Comte was an outstanding early social logician, noted as the philosophical originator of static laws. The term static is not quite correct, for it suggests a rigorousness which, as was seen in

Chapter XII, is more applicable to the natural than to the social sciences. Such laws hold that there is a necessary and unchanging causal relation among the elements of a system. The several variants of the doctrine of association as proposed by the "associationists" are representative of static laws in the domain of individual psychology. In the field of social psychology the writings of Tarde and Ross furnish abundant examples of attempts to establish such laws. The laws of imitation are essentially static laws. The theories of Espinas and Durkheim also comprehend such laws. A few examples will make clear just what is meant in social psychology by static laws. "The result of the daily contact of minds, after many struggles and discussions, is the establishment of a kind of approximate balance of convictions, comparable to the balance of the seas, which does not exclude waves and tides."¹ "In every particular state of the world, those nations which are the strongest tend to prevail over the others; and in certain marked peculiarities the strongest tend to be the best."² "An invention is a potential parent of generations of unborn inventions."³ "Habits of consumption are more stable than habits of production."⁴ What of the integrity of these laws? It has been urged that such relations between the elements of a system are ideal rather than causal. They are ideal relations in the sense that they conform to experience. It is urged that scientific laws possess a quality of rigorousness independent of minds; scientific laws must go beneath appearances and discover the forces that account for the phenomenological appearances even if such appearances are consistently observed. But this qualification can be overworked. As stated before, the aim of science is to raise "common sense reflection to the level of science." Men will never have more than trained common sense with which to work. This trained common sense means refined methods. Even the enthusiasts of the statistical method (the best for many purposes at our command) continually remind us that one must after all know *how* to read his tables of distributions, dispersions and correlations.

¹ Tarde, G., *La Logique Sociale*, p. 74.

² Bagehot, W., *Physics and Politics*, p. 43.

³ Bogardus, E. S., *Essentials of Social Psychology*, p. 167.

⁴ Ross, E. A., *Social Psychology*, p. 262.

The statement of this caution from what might be called the mechanical angle suggests the variability of even static laws as applied to social psychology. There may be a necessary relation between elements of a system, but the cause of the connection may itself be dynamic in character rather than static. A law of change may be involved. This, as has been repeatedly stated, is the nature of all elements in social psychology. In the strict sense there are no static laws for social psychology or for any other sort of psychology. The examples cited may be interpreted as amenable to static and dynamic interpretations.

EMPIRICAL (DYNAMIC) LAWS

In the preceding chapter the argument was advanced that a historical method might be used to assist in the determination of socio-psychological knowledge. Care was taken to show its limits, viz., its application to group psychology (or social psychology if no distinction is to be made between group and social psychology) in reference to the cultural products which groups create and use. It must be admitted to begin with that empirical laws are not natural science laws, but rather that they point to natural science laws. Most sociologists accept empirical laws with less hesitation than do the natural scientists. Empirical laws should perhaps be called dynamic laws merely for the purpose of contrasting them with the uniformities of the static laws.

The difference between the exact historical and the exact scientific inquiry lies in the fact that the first is interested in the individual occurrence and the latter in the law. Both are needed, because the knowledge of a timeless correlation between two elements is not a knowledge of their actual existence. The timeless relation which binds B to A is incapable of determining that A exists. To ascertain that A exists, to ascertain the individual case, which determines through its own qualities what laws apply to it, is the task of history. Science asks for the law, history asks for the specific instance of the law, for the specific case—and not as a means of reaching inductively a knowledge of the law, but as a final goal.

But the historical laws may also be regarded as satisfactory projections of the actuality on a different mental plane. In that case the independent epistemological requirements really demand that the original syntheses and collective structures in which the actuality seems to shape itself shall be treated as unities without further analysis. From the point of view of exact science they are not unities. But as they are then used for the purpose of historical knowledge and not for the purpose of exact knowledge, there is no valid objection. History, then, does not

go down to elements, is not directed toward basic occurrences and individual processes. Its material is different and lies in a different mental plane.⁵

Empirical laws are therefore tentative statements of relations rather than exact statements of causes of relations. For certain types of socio-psychological knowledge they are the best we have. The group mind theories of Lazarus and Steinthal especially comprehend this sort of laws, as do also in a measure all theories of differential social psychology. Professor Dewey is a fairly good example of those philosophers whose theories may be said to include empirical formulation.

In one sense what are here called empirical laws are little more than classifications. Thus when Ross for example tells us that "the holder of power is imitated" there is no necessary connection between the two classes of people—the holder of power and the non-holder of power. There must be plenty of exceptions to this "law" but as an empirical psychological law it may be said to be valid if the exceptions do not outnumber the conformities. But when a causal element is introduced to account for empirical laws, they approach more nearly those rigorous laws that science demands. Some laws of social psychology are of this sort. For example, when McDougall analyzes instincts into their cognitive, conative and affective aspects, he is prepared to say that such a force is capable of a degree of adherence to causal law not specified by the use of the term instinct less strictly defined. So too, when Allport introduces his mechanism of circularity. Psychologists try to avoid empirical laws. This is one reason for the decline of the concept of instinct, for students found themselves in disagreement as to the origin, modifiability and biological worth of instincts.

SOCIAL INTERACTION LAWS

Perhaps the most popular type of law (or rather principle) is that which states the direct affect of one person (or group) upon another person (or group). The sheer simplicity of statement of these principles has commended them to the reading public and uncritical students as well, in spite of the variety of mechanisms proposed by the several supporters. Generally speaking, the mechanisms may be

⁵ Spykman, N. J., *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 68–69.

classed under the captions, suggestion, induction and imitation. Suggestion and imitation are often represented as respectively cause and effect of social interaction. "Crowds are credulous and readily influenced by suggestion."⁶ "A merry face makes us feel brighter; a melancholy face may cast a gloom over a cheerful company; when we witness the painful emotion of others, we experience sympathetic pain; etc."⁷ "Most men mostly imitate what they see, and catch the tone of what they hear, and so a settled type—a persistent character—is formed."⁸ Socio-psychological literature is teeming with such statements, although the mechanisms themselves are variously interpreted by social psychologists. From a logical point of view it should be said that all such principles of social behavior need to be limited in definition to their extension. To a certain extent they are valid; limited they are of course empirical statements of social interaction. The various criteria for social interaction as described in Chapter XI indicate something of the complexity of the psychology of interaction. There it was shown that conscious mental processes are involved to an extent far in excess of that represented by the principles of interaction usually found in the literature of social psychology.

QUANTITATIVE LAWS

The interaction principles just noted are in one sense related to quantitative laws. For example, Ross while holding to the principle of interaction in general, and defining social psychology as a study of "the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association," is careful to state the behavior that takes place in these planes and currents with more scientific exactness. Suggestibility varies, according to Ross, with species of animals, races of men, sex, age, etc. The element of quantity under such and such conditions is introduced—"Crowd conditions facilitate the circulation of feelings, hinder the circulation of ideas."⁹

The quantitative character of laws in the exact sciences has always appealed to social psychologists. We may mention Giddings, Sidis

⁶ Le Bon, *The Crowd*, p. 39.

⁷ McDougall, W., *Social Psychology*, p. 97.

⁸ Bagehot, W., *Physics and Politics*, p. 146.

⁹ *Social Psychology*, p. 61.

and Allport who have emulated the more exact sciences in this respect. "In a crowd the strength of excitement increases in geometrical proportion to the number of individuals present" (qualified).¹⁰ "In the absence of interference, imitation spreads in geometrical progression."¹¹

Sidis¹² has devised a number of ingenious formulae for studying social psychology quantitatively. The following is an example:

$$S_1 : S :: i : d^2$$

Where S_1 is a state of normal suggestibility; S is an abnormal state of suggestibility; d is direct suggestion; i is indirect suggestion.

Stated in words the formula means: "The efficacy of a force of direct suggestion increases faster than the magnitude of advance into the state of abnormal suggestibility."

Giddings' recent work *Scientific Study of Human Society* is devoted almost entirely to the devices for establishing quantitative laws. Statistical methods (devices) have been very popular in recent years. However it is still a question as to how far quantitative methods may be carried. There is a personal equation involved as Dittmer suggests.

What statistics can actually accomplish in its present state of development and what we desire to accomplish through its use are two very different things. At best, the science of statistics is capable of measuring measurable phenomena, of discovering correlations, and other relationships. But to this must be added a large measure of common sense. We might discover, for instance, a direct correlation between the increased consumption of automobiles and the increased amount of divorce, but the mere fact proves nothing. It may be only an accident. Again, we have an amusing illustration of the use of statistics for philosophical purposes, in the publication of Johann Peter Süssmilch, who in 1741 attempted to demonstrate statistically the doctrine of "Natural Order" in a document entitled "Reflections on the Divine Order in the Mutations of the Human Race as Indicated by Its Birth, Death, and Propagation." Noticing an approximate equality in the sexes at the time of marriage, he saw proof of a divine command in favor of monogamy. Noticing also that the death-rate in the city is higher than that in the country he decided that in the cities vice and luxury flourish, bringing down the wrath of God, and decided in favor of the country. Faulty as his methods were, we have here the beginning of the use of statistics for definitely social purposes.¹³

¹⁰ Allport, F. H., *Social Psychology*, p. 301.

¹¹ Quoted from Tarde by Znaniecki, *op. cit.*

¹² *The Psychology of Suggestion*, p. 370.

¹³ *Introduction to Social Statistics*, pp. 9-10.

TELEOLOGICAL LAWS

Following teleological rationalism of the Kantian variety, some social psychologists have expounded principles of social philosophy that account for behavior on the basis of purpose. The individual is free to choose his course of action from a number of possible courses, thereby directing his acts consciously (teleologically). Some of the supporters of the group mind theory entertained such possibilities. In Chapter V, attention was called to Espinas and Durkheim who held theories of reality that ascribed to society the power to know itself; the group mind had a conscience of its own. Giddings' position is a modification of the same theory:

Conscious efforts to achieve visualized ends are made by individuals, by small social groups and sodalities, by societal groups, blocs and classes, and by sovereign states. By each of these agents effort is directed upon itself and upon all agents, namely, individuals, small and large groups, sodalities, blocs, classes, and sovereign states. By each and all it is directed upon conditions deplored but believed to be remediable, which are pervasive throughout society, and upon conditions which it is desired to make pervasive. By each and all it is directed also upon status, which has been created by government but is objected to or is believed for any reason to call for change. This, in bare outline, is the form pattern of societal telesis.¹⁴

In Bobbitt's *Curriculum*, one gets a fair idea of the length to which some writers go in applying theories suggested in social psychology. Bobbitt conceives the problem of civic training in the schools to be "par excellence the development of large-group consciousness."¹⁵ As has been said repeatedly, society possesses no such capacity. This does not mean that Giddings' view may not be correct in part. The principle of social telesis is certainly very limited, and this of course Giddings is careful to make clear. The fallacy of social telesis is that an observer may look back upon social accomplishment, and reason that it is possible for society to direct itself consciously in the achievement of chosen ends. At all events the theory of social telesis does not appear to contribute much to the establishment of social laws. Individual actions, as modern psychology abundantly demonstrates, are predominantly efforts characterized as trial and error. If this is the rule in the case of the individual, it can only be

¹⁴ *Scientific Study of Human Society*, pp. 144-145.

¹⁵ Page 131.

more so in the case of groups that are never as free to direct their behavior as are purely isolated individuals. Of course it sometimes appears that groups purposely choose and direct their behavior, but upon close analysis the force of habit may be clearly apparent. However a select group may envisage telic ends, and carry them to completion. Parliamentary bodies are supposedly telic groups, as are corporations. In a practical sense such groups must be small, and their composition must be of the higher type of intellectualities.

EVOLUTION LAWS

The oldest laws in social psychology are the evolution laws. The cycle theories of the earlier sociologists, although metaphysical in respect to their formulation, are essentially evolution laws. With the coming of Darwin's theories and the subsequent interest in biology, the evolutionary principles took on a different character. Several examples are given in Chapter I of these attempts to apply biological theories to society. In the main, they are historical, although founded in every case on slender evidence, as the quotation from Darwin on page 16 shows. Bergson's philosophy is more satisfying than the reconstructed historical theory of Darwin, provided we grant the former's initial assumption of an "élan vital;" it comes closer to the demands of the methods of natural science since it postulates a force to account for the necessary permanent determining relations between elements. This is the assumption that gives the philosophy of vitalism so much persistence. At the same time it should be pointed out that evolution theories of the Bergsonian variety leave something to be explained. His "élan vital" comprehends a metaphysical basis for original psychic elements. It is held by some that one does not even need to deny the existence of an "élan vital," to run into a fallacy. Admit the "élan vital" and you still must explain the causal relations that hold among the creations of that force. According to Bergson, every creation due to the vital force is essentially new, different, standing alone in the world of phenomena. This assumption has raised the question whether or not psychological laws can in any rigorous sense be determined. This objection however may be overworked. It would appear that the essential freedom in creation which Bergson holds, enables us to understand variation in the round of psychical phenomena, merely limiting

the use of scientific concepts which are logical deductions from the natural science methods of study.

Spencer's principles as hypotheses are still better since he postulates that if certain events happen in the environment, a necessary result will follow—there will be an internal adjustment of the organism thereto.

But all these hypotheses are faulty; they are either frankly meta-physical in all respects, or partly so, or they are derived from the philosophy of history, or finally they are conditional in nature. The recapitulation theory that is the chief among them has already been reviewed from the standpoint of practical psycho-sociology. In any case we cannot escape the fact that all evolution laws are admixtures of philosophy and science; consequently the science of social psychology cannot be constructed in detail from them.

ZNANIECKI'S LAWS

It is possible to turn to one student who has pointed to a relatively definite subject-matter, embraced the method of the natural sciences, and postulated a number of hypothetical laws. His theories are perhaps somewhat faulty in the eyes of many modern psychologists. Much depends upon whether or not a given student is willing to accept the fact that theories of knowledge arising from epistemological considerations have a place in social psychology. The tendency to seek concreteness above every other consideration will lead some to discount his efforts which as such are rather hard to understand. Znaniecki approaches his problem from the viewpoint of modern tendencies in philosophical thought; these tendencies may be regarded as approaching the scientific ideal. It is a mark of true scientific inquiry to challenge, as Znaniecki does, the several objections which have from time to time been raised in respect to the possibilities of ever obtaining laws for mental causation. To his own satisfaction, at least, he arrives at the conclusion that psychological laws are possible. This brief reference to Znaniecki's findings may be supplemented by the following quotation:

Human activities are not all equally original and indetermined: they may be graded on a long scale ranging from the reflex to the realization of moral ideals, from automatic speech to the master-work of a great poet. Even at the lowest grade of this scale, where there is no reflective consciousness of their aims, they do not lose

their psychological character, and do not cease to be free and creative in some degree; it is an obvious mistake to identify the field of spontaneous action with that of conscious reflection about action. But even at the highest grade freedom and creativeness do not entirely preclude the occurrence of determination and repetition. The point is that activity at every level of its cultural development is apt spontaneously to become repeatable and determinable by subordinating itself to definite objective requirements. It becomes automatism when it attaches itself to a certain organic state, personal habit when it connects the performance of certain acts with particular material conditions outside of the body, social custom when it binds itself with rules demanding specific behavior in specific social situations, the realization of a norm when it follows reflectively self-imposed demands of an ideal order—moral, religious, aesthetic, logical. In the measure of its stabilization it becomes the proper subject-matter of psychological laws. On the other hand, in so far as it breaks all restrictions of automatism, habit, custom or norm, and blossoms into unreserved freedom and originality, it escapes all attempts at scientific classification and explanation.¹⁶

THE PROSPECT FOR LAWS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The foregoing classes of laws represent skeletal classifications of attempts to reduce socio-psychological facts to orderly principles of combination. In every case it is found that these principles cannot be rated as laws, for they do not in any case establish universal and necessary connections between facts, which it is the ambition of the method of natural science to ascertain. It is upon the basis of a search for laws that we draw close to an understanding of social psychology as a science. In the end it is found that the science of social psychology is very inchoate.

But from this survey we are in position to look with more confidence to a determination of laws. We need not enlarge upon the necessity of waiting for more investigation; that is obvious. It is possible to use the beginnings that have been made and to interpret them as natural steps in the evolution of a growing science.

The laws of social psychology, however they may be determined, will first of all give some logical and experimentally valid statement of the predictable behavior of human beings in the presence of their human environment. The behavior of human beings in the presence of such an environment must in every case be interpreted in the light of experiences which they have with one another, as well as in the light of their experiences with relatively non-human environments.

¹⁶ *The Laws of Social Psychology*, pp. 4-5.

In all probability, there will always be some difficulty connected with determining the respective importance of the several environments which motivate or direct behavior. Undoubtedly some headway in this particular may be made through a differential study of social situations. Empirical observation shows that an individual may in a given situation act in deference to persons rather than institutions, customs, beliefs and the like, while in another situation he may ignore his human associates in the interest of satisfying relations with his accepted institutions and beliefs. Looking at the problem from the point of view of the native reaction patterns of the individual, as a social unit, it seems clear that such reaction patterns are not so important as acquired reaction patterns, all of which implies that social psychology will make as much use of social (environmental) stimulus patterns as of individual reaction patterns in determining the laws of behavior.

The laws of the social psychology of the future will then be laws of human action as directed by human thinking.¹⁷ Both the acting (behaving) and the thinking may be studied as reaction patterns that originate in the course of adjustment to stimulus patterns, and which by virtue of the latter's repeated presentation, contribute to the formation of habits. The primordial consideration in such a discovery of laws will be that of habit determination, formation, utilization and change. The study of native tendencies will take a minor position as theoretical determinants of action, while all metaphysical conceptions of causes of action will be discarded at the very outset.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS.

- BERNARD, L. L.: *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. 24.
GUMPLOWICZ, L.: *The Outlines of Sociology*, Part II.
MACIVER, R. M.: *Community*, Chap. I.
MILL, JNO. STUART: *A System of Logic*, Book 6; Chap. 5.
RITCHIE, A. D.: *Scientific Method*, Chaps. 2 and 3.
STRATTON, G. M.: *Experimental Psychology*, Chap. 15.
ZNANIECKI, F.: *The Laws of Social Psychology*, Chap. I.

¹⁷ The term thinking is used here in a loose sense, in order to provide for a consideration of all those mental processes which it is the task of individual psychology to explain.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Science deals with facts. The methods of science consist in the observation, classification and explanation of phenomena for the purpose of formulation of laws. These laws are used for the purposes of prediction when facts are found in novel relations. The important part of the work of science is concerned with the establishment of working hypotheses, even though these hypotheses are in time discarded. Hypotheses assist observers in relating facts and defining problems for experiment. Science in general advances in this manner.

There is some question as to the right of social psychology to claim a place with the settled sciences. Whether or not social psychology is now or may become a science in the accepted sense of that term, depends upon its satisfaction of the criteria of science just stated. It is a matter of some importance to put social psychology to the test. Does social psychology deal with facts? If so, what are these facts? How are they classified? What laws, if any, obtain for classified psycho-social facts in causal relations? What predictions can be made for novel fact combinations? Throughout this study many examples were cited which indicate that social psychology has not fully measured up to the requirements of a science, although in very recent years it would seem that considerable headway has been made. It is the purpose of the present chapter to bring the discussions of the previous chapters before the reader in summarized form.

In the first place, the vast literature on the subject of social psychology reveals anything but an agreement as to the true nature of social units and the conditions that affect them. These units, whatever they are, constitute the primary fact-bearers of the science in question. The derivation of laws and their final usages for prediction await some clarification of the concept of social units. The units of any society may in the first instance be identified with the

individuals that compose it. The facts of social behavior grow out of the various relations which this extremely complex individual sustains to a no less complex environment. The facts of social behavior are therefore derived from two general sources: the make-up of the individual, native and acquired, and the character of the external environment within which the individual lives. While we have divided the sources of social behavior into two general classes, the individual and environment, it must not be supposed that this classification may be taken to mean that either source may be separated at any time from the other. No individual has existed without an environment. No environment has meaning for social psychology without reference to individuals.

In a second sense, the unit of social behavior is a historical group. Groups of people living in a relatively homogeneous environment come to attach certain values to the cultural products that are indigenous to that environment. The individuals may be regarded as possessing a common set of habits, attitudes, or dispositions in relation to aspects of environment; these commonly shared mental processes and contents appear as a unitary whole. They give rise to a corresponding type of behavior peculiar to the group. Observations relating to this class of facts, take form in accordance with those presuppositions embraced in a variety of group mind theories.

This dual way of looking at social units amounts to two divisions of observable phenomena, but in social psychology at the present time, they have not been clearly differentiated. The situation at once suggests two discrete sciences--social psychology and group psychology. Social psychology would therefore be taken to mean that science which accounts for behavior due to interaction among individuals, while group psychology would account for behavior due to individual attitudes and practices in the presence of many forms of culture. If these two types of behavior can be sufficiently differentiated, and studied as differentials, the many categories of action and reflection comprehended in treatises of social psychology, will undergo more rigorous classification and definition. It is probable that all attempts to segregate social facts, and to mark off the boundaries of these facts in the interest of determined branches of social science, are for some merely academic questions. As such, they are removed

to the realm of interesting in contradistinction to practical considerations.¹

A second conclusion is that two methods for treating these data will one day be employed. The conclusions now drawn from what appears to be the logical situation in regard to social units, are basic for the contention that social psychology is still in the making. Our summary must now proceed with a more detailed review of the propositions so far advanced.

The first crude scale for the assortment of social facts presented the picture of an individual continually responding to forces internal and external to him. Since it is apparent that a metaphysical spirit cannot be evoked, nor yet a group of strictly definable native tendencies to account for the behavior of an individual in the presence of the many aspects of environment, it becomes necessary to seek some plausible basis for this behavior. What are the obvious structural facts of the first named unit of social behavior, the individual?

To begin with, the individual possesses a nervous system which is characterized by what may be called irritability, registerability and recollectability. Of these three salient characteristics of the nervous system, the last possesses a peculiar potentiality that is called memory, and which as a functional capacity is describable in terms of ability to profit by past experiences. This profiting by past experience is made possible through and on account of still other psychological processes known as imagery, attention, and habituation. At the same time an individual may or may not be aware of the operation of these processes since much of what goes on may be described in terms of the unconscious. The unconscious is not however a special capacity or faculty but rather a zero degree of awareness which results from a progressive extension of marginal states of attention and its derivatives. Past experiences make up the memorial content of an aware or unaware individual. There is a continual stream of images which in themselves account for consciousness of whatever degree of vividness. Stimuli from all sources are not completely understood by an individual at all times. Nor are all these stimuli recurrent in sufficiently identical patterns to create fixed habits of response. Only those that occur regularly are

¹ See especially Bernard, L. L., *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 21ff.

reduced to habits. Higher mental processes fill out the requirements for regularity which ordered forms of interpretation and response demand. The functioning of imagination, as an individual mental process, and admittedly a composition of several other mental processes, gives substantiality and order to novel surroundings. Each individual behaves in a real environment, an environment reduced to a relatively complete understanding, and also a fanciful environment, a creation of imagination which functions as real environment not yet reduced to order. The terms actual and virtual as applied to environmental situations appeared helpful in this connection.

We may say then that the capacity to imagine is a functional possibility for meaning, values, etc. This imaginal endowment is co-extensive with the sensory endowment of the individual and tends to become organized around the biologically useful, or the most often repeated combinations of stimulations from environment. The mind of an individual tends to function as patterns neurally established and giving rise to what may be termed a tendency to select, order and react accordingly. In short it may be said that in the last analysis an individual may be described as a bundle of habits. Habits are not only adjustmental patterns in a behavioristic sense, but also the axis of mental structures which satisfy the individual's grasping for complete order.

The whole burden of psychology as a science has been that of attempting to give a connected and consistent account of the individual. In the earlier stages of psychology, these attempts, as often as not, sought to explain him in terms of his social nature as an *a priori* synthesis. Hence metaphysical assumptions. That these metaphysical assumptions will be dispersed, is a matter that scientific methods may be depended upon to consummate.

Psychology, however, in the course of its development, could not breach the gap between hypotheses and classified knowledge at one leap. The history of psychology as it is today, is a history of schools, each in turn discrediting its forerunners and claiming the prospect of finality for its own particular methods and assumptions. The result is a "crisis," which for some is to be interpreted as a need for an entirely new venture. Watson prefaces his epoch-making study by asserting that he can dispense with a number of traditional terms, e.g., sensation, perception, attention, will and image. He admits

that he does not know what they mean; furthermore he is not convinced that anyone else may employ them consistently, although he admits that they are reputable terms. So wherever he uses these and other traditional terms a re-definition is implied. Another example is Allport² with his individualistic-behavioristic-mechanistic approach to social psychology. It is not too much to say that he has made a contribution of the highest import. The importance of Allport's position may at once be recognized when it is recalled that the multi-focal personality of an individual is stimulated by social stimulus patterns far more frequently than by any other sort. Taking Watson³ and Allport together, we have a joint statement more nearly approaching a complete account of the objectively responding individual, than any other combination of students we might choose for appraisal purposes. But at the same time this contribution must be weighed in the light of what was not done prior to them rather than what may now be expected of them.

Has behaviorism given the key to social science? Will it allay the crisis that it has in large measure assisted in bringing about? These questions suggest that behaviorism like every other "ism" tends to run to extremes. By this, it is to be understood that the method that is sufficient for one class of subject-matter may not be for another; here reference is made to two aspects of individuality—the objective and subjective—and the two corresponding ways of studying individuality. In the first place, Watson's work is distinctive for what it negates. He carries his discarding process to unwarrantable lengths. How can psychology discard consciousness as something meaningless? There would be a fatal outcome, a crisis indeed for social psychology, if such terms were discarded.⁴ While a strictly objective method of studying psychology is valuable and should in the interest of science be carried as far as possible, there appears to

² *Social Psychology*.

³ *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*.

⁴ The reader should not get the notion that because Watson and other strict behaviorists dispense with consciousness and other orthodox psychological terms, they do not believe that we possess the attribute referred to as consciousness. The claim that the behaviorists make is that they are able to give a better account of psychical phenomena without such assumption as consciousness. For behaviorism, consciousness merely coalesces with the physiological components which they find to be the essential attributes of all behavior.

be a limit beyond which this method becomes useless; subjective or introspective methods must also be used.

The behaviorists have taken their cue from natural science. In so doing they have limited the field of investigation so that psychology may now reorient itself by new principles. This is the big contribution of the behaviorists. The only psychologists who feel the effect of this discarding are those who have had their presuppositions destroyed. Yet in leading the way to the destruction of pernicious presuppositions, the behaviorists have gone too far; they have robbed themselves of their tools for the extenuation of the methods they now employ. Consciousness is a fact. It must be reinstated to its rightful sphere—psychology, for it has a function in the domain of social psychology. While it is conceivable that individual psychology may dispense with the term as meaningless, it is inconceivable that the method of the strictest behaviorism⁵ (as now applied to the individual) can be taken as the explanatory principle for social psychology. Boodin gives a good statement of the relation of behaviorism to social psychology:

The study of individual behaviour in the abstract does not require the concept of mind. Individual psychology is an unreal abstraction. We can, it is true, study the human individual as a system of indicative signs or implied meanings, just as we study geological strata or the life of plants. But this is behaviour as the physiologist studies it and should be called what it is, viz., physiology. The issue has been confused by the fact that psychology in the past has followed no consistent principle of explanation. When it has dealt with the more elementary processes of habit, emotion, and sense perception, it has leaned on physiology, or pretended to do so. When, on the other hand, it has dealt with the more complex processes, such as the sentiments, thinking, and will, it has fallen back on social psychology. It has, as a matter of fact, started with the adult behaviour of the psychologist as differentiated, integrated and stereotyped through social relations, but has abstracted from those relations. Instead of treating of the individual with the matrix of social relations, under the control of which he acquires his habits, attitudes, and perspectives, it has made him an abstract entity. It has forgotten that the world as it exists for the psychologist, with its things, qualities, and relations, its values and attitudes, its play of free ideas and its organized will, is the product of social communication and interaction, made possible by a highly evolved language and tradition. The physiologist, who starts with the simple reflex of the nervous system and follows this through more complex levels of selection, integration, and

⁵ The Watsonian type. For the various types of Behaviorism, see Roback, A. A., *Behaviorism and Psychology*.

control, is at any rate consistent in his explanation. In the most complex behaviour of the organism he sees the play of ever more complex mechanical causes. And though these may not furnish the sufficient reason of the behaviour, they are at any rate an index to behaviour, and make a consistent story. It is assumed that the organic mechanism in its entirety—neural, chemical, physical—would indicate all the various complexities of behaviour, could we follow it, which we cannot. At any rate, it is all we have so long as we deal with the individual organism in the abstract.⁶

In the case of the functional aspects of environment, a similar ordering of the facts of stimulation enforces the conclusion that they in turn tend to present themselves to the functioning nervous system of the individual in terms of patterns. A gross classification of environmental patterns means giving the names of the different typical environments to which the individual is continually subjected and from which there is no escape. They become the stimulus patterns which provoke the responses responsible for what is ordinarily called the behavior of the individual. Individual behavior is therefore first and last a matter solely of stimulus and response. The selecting and organizing function of attention gives rise to groups of associated responses. The mere chance occurrences of naturally associated stimuli appear to the individual and are interpreted by him in combinations or patterns. Individual psychology may therefore be regarded as an account of the functional relations of individual reaction patterns evoked by appropriate stimulus patterns.

DYNAMIC VS. STATIC SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Practically all of the discussions in the previous chapters indicate that social psychology is now being conceived in dynamic rather than static terms. This changing conception of the possibility of society is due in large measure to the diverse philosophies of evolution, some of which antedate Darwin. The contrast between static and dynamic psychology was briefly indicated in Chapter II and at greater length in Chapters III and IV.

For the most part the early conception of instincts betrayed the staticism which a supposedly unchanging body of innate tendencies promised for the construction of a social theory. Scientific constructs in general tend to be so expressed that they convey the idea of finality

⁶ *Cosmic Evolution*, pp. 161-162.

whether the authors of such constructs intended so or otherwise. Thus from some time before the present century until what may be called the present time, the conception of instincts underwent a remarkable change; whereas before they were blind, they are now considered only relatively so by the most conservative thinkers; by the more progressive (even if less accurate) thinkers, instincts are conceived as mental processes quite as variable as habits, if indeed instinct and habit are not one and the same thing.

The search for some one type of mental process or element which may be found to remain constant must be given up. A more dynamic conception of method led Watson to investigate at first hand the behavior of children before they might be subjected to the learning process, and as a result a newer and better genetic psychology appeared. So too the psychoanalytic school regardless of its occasional faulty conclusions pointed the way to more perfect geneticism. The farther these research methods are carried, the more apparent it becomes that practically the only discoverable unlearned common reaction patterns are the reflexes that control respiration, circulation, nutrition and such fundamental functions as are associated with general bodily movements. Such reactions are so devoid of any rational cognitive control that it is naturally impossible to assume that they alone afford a basis for the variety of movements known in ordinary social behavior.

Upon the basis of such discoveries it became evident that there is nothing upon which to base a theory of an over mind or social consciousness. The doctrine that a person in the presence of an aggregate or group behaves differently because of the presence of a super-individual mind possessing characteristic processes belonging thereto, had to be abandoned. In place of such a static conception of the group mind it is possible to account for group spirit, social consciousness, etc., in terms of common mental contents, common habits, and common attitudes, which represent reaction patterns appropriately responding to certain stimulus patterns. These are never the same for all the people for all times, although there is enough constancy in them to insure them a place in socio-psychological investigation and knowledge. Being habits generally, they do not partake of the nature of interpersonal behavior, so that it seems they are sufficiently different from other forms of interaction to assign them a separate

place in the world of observable phenomena. Hence group psychology as distinguished from social psychology.

But the important thing about all this change from staticism to dynamicism, and one not readily grasped by the beginning student or even stressed by some writers, is the fact that methods for studying socio-psychological facts must follow a similar course. Chapters XII and XIII deal with this question.

The dynamic aspect of social psychology is due to the dynamic nature of human beings. Human nature seems to defy law; variation seems to be the descriptive term.

By static psychology we are to understand that the science of psychology has in the past been limited to a system of terminology which actually turns out to be an impediment to progress. Dynamic psychology has not as yet been completely discovered; we can discuss it merely as a principle which holds the key to future observation. Accordingly the present treatment of this theme must be looked upon as a mere fragment of what is yet to be known, and what is just as important, how this knowing is to be interpreted. There is in all of it some adherence to the old instinct philosophy, betrayed by such terms as submission and conflict. On the other hand the terms conservation, repression and mobilization suggest certain active environmental features of social becoming. All these terms might properly be called mechanisms through whose operation society comes into being, or again changes the status it acquires from time to time.⁷ Such conceptions are vastly more pregnant than Hegel's "Begriff," Tarde's "universal imitation," or Durkheim's "purely collective representations." Society ought to be known as something that creates, as well as something created.

A similar tergiversation is met in the case of those earlier theories from the domain of anthropology; the idea that civilizations passed through a definite order in a series of evolutionary developments is entirely overthrown, while the notion that racial traits of a psychological nature tend to perservere, is fast losing substantiality. There is reason also to believe that the notion of primary in contrast with secondary groupings or organizations of society is not so solidly established in social theory as it once was. On turning to any basic

⁷ See especially the studies by Znaniecki and Simmel, already cited.

assumption, it is evident that the subject-matter of social science is now being regarded as something moving, something dynamic, in contrast with earlier conceptions static in nature.

Dynamic conceptions of social psychology throw a flood of light upon the various aspects of society as they are actually at work in our everyday world. While the academician is concerned with science, *qua* science, the man of practical turn of mind, interested in social affairs as they find expression in politics, industry and trade, seeks to explain but more often to predict social behavior from observations less minutely analyzed. Much of the literature pertaining to social psychology is of this very nature. There is a good deal of wasted energy on the part of public-spirited organizations, that seek to transform or remodel human social destinies on the basis of generalities deduced from such observations.

The psychology of social becoming (change) is therefore a subject to which many writers have devoted a great deal of attention. Le Bon contends that the masses are not to be depended upon to initiate changes that require the utilization of reason.⁸ Others suppose that society is a coherent organization similar to the organization of the parts of an animal, and from this they reason that social changes may be explained on the basis of the mutation theory as championed by the biologist De Vries. This view holds that social change is not gradual but spasmodic. Korzybski⁹ thinks that these "jumps" can be explained by what takes place prior to revolutions, insurrections and wars. Dewey has recently expressed the view that after all changes are not so dramatic: "Men cannot easily throw off their old habits of thinking, and never can throw off all of them at once."¹⁰ Smith¹¹ supposes that social change is due to the conflicting purposes of groups which first grew out of the conflicting interests of individuals. His is a philosophy of struggle both among individuals and groups acting as social units. Smith is a good representative of those who have taken their meaning of social psychology from the lessons of the late World War.

⁸ J. H. Robinson, as historian, has recently emphasized this point of view.

⁹ *Manhood of Humanity*, p. 22.

¹⁰ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 75.

¹¹ *The Collective Mind*.

Wood¹² finds everywhere in nature a struggle which in all its aspects is a manifestation of the warlike nature of man. Intelligence and will are the attributes of this warlike spirit or instinct. It would appear that we have no will except through intelligence, and as the latter develops the former becomes more active and important as a factor conditioning social progress.

This struggle is shown in man's attempt to conquer the various elements in his environment. He replaces the variegated face of nature with his standardized human structures of every kind. It would seem that man tries the mathematical formulae of exactness and minutiae of geometrical relations. In every department of a man-made world we see this scheme of exact formulae taking possession of human achievement and directing it. As time goes on we may expect this to assume almost, if not entirely, a deadening level whereupon nothing but standardization will be the descriptive term.

But among the various elements of human environment, there are none so powerful, so problematic, so insistent, so potent for future considerations, as man himself. We may postulate that we live in a world that is changing its aspects so far as the dominance of given environments is concerned. The whole course of human history may be characterized as the picture of man struggling along with his environment without at any given time a very clear picture of where he is going. His successive attempts to adjust himself may at best be regarded as temporary expedencies or makeshifts. Man is short sighted—he can see only the near and obvious.

The forms of government which he has from time to time devised to control his interrelations, i.e., his social environment, are mere expedencies which are supposed to offer an immediate way out of the difficulties which man to man relations present. Democracy therefore must not be regarded as the finished product in a scheme which has promise of perfect adjustment. The mental make-up of man must ultimately be regarded as a natural thing, and as such it presents the original picture of nature's variation. We are neither slaves to instincts, nor guardians of reason. Instinct and intelligence are not so powerful in influencing social behavior as some sociologists assume. Instinct and reason in a very important sense belong to-

¹² *Democracy and the Will to Power.*

gether. They cannot be separated. The one conditions the other, and at the same time they are both plastic and yielding enough to defy strict delineations of the forms they may take.

The will to power is also a mobile force. We see its success in the world of government as something always striving, always yielding, sometimes defeated temporarily as it blunders along toward its unseen goal. No superior group can hope for an indefinite tenure of life, although a superior group may and does represent the survival of the strong. Just as man, superior to material and animal environment, made them obey his will, so the weak willed and inferior elements in the social mass are to be regarded always as the subjects of the superior minds which on the whole govern society.

Standardization is the direction and all-pervading trait of democracy. Standardization is not nature's method. Democracy says that "all men are created equal." It is an easy deduction from the assumption, that we were created in some mysterious fashion by a supermundane power. But man is a part of nature, a creation of natural forces. Being natural in every respect, he must have the stamp of nature upon his mind as well as on his body. This stamp is always variation. Nothing has done so much in recent years to dethrone the idea of mental equality as the application of psychological tests. They show marvelous differences in minds. Differences of so much variation in type and amounts have been discovered as to discourage the testers in hopes of finality. They find that even the best measuring sticks call for reservation of judgment, so variegated is natural man and his mind. Here is where Kellogg¹³ gets his optimism. He thinks that the many types of mind preclude the possibility of a form of government such as that of Russia. Communism which is only democracy strictly applied is another word for mental equality assumed and applied.

HUMANISM AND THE SCIENCE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The period in which we live is characterized by an unusual interest in science, on the part of the layman and the scientist alike. It would appear that the past twenty-five years have been a period during which a new humanism has developed. This humanism is concerned

¹³ *Instinct and Heredity.*

chiefly with social life and the various ways in which it is conditioned by the individual's psychical make-up. We see this humanism groping for more efficient adjustments in matters pertaining to pedagogy, criminology, religion, jurisprudence, literature, art, domestic relations, public hygiene, industrial welfare, practical politics, and international affairs. The whole of science is called upon to submit its findings, while each special branch of science is encouraged to push its way into the unknown in order to illumine the dark paths of this groping humanism. It is not difficult to designate that branch of science which serves as the nucleus of the program. The opinion expressed by Comte to the effect that sociology should be the crown of all the sciences, is not without foundation.

The present popular interest in social psychology is something real, although the notions that this interest begets and disseminates comprehend a host of false presuppositions. The problems of this newer humanism must in the end be solved by the sober scientist. Throughout the several chapters of this book an attempt has been made to present the major qualifications of such a science. These qualifications are of course the same for all branches of science. The thing of prime importance is to start with facts instead of metaphysics. There will of course come a time when the scientist in the interest of a rigorous structuralization of his science, may no longer confine himself to the mere observation of empirical facts and events. As he pushes his inquiries further and further back to ultimate causes, he is forced to regress from the descriptive to the interpretative stages of his work. He is then scientist turned metaphysician. But this is a very different procedure from that of starting with metaphysical presuppositions and thereafter working towards description. The difficulties involved in interpretation (the point from which philosophy and metaphysics take origin) come in time to create a body of uncorrelated assumptions which lead to confusion in any given branch of science. This situation is particularly true in the case of social psychology which is unique for the reason that it has many origins.

In the preface to his *Grammar of Science*, Karl Pearson observes: "There are periods in the growth of science when it is well to turn our attention from its imposing superstructure and to carefully examine its foundations." Applying this advice to present-day psychology, Kantor similarly prefaces his admirable two volumes (*Principles of*

Psychology). The import of the literature of social psychology in recent years betrays the same search for foundations. Social psychology, it would seem, is just on the eve of critically examining its basic principles. The task is a difficult one indeed, and must necessarily await the establishment of the foundations of individual psychology, biology, and anthropology. At the same time refined methods for study will yield more reliable foundations from the field of sociology. Meanwhile social psychology may profitably continue the work already begun, namely, that of establishing a body of explanation for psycho-social phenomena viewed in the light of those branches of science from which it is derived.

The admitted lack of scientific rigor and definite organization of the categories of social psychology is due to its youth. Every science as it seeks to contribute to the needs of men must first be regarded as founded in those needs. As it seeks to find reliability for its offerings, it must perforce resort to the method of experimentation, and in so doing it must acquire, analyze, and classify facts. Then such a science may attempt to formulate its laws, which in turn afford a basis for the prediction and control of social events.

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Sans Tache



Sans Tache

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